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INTRODUCTION 
It is in the perspective of international balance of power, preserved 
precariously by the studious non-use of nuclear weapons that forms the 
backdrop of the present work. The material presented in the following pages 
deal with a wide range of issues concerning the power politics of states 
possessing nuclear weapons and the way non-nuclear weapon states are 
prevented from acquiring nuclear technology even for peaceful purposes. 
The study covers such relevant aspects as, the unending efforts of the United 
Nations to create a world free of nuclear weapons, through its agencies and 
agreements, notably; International Atomic Energy Commission (lAEC); the 
provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, NPT and such other 
efforts. Attempt has also been made to find out the factors for India's 
response to the CTBT; and the problem of nuclear weapons falling into 
wrong hands specially the so-called 'rogue' states. 
The compilation draws from wide range of sources, both Indian and 
foreign, with the intention that it will be of much use and interest to all those 
interested in the dynamics and politics of nuclear weapons, students and 
researchers, political analysts and journalists. 
The most talked about and pressing problem of today, undoubtedly, is 
to find a solution to the unending arms race by adopting measures for 
disarmament and arms control. The problem becomes even more difficult to 
solve when nations, which very well realise the gravity of the situation, 
which may culminate in the extinction of mankind. 
An analysis of the world's nuclear arsenal clearly indicates the sure 
destruction and extinction of mankind from the face of the earth, if we ever 
have a third world war. Survival of all living organisms rest on man's 
success or failure in achieving genuine disarmament and ending arms race. 
It is becoming clearer by the day that the destinies of nations of the world 
depend on how far nuclear weapons are in the hands of responsible control 
mechanisms controlled by responsible and how they conduct among 
themselves and with other countries. 
VThis study is primarily aimed at India's policy towards arms control 
and disarmament measures particularly, to the CTBT in the purview of its 
regional constraints and economic sanctions pursued by nuclear haves on 
those considered to be havenots. No nation or individual can claim 
immunity or afford the luxur}' of laziness to the problems created by arms 
race. In a world floating in the constant fear of an outbreak of nuclear war, 
that too with some nations having already dropped bombs on cities forcing 
surrender by enemy forces. In the community of nations, some want to 
dominate others by using instruments of spying and inspections and 
producing false evidences to find reason to interfere in the internal affairs by 
military aggression, where nations want to become guardians of other 
nations by providing protection, peace and harmony. It is in this context, the 
compilation is made. 
The study consists of four chapters, tackling the problem in some 
detail, not only India's stand on the issue but also the original problem itself 
s/the first chapter aims at studying closely the problem of arms control and 
disarmament, its history and origin in particular. References are made of the 
rise in the use of nuclear weapons to threaten, their proliferation and their 
implications for the geopolitical setup especially, of Indian subcontinent. 
Reference is also made of the issue by providing some informative data on 
the geostrategic and domestic constraints. 
The second chapter deals with South Asian crisis, which is related to 
ethnic conflicts, secessionist movements, territorial disputes among 
countries including their domestic problems. It also describes India's 
prominent position in South Asia and its pursuit of bilateral and regional 
cooperation. 
The third chapter deals with determinants of India's nuclear policy 
and the extra-regional involvements in the nuclearization of South Asia and 
the bilateral and multilateral agreements in this field. 
The fourth and the last chapter considers in considerable detail the 
efforts made by the United Nations and its members in order to achieve the 
goal of complete disarmament. It also mentions the Indian contribution and 
arguments advanced in achieving genuine disarmament goals, its policy 
regarding the measures adopted for disarmament and arms control in various 
international forums, and also India's efforts in the field on bilateral basis. It 
also highlights some regional as well as global problems in reaching any 
general concensus on the issue. 
Lastly the study contains the concluding remarks, an analysis of 
problems of disarmament and India's role in attempts in that direction and 
her attitude towards global superpowers as well as regional nuclear tigers, 
their policies and designs within the framework of international nuclear 
scenario. India's policy perspectives and position is also mentioned in the 
conclusion. 
At the end of this work, an Appendix has been provided of CTBT 
draft treaty, important from the point of view of the subject of the study. It 
does not mean that other treaties are less important or are of little 
significance, but due to lack of space other texts have been excluded. 
Chapter - 1 
INDIA AND THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION 
Disarmament and Evolution of CTBT 
Efforts to control arms and armaments are not new in the field of 
international relations. Ever since the dawn of history man has been 
producing armaments to protect himself from attack, either of the animals or 
his fellow human beings. The arms race has become, perhaps it has been for 
hundred years, the most important fact in men's affairs. It is itself the 
strangest paradox in history. 
Human beings have always depended on the use of physical coercion 
or threat, to influence the behaviour of their groups. The size of these groups 
has largely depended on the destructiveness of the tools possessed by these 
groups. Slowly but gradually, in this century the controlling group has come 
to be called as nation-state and possesses the tools that include nuclear arms, 
missiles of all types and chemical weapons. The controlling groups are now 
preparing themselves to engage in wars even in the outerspace. Another 
ancient phenomenon which continues even now is that there have always 
been efforts to reduce or eliminate these armaments of mass destruction. 
The Old Testament speaks of "engines invented by cunning men to 
shoot arrows and great stones". In New Testament days, the Romans had 
catapults, chariots, swords, spears, shields and helmets; gunpowder, 
invented by the Chinese was first known in Europe^ in the early fourteenth 
century. After 500 years, it had much improved the catapult artillery of the 
Romans. There were more guns that the Romans had; they had larger 
charges and longer range; they were used, not in sieges only, but in the open 
field too. Gunpowder gave infantry the rifle, cavalry, the carbine and the 
pistol. Daggers were turned into bayonets in the seventeenth century. 
However, these were only minor changes. 
The success of Krupp's steel guns in the Franco-Prussian War started 
a revolution in the armaments of land forces. This continued without 
intermission until the outbreak of the 1914 war.^ 
During this period there was an equally active competition in naval 
armaments. Beginning from 1884, not only was the number of warships 
much increased, but also their size and speed, the calibre and range of their 
guns, their protective belts of armour plate. The submarine was introduced, 
and was sold by Sir Basil Zaharoff in quick succession, first to Greece and 
then to Turkey; the larger navies soon took it up. In the years immediately 
preceding the 1914 war, both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente 
expanded their fleets as swiftly as they could; dreadnoughts, super-
dreadnoughts, cruisers, destroyers and submarines increased in power and 
numbers. 
The 1914 war brought further big improvements in the weapons with 
which it began. It also led to new weapons and methods of war fighting: 
fighter aircraft, which did artillery spotting, reconnaissance, and close 
support for the infantry; embryo bombers; tanks; many varieties of poison 
gas; flame-throwers; trench mortars; the artillery, barrage; and many more; 
it enormously multiplied the number of machine-guns, mortars, light and 
heavy field artillery with which each division was equipped. 
These weapons greatly added to the terrors and hardships of the 
figlitiiig men, and, at sea and in the land-battle zones, of civilians as well.^ 
After the First World War, the competitive improvement in the 
quality of weapons continued without a break. It was still with the weapons 
of the 1914 war that the 1939 war began. Besides the development of the 
war of 1914-19 weapons, the 1939 war also brought the introduction of new 
weapons of many kinds. The scientists were called in to help in great 
numbers. They were given great resources; and they produced astonishing 
results."* Hitler made the first beginning in a new kind of war. Finally, in 
1945, came the first atomic bomb. 
No less striking was the fact that when the war was over these 
methods of warfare were accepted as normal and conventional by all 
governments and staffs. The "established rules of International Law" have 
perished in the flames of war. 
Since 1945 the scientists have been given far greater resources than 
they ever had, even during the 1939 war. In the consequence, there has been 
a development of weapons, which makes the achievements even of that war 
pale into insignificance. It has not been confined to Russia and the United 
States, as is sometimes believed.^ Other nations too have been striving to 
develop new weapons and to improve the weapons that already exist. The 
arms race was a major factor in the causation of the 1914 war. The failure of 
the Disarmament Conference in 1933 was the turning point at which Hitler's 
war began. Unless governments are able to make any general treaty now, the 
arms race will go on, with very dire consequences. Every year the race goes 
on with greater vigour, the danger that it brings grows more acute that might 
take the world to the final catastrophe. Any lethargy in disarmament efforts 
could prove fatal. 
Athens and Sparta argued over Athen's decision to extend its walls, 
purely defensive in nature.^ Sparta saw the walls as offensive. Efforts to 
negotiate failed, and Peloponnesian war resulted. 
Modem efforts to control arms and armaments are generally traced to 
the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907.' Both conferences are said to be 
well meaning efforts but complicated by military realities and uncertainties. 
The question of disarmament in the form of restriction, on the use of 
poisonous gas, bacteriological warfare, etc had been raised in the Hague 
Conference. But no significant advances could be made. The proposals 
received their death warrant on the conference table itself. 
Moves to take more effective steps to stop arms race and to bring 
complete disarmament is an essential precondition for tackling global 
problems which are becoming increasingly acute. More serious and concrete 
attempts were made since the Versailles Conference. One such attempt was 
the establishment and formation of League of Nations to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by 
the acceptance of obligation and not to resort to war. 
Numerous attempts were made in that direction including the Treaty 
signed under the banner of League of Nations on Control of Traffic in arms 
in St. Germain-Enlaye on September 10, 1919.^  But all the negotiations 
inside and outside the League including Treaty of September 10, 1919 failed 
to reap real fruits. The Locarno Treaties of 1925 resumed the negotiations 
that had failed earlier. 
All the human beings on this planet live under the shadow of 
weapons, fearsome in their numbers, and awe-some in their capacity to 
inflict pain and destruction^. A commission for the disarmament conference 
was established consisting of selected League members. The conference 
considered proposals and reports but no agreement could be reached, for no 
country was prepared to consider the question with an open mind and from 
the wider international point of view. Nearly 337 proposals were made, 
three of the most important were put forward by France, the U.S.A. and 
Soviet Union respectively. The Conference met at last on February 2, 1932 
with sixty-one members. Germany one of the League members demanded 
for equality with other powers. Rejection of her demand met not only with 
walk out of her from the Disarmament Conference, but she also resigned 
from League of Nations. Various steps were made to end the deadlock but 
all of them met with failure.'° 
The Disarmament Conference yei secured certain principles and laid 
the foundation, in the early stage of disarmament, for bilateral negotiations. 
Different countries took part in different Conferences and negotiations, 
Washington Conference of 1921-22'' can be presented as an example of 
such an effort is also known as Power Treaty.'^ With the rise of Nazism and 
Fascism in Germany and Italy the world war II broke out. The terms of 
Washington Conference came to an end in 1936 and from the very next year 
no important attempts at disarmament were made till the close of the World 
War II. All attempts made during the inter war period and before the 
beginning of the League of Nations proved to be abortive. Following the 
action on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet Union exploded atomic bomb on 
September 23, 1949. This was followed by the explosion of Hydrogen bomb 
by U.S.A. Later Soviet Union made one of its own. 
Disarmament and arms control has, thus posed an important and 
pertinent question - either to save our planet or to perish it in flames. There 
is existence of modem weapons, ten million times or more powerful than 
any thing the world has ever seen and only minutes away from any target on 
earth. The explosions by USA and former Soviet Union brought Afro-Asian 
countries under pressure. The pressure brought big giants, UK, USSR, USA, 
Canada and France on negotiating table at Geneva on May 10, 1955. This 
could be regarded as the second important step towards disarmament. Earlier 
on June 14, 1946, The Atomic Energy Commission was established to look 
after the assigned work. The Commission was the result of Trinity 
Declaration of November 15,1945. On 27 Dec. 1945, the Three Powers 
Trinity (UK, USSR, USA) formally proposed the establishment of such a 
commission to United Nations.'^ Thus with a view to deal with the problem 
of nuclear proliferation the first session of UN adopted Resolution 1(1) on 
January 24, 1946 providing for the establishment of UNAEC (United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission) ''*. 
The ongoing arms race in general and between former Soviet union 
and U.S.A. in particular led US to propose Baruch Plan.'^ The essence of 
this Plan was mainly to prevent former Soviet Union from acquiring more 
nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy 
without eliminating the US nuclear weapons monopoly was presented before 
the UNAEC on June, 14, 1946'^  Acquisition of nuclear capability by the 
Soviet Union by 1949 led the UN to establish a Disarmament Commission 
in 1952 with limited membership, which was expanded in 1959 to include 
all the members of the United Nations. 
The Geneva Summit of May 10, 1955 and disarmament talks between 
great powers during 1958-1960 were done out side the UN and were mainly 
the outcome of negotiations between President Eisenhower and Prime 
Minister Khuruschev. In 1958 Soviet Union took unilateral decision to 
terminate the test of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. 
The General Assembly held in 1959 [Resolution 1378 (XIV)] 
proclaimed the goal of general and complete disarmament.^^ The agreements 
outside the UN between two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union 
could not materialise because of the strained relations between the two 
around 1960. 
In 1960 U.S. temporarily postponed tests of Atomic bombs. A ten 
nations (Canada, France, Italy, Great Britain, U.S., Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Soviet Union) committee was convened at 
Geneva on March 25, 1960. Failure of the Ten Nation Committee to reach 
any final agreement led to the resumption of atomic tests. Their resumption 
brought neutral nations together at Belgrade Conference, demanded a final 
end to such tests. In December 1961, an agreement to set up an Eighteen 
Nations Committee and General Assembly [Resolution 17222 (XVI)] 
welcomed the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations by United 
States and former Soviet Union.'* Ten years later, in 1969, the goal was far 
from being achieved. Of course, a resounding victory for the cause of 
disarmament was achieved outside the United Nations when the nuclear test 
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ban agreement was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. The only thing 
that 18 Nation Committee did was to submit an agreed draft on Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty to the UN Political Committee which approved it 
by an overwhelming majority vote. India along with 22 other nations, 
including France and China, abstained. France and China have adopted it 
only after stockpiling nuclear arms. In the light of the increased 
militarisation of states and the everpresent threat of nuclear war, the UN 
declared the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s as disarmament decades.^^ 
The steps taken so far by the superpowers with regard to the so called 
"Nuclear Disarmament" have rather proved instrumental in the 
institutionalization of vertical proliferation, legitimization of the status quo 
of the Nuclear Club and the assumption that nuclear weapons and nuclear 
weapon powers will not disappear giving the necessary impetus to 
horizontal proliferation. The horizontal proliferation is "the bye-product of 
vertical proliferation". ^' Nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal, 
is equally sinful. The question of stopping all nuclear weapon tests had been 
on the agenda of multilateral, bilateral (US-Soviet Union) and trilateral 
(UK-US-former Soviet Union) negotiations since the early 1950s but no 
comprehensive ban was reached to take it to its final end. The 1963 
multilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibited any nuclear 
explosions (including those, which may be intended for non-military 
purposes) in the atmosphere, outer space or under water or in any other 
environment if the explosion would cause any radioactive debris to be 
present outside the territorial limits of the country conducting it.^ ^ 
The PTBT has certainly helped to curb the radioactive pollution. But, 
by the time treaty was concluded the two main testing states knew that this 
activity could be continued underground. Thus the nuclear arms race was 
allowed to continue unhampered. 
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There is no denying the fact that some developing countries have 
acquired the nuclear capability.^^ In this context where each country is 
feeling a sense of insecurity-, the desire to acquire nuclear weapons has 
become inevitable. Thus the industrial and scientific potentials of the PNE 
(Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) attracted various countries, mostly the 
developing ones. 
In 1969, the USA and Soviet Union initiated bilateral negotiations on 
possible restriction regarding their strategic nuclear arsenals. The first phase 
of these Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-1) ended in 1972 with the 
conclusion of a treaty limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems.^ "* The 
interim agreement also took place on the limitation of strategic offensive 
arms. The second phase, 1979, SALT-II Treaty (never ratified) sets for both 
parties an initial ceiling. The SALT-II agreement has serious shortcomings. 
Real progress would require not only substantial reductions, but also tight 
constraints. 
The real race of armaments and the concept of proliferation divided 
the nations into two divisions, nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-
nuclear weapon states (NNWS). While both the parties talk about the 
dangers of nuclear weapons but the main objective of nuclear weapon states 
behind their negotiations is only to prohibit the NNWS to gain nuclear 
capability. In the wake of various amendments and suggestions mooted by 
India and other countries to the American and Soviet draft treaties, both 
former Soviet Union and United States after scrutinizing these amendments 
presented a joint draft treaty on March 11, 1968, which thereafter, formed 
the base of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.^^ 
Until the formation of the NPT the superpowers, in particular, have 
stockpiled thousands and thousands of warheads. The predominant theme of 
US-USSR negotiations have been the maintenance of East west balance 
accompanied by the precious balance for them. The talk in terms of mutual 
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limitation in number of ICBM, SLBM, SLCM, MARV, MIRV and so on 
and so forth.^ 
All the treaties including SALT-I and others raised a point of 
uncertainty, which occupies a dominant position in international relations. 
The non-nuclear weapon states threatened by power hegemony and by the 
waves of the cold war joined together under the banner of NAM (Non-
Aligned Movement). Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India 
and the Chairman of NAM, invited a meeting of six nations to consider the 
issue. Mrs. Gandhi said, "the people we represent are no less threatened by 
nuclear war than the citizens of nuclear weapon states". 
On 28 Jan. 1985, leaders of six nations again met under the 
Chairmanship of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, and issued 
a declaration known as the'New Delhi Declaration'. The Declaration urged 
the NWS to immediately halt the testing of all nuclear weapons and to 
conclude at an early date a treaty on nuclear test ban. The six nations met in 
Mexico in August 1986 where India, Tanzania, Mexico, Argentina, Greece 
and Sweden stressed the NWS to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.^^ 
The substantial international pressure on the United States and on the 
United Kingdom to reopen negotiations on a comprehensive ban of nuclear 
weapon tests paved the way for the signing of the NPT in 1968. It prohibits 
the transfer by nuclear weapon states to any recipient non-nuclear weapon 
states nuclear technology and to undertake to conclude safeguard's 
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a 
view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful use to 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The 
treaty also said, the nuclear weapon states are not allowed to assist, 
encourage or induce any no-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire 
the devices in question. ^ 
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However, without a process of actual disarmament, the future of NPT 
may be at risk. The arms race undermines the credibility of the treaty in the 
eyes of its non-nuclear weapon states and parties and provides an excuse to 
non-parties for not joining the treaty. Steps to reduce such tensions were 
taken at the 1978 UN General Assembly Special session on disarmament, 
the USA, the UK and the USSR each made an official statement giving 
assurances to the countries concerned, but the statements showed significant 
disparities . The clause 3 of Article IX of the NPT says that a nuclear 
weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon 
or other nuclear explosive device prior to Jan.l, 1967 under such a clause 
the classic problem of cheating has been recognized and discussed by both 
the Soviet Union and the United States. 
In the wake of the keen interest shown by the increasing number of 
NNWS, a majority of whom constitutes developing countries, in the 
development of nuclear power, the civilian use of nuclear energy is being 
identified as horizontal proliferation. India's peaceful nuclear explosion 
(PNE) of 1974 has been interpreted by western nuclear experts as an event 
having opened the floodgates of proliferation,'*' as envisaging second 
nuclear age and as having brought forth 'proliferation-phase two' and so 
forth. William Einstein, Consultant on Disarmament to UN Secretary 
General has expressed the view that 'the risks of proliferation* have 
increased with the sudden surge of interest in nuclear weapons to spread to a 
number of smaller countries, the out look for world survival becomes much 
more gloomy. 
From August 27 to September 21, 1985 parties to the Treaty on the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons met at a conference in Geneva to review 
the operation, earlier two similar conferences were held in, 1970, and in 1980, 
but failed to conclude any such draft of wider strength. Even the third NPT 
Review Conference held in Geneva failed to conclude the demands of non-
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aligned non-nuclear weapon states. This has created a stalemate between NWS 
and NNWS. It was attended by 86 out of 130 states parties. 
The Conference, of course, emphasized the importance of nuclear 
weapon-free zones arrangements for the cause of achieving a world free of 
nuclear weapons. It mentioned in this context the successfiil operation of the 
1967 Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco) welcomed the endorsement in 1985 by the South Pacific Forum of 
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and urged implementation of the 
proposal to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle 
East. South Africa was claimed to have frustrated the implementation of the 
UN-Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa by developing nuclear 
capability. 
One of the major successes of the review Conference, with the exception 
of the USA and the UK, deeply regretted that the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) had not been concluded. It called on the nuclear weapon parties 
to the NPT to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985, and called on all nuclear 
weapon states to participate in multilateral negotiations and the conclusion of 
such a treaty is a matter of highest priority in Geneva Conference on 
disarmament. 
The dispute which arose on the subject of nuclear testing almost brought 
about the collapse of the Conference, particularly insistent on the immediate 
resumption of negotiations for a CTBT, where the non-aligned states, which 
recalled the NPT preamble reiterating the determination of the parties to the 
1963, PTBT to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of 
nuclear weapons for all times and to continue negotiations to this end. 
Over 2000 nuclear explosions were registered during the 51 years 
between the conduct of the first nuclear explosive test and opening it for being 
signed by states in September 1996.^ ^ Unlike many other multilateral arms 
control agreements, the NPT of 1968 is not of a permanent duration. 
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The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a culmination of 40 years of 
efforts to ban nuclear test explosions and thereby, halt the development of new 
weapons of mass destruction.^^ 
The intensive negotiations on CTBT began at the Conference on 
Disarmament of Geneva in Jan 1994. Two and a half years later, however the 
painstakingly elaborate draft treaty could not command consensus at the close 
of the negotiations in Aug. 1996.^ ^ 
During the cold war, three treaties on nuclear testing, one multilateral 
PTBT, 1963 and two bilateral, 1974 and 1976 excluding NPT of 1968 were 
registered, but none of them was comprehensive enough. The CTBT is 
'comprehensive' in that it bans nuclear test explosions in all environments. Not 
only military but also non-military nuclear explosions are harmed under its 
context. A text identical to that discussed at the Conference on Disarmament 
was then sponsored by 127 states and formally submitted to the UN General 
Assembly where it was adopted as a treaty by an overwhelming majority on 
September 10, 1996. The Treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 
1996 at the UN Headquarters in New York. On the very 1st day of its opening, 
71 states signed including the five nuclear weapon powers and 27 of the other 
44 states, required by article XIV of the Treaty to ratify it, to enable it to be 
enforced. 
A meeting took place on November 19, 1996 where a Preparatory 
Commission for CTBT, organization was established as an international 
organisation^^ financed by the State signatories to establish the Global 
Verification Regime of the Treaty and to prepare for its entry into force. 
The CTBT consists of a preamble, 17 Articles, an annexe containing a 
list of states grouped by region, and in relation to the entry into force provision 
(article XIV), and a protocol. 
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Nuclearisation of World Politics 
The rapid proliferation of Nuclear weapons constitutes a danger of 
unimaginable magnitude, which can result in complete annihilation of human 
civilization from the face of earth. . The first successful detonation of nuclear 
device by the United States at Alamogordo on 16 July 1995 unveiled the 
gigantic secret of atomic energy which if used cautiously could be a blessing or 
else it could unleash catastrophe. The catastrophe aspect was proved in on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 respectively. 
The emergence of US as the only nuclear power gave rise to cold war 
and prompted Soviet Union to make efforts in that direction. By 1949 the 
Soviet Union had succeeded in acquiring these weapons. It continued to swell 
with UK (1952) France (1960) and China (1964), acquiring the nuclear status. 
Thus, by 1964, the number of nuclear weapon states went up to five. 
Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation 
Nuclearisation of politics can be understood by the typology of nuclear 
proliferation. Proliferation is of two types: vertical and horizontal. The vertical 
proliferation can be defined as an augmentation in number and types of nuclear 
weapons in the possession of NWS whereas horizontal proliferation refers to 
the spread of nuclear weapons to the NNWS or latter's capability to 
manufacture them.'*° There is no denying the fact that some developing 
countries like India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil etc. 
have acquired the nuclear capability. 
The non nuclear weapon states (NNWS) or the developing world 
regards nuclear proliferation mainly as a political issue and not as a technical 
issue as projected by the NWS. "The will to go nuclear" and the decision 
making about it is indeed a political process no matter at which level the 
technological sophistication be.'*' 
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While making tiie NPT draft vertical proliferation was not included in 
the NPT. Aciually it was deliberately left out because its inclusion was 
detrimental to US interests'* .^ Basically, in mid 1950's the idea of Nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty was mooted by the US to control the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by the then potential industrial powers like West Germany and 
Japan . Thus, it is obvious that right from the beginning, it has complicated the 
whole issue of nuclearisation. 
Nuclear command and control have assumed extraordinary significance 
in the contemporary era of "information revolution" and "information warfare". 
With its focus on such elements as command and control warfare, the military 
technological revolution, net war, cyber war, electronic warfare, military 
discipline and disinformation, and communication security, information 
warfare, according to some has introduced a "comprehensive paradigm shift in 
war fighting" rendering classical nuclear deterrence obsolete.'*'* 
Scale of Proliferation 
Since ancient times, there has always been technological developments 
in weaponry, but since world war II the scale of expenditure and the pace of 
change have been in a totally different language/League. 
The qualitative changes are even more likely than quantitative increases 
to cause uncertainty and insecurity and to stimulate more changes in response. 
The qualitative arms race is fiielled by military research and development (R & 
D). There was a substantial rise in the volume of world military R & D 
expenditures since 1980. The estimated rate of growth per year, which was 
some thing under 1% from 1974 to 1980 was around 5-8 percent from 1980-83 
and seems to have been more than 10% from 1983 to 1984.'*^  
The table below shows an estimate of total nuclear explosions from 16 
July, 1945-31 Dec. 1985.'*^  
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USA' 
800 
USSR 
562 
UK' 
39 
France 
134 
China 
29 
India 
01 
Total 
1565 
'All British tests from 1962 have been conducted jointly with United States at 
the Nevada Test Site. Therefore, the figure for US tests is actually higher than 
indicated here. 
The volume growth in deliveries of major conventional weapons in the 
five-year period 1981-1985 the USA was the leading arms supplier with about 
39% of total arms exports. The share of the Soviet Union was about 28%. The 
Soviet Union was the largest supplier of major weapons to the third world 
during 1981-85. The Soviet share was 32% and the US share was around 27% 
whereas US exports go mostly to industrialized countries, Soviet exports are 
predominantly directed towards the third world.'*^  
France has further consolidated its position as third ranked exporter of 
major weapons followed by the UK, Germany and Italy. Together, the four 
major West European arms exporters now account for almost 28% of arms 
exports to the third world. Between 1978-82 that share was around 18%. In 
addition new West European arms exporters have gained market shares, most 
notably Spain. Spain ranked eighth among arms exporters to the third world in 
1981-85 with a share of almost 2%. 
China, Israel and Brazil are ranked seventh, ninth and tenth, 
respectively, among the exporters of major weapons to the third world. The 
largest arms-importing region is Middle East with a share of about 50% of total 
third world imports during 1981-85.''* 
The three highest-ranking arms- importing countries are in the Middle 
East, Iraq, Egypt and Syria alone account for at-most 32% of third world arms 
imports during 1981-1985''^  
The annual value of the production of major weapons in the third world 
has grown fairly constant from 1950 to 1984. In 1950 production was valued at 
about $ 2.3 millions. In 1984 this value was almost 600 times higher. Ai 
production in the third world stood still at a low level in the early 1960s. It 
regained some momentum during the second half of the decade: additional 
countries (Brazil Jsrael and South Africa) entered into Arms Production while 
others, notably India, expanded their activities^". More & more countries joined 
the ranks of arms producers. 
If the growth in production slowed down in 1980s then at about the 
same time, the arms trade with third world also ceased to grow, most of the 
countries continued to produce arms and imported and exported them. 
In 1985, for the first time in many years, there was some sense of 
movement in nuclear arms control talks. Both USA and USSR had put forward 
several new arms reduction proposals, culminating in both super powers 
offering cuts of 50% in strategic nuclear forces. Both nations also called for the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons as their ultimate arms control 
objective. Both Reagan and Gorbachev presented their programmes of action. 
Nevertheless, while the words were about reduction, the actions were 
about increases. All human beings on this planet live under the shadow of 
weapons. The World Health Organization in 1985 had estimated that a large-
scale nuclear war might kill 1.1 billion people & seriously injure an equal 
number. Thus nearly half of the population of the globe in 1984 could be an 
immediate casualty in a nuclear war '^. 
The threshold for triggering a nuclear war in the form of nuclear winter 
is around 500-2000 nuclear warheads. This threshold war crossed by United 
States in 1953 and by the Soviet Union in 1966^ .^ 
The USA and Nuclearization of World Politics 
The United States is the only state that has used an atomic bomb in 
anger. On August 6, 1945, the ''Enola Gay" a US B-29, dropped the. Bomb on 
Hiroshima city. Three days later a second bomb destroyed Nagasaki^ .^ Since 
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that time the US and Soviet Union in particular, and other countries as well, 
have engaged in a nuclear arms race. According to many international scholars 
the nuclear arms race is the dominant single feature of post-world war II 
history. 
Soviet-American nuclear rivalry soon moved from developing fission 
weapons to developing fusion weapons. The United States exploded its first 
fiisiun device in late 1952, and Soviets followed suit less than a year later. 
In 1972 Soviet and American leaders reached an agreement on the first 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) placed a cap on the quantity of 
Soviet and US delivery vehicles, and an accompanying protocol limited the 
number of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABMs) each side could deploy. No 
limits were placed on qualitative improvements however, and the nuclear arms 
race continued. 
A SALT-II agreement that effected some limitations on qualitative 
improvements was negotiated by 1979, but the US Senate never ratified it. '^' By 
the 1980s the nuclear arms race had become a confused arena for sophisticated 
arguments, expensive weapons systems, and bewildering acronyms. The most 
pessimistic estimates are that as many as forty states may have the nuclear 
capability in near future excluding the Big-5. 
Since World War II military expenditures of nation-states have 
expanded astronomically, very few nations can claim for not having 
contributed to this explosion. The continuing influence of nuclear power in 
world politics appears inescapable. The pattern of relations among states is 
fundamentally one of inequality. 
There is a growing international realization that South Asia and North 
East Asia are among the major trouble spots of the world. Next to Europe, Asia 
is the only other region where major military powers exist.^^ But in contrast to 
Europe they are more rivals than partners. 
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Pakistan has close military ties with United States. India is a party to a 
Treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. The members of 
ASEAN (the Associations of South East Asian Nations) consider themselves as 
non-aligned. But strictly speaking they all have links of various kinds with 
western countries. 
Asia has the greatest concentration of armed forces - nonetheless, there 
are three nuclear weapons states present in Asia: the Soviet Union, China and 
the United States. The first two are Asian powers themselves and the latter 
maintains major nuclear forces in the region.^ ^ 
The testing of nuclear weapons by China is continuing, though at a very 
slow pace. From 1964 to 1982 China conducted a total of 26 nuclear tests, as 
compared with about 700 tests by United States and 500 by Soviet Union in the 
period of 1945-82.^ ^ 
Finally in June 1982 China announced that it was developing a three 
stage liquid-fuelled rocket capable of launching satellites into geostationary 
orbit. Such a satellite could fulfil important military missions in the fields of 
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communications, early warning and metrology. 
Military systems have experienced massive change over the post world 
war II period. Global military expenditure, measured in constant values, has 
also changed markedly, roughly quadrupling during 1950-1985.^ ^ This constant 
proportionate increase is what we mean by a 'compound interest' type of 
growth.^ '^  
In the first half of the 1950s the US government developed the 
hydrogen bomb and stepped up its atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons 
(with the hydrogen bombs invention, both fission-based atomic bombs and 
fusion based hydrogen bombs became known as nuclear weapons). The main 
goal in the testing programme was to increase the destructive power and 
efficiency of nuclear weapons. '^ This involved experiments to test new designs 
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and to gain a better understanding of the internal workings, ttie Physics of the 
weapons themselves.^ ^ 
In the early 1950s, the development of the thermo-nuclear, or hydrogen 
bomb led to much higher yield weapons. It was clear to observers at the time 
that "with the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons... yields would increase a 
thousand fold".^ ^ 
History, particularly recent history, has shown that South Asia can not 
been seen in isolation from its neighbouring regions. South Asia comprises 
densely populated large states - India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, two Island 
communities - Sri Lanka and Maldives and two landlocked Himalayan states -
Nepal and Bhutan. All are members of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) 
and the Group of 77 and four - India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives -
are also members of the commonwealth (Pakistan has recently been expelled). 
All South Asian countries are distinguished for being in the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) category of the United Nations.^ 
In the light of above setting, conflicts, which have their own specific 
cause, identities and characteristics, can not be ruled out in the region. 
On 11 May 1998, India crossed the nuclear Rubicon, embarking on a 
journey that can only bring greater insecurity, tension and maldevelopment 
even as it represents another crucial phase in the ongoing efforts of the Sangh 
combine to totally transform the character of Indian society and to impose its 
version of what constitutes the Indian nation and nationalism.^ ^ 
Three kinds of arguments can be put forward to explain why the Indian 
government embarked on this course. The first has to do with supposed 
changes in the external security environment, or perceptions about such 
changes i.e. Pakistan and/or China have become more nuclearly threatening 
and belligerent. The second kind claims that the nuclear hypocrisis of existing 
NWSs and their reluctance to move rapidly to full nuclear disarmament has 
finally "driven" India out of frustration/impatience to try and gate crash into 
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their club. The third set of argument focuses on changed self-perceptions and 
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the domestic factors behind such changes. 
This was not surprising, Sino-Pakistan and Sino-Indian ties were always 
situated in a wider context of cold war relationships, more specifically Sino-
Soviet, Sino-US and US-Soviet ties. Here the crucial axis for most of the three 
decades of the sixties, seventies, and eighties was Sino-Soviet hostility. 
India valued Soviet diplomatic support on Kashmir, its military supplies 
and economic assistance and in the context of the 1971 Bangladesh war for 
independence, the strategic counter weight the Indo-Soviet Treaty of that year 
provided against the Sino-Pakistan -US axis that was emerging at the time. 
The nuclear arms race started slowly enough, at least on the public level 
and entrapped India, Pakistan, Iran and Libya and goes mad with the other 
countries of Asia. 
Since the World War II military, expenditures of nation states have 
expanded astronomically. Very few nations can claim not having contributed to 
this explosion. During the 1970s alone, as the following Table indicates, world 
military expenditures in real terms expanded by roughly 20 percent 67 
The growth of military expenditures, 1960-80 in billions of constant 
1979 dollars. 
Developed world 
Developing world 
Total 
1960 
270 
28 
298 
1965 
291 
46 
337 
1970 
347 
64 
411 
1975 
345 
91 
436 
1980 
389 
106 
495 
The industrialised states of the East and the West, as well as China, 
account for 75 percent of the world's military expenditures, but third world 
states have actively increased their military budgets as well. Mr. Macmillan has 
said that control over nuclear weapons caimot really be established until a 
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system is evolved by which the production of all fissionable material can be 
accurately checked. 
The NPT has been wrecked by proliferation regimes in various third 
world countries. Most recent example being A.Q. Khan (Pakistans nuclear 
hero), China, North Korea and European nations and permissiveness towards it 
by Washington during the 80s and 90s. It is in this context that India's national 
security advisor Brajesh Mishra said at the 40* Munich Conference on 
Security, "extra-ordinary measures are being contemplated to guarantee 
security from these challenges. A multilateral consultative machinery with 
international credibility can provide legitimacy to such measures. But for it to 
be effective, it has to be evolved with wide and representative consultations. I 
would also add that clubbing partners against proliferation with countries of 
true proliferation concern is a self defeating approach, which can only weaken 
the cause of genuine non-proliferation". Is Washington Listening? ^ ^ 
When did Washington come to take note of Khan's proliferation 
activities that if Khan could handle successfully the proliferation from Europe 
to Pakistan he could with equal case do it for Iran and Libya. However, in the 
eighties, the US and other western countries supported the WMD proliferation 
of both Saddam Hussain and Zia-Ul-Haq. 
Ten years after the cold war ended, the world still has enough firepower 
in its 30,000 plus nuclear weapons arsenal to cause a million Hiroshima's; 
indeed wipe out the human race altogether. 
Associated with nuclear weapons is not just a highly evolved 
sophisticated military infrastructure, command, confrol, communications and 
intelligence (C 1) systems. Equally vital is what has been called 'nuclearism' 
or psychological, political, and military dependence on nuclear weapons, the 
embrace of the weapons as a solution to a wide variety of human dilemmas, 
most ironically that of "security"'^. Wars involve the deliberate use of lethal 
violence, which can be justified only because we recognize two orders of fact, 
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each of them compelling, each of them terrible." Wars are just, only in so far 
as they are waged in self defence or in pursuit of causes that are noble, and 
oppose injustice and tyranny. 
The great significance at the international level of the crossing of the 
nuclear threshold in South Asia lies in the challenges it poses to the advocates 
of nuclear disarmament, the vast majority of the world's peoples and states, the 
five recognized NWSs, and more generally, to global nuclear order, itself 
skewed and unequal. 
The global nuclear order is non-proliferation oriented, not disarmament 
oriented. It is based on three foundations; the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) of 1968, the P5 state's nuclear oligopoly and their continued reliance on 
nuclear weapons for security, and their reluctance to move quickly towards the 
abolition of nuclear weapons, and number of specific arrangements that restrict 
the sale of nuclear materials or transfer of nuclear and related technologies, e.g. 
the London Supplier's Group (LSG) the Zangger Accords, or the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).''' 
The NPT places no real, operational compulsions or injunctions upon 
the nuclear weapon states to demonstrate tangible progress towards the goal of 
nuclear abolition. For reasons of legal logic alone. Article VI has considerable 
weight in the overall framework of the Treaty. As Mueller, Fischer, and 
Koetter argue, If Article VI is removed from the NPT, the remaining 
obligations of the NWSs (essentially not to transfer nuclear weapons to 
NNWSs) cannot be said to establish an adequate reciprocal commitment for the 
renunciation of nuclear weapons by their non-nuclear weapon Treaty 
Partners.''^ 
NPT 'has succeeded beyond the expectations of its founders', in 
reducing the number of potential proliferants from 20 or 30 to about half a 
dozen, as from the circumstance that without its basic discipline and 
constraints, including international safeguards —and despite its flaws - it 
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would be considerably more difficult, if not possible to negotiate arms control, 
arms reduction and disarmament measures. 
A March 1998 report of the National Resources Defence Council 
(NRDC), Washington DC, USA, a US-based NGO, provides, for the first time, 
authoritative estimates of the sizes and locations of the nuclear arsenals of the 
US, Russia, the UK, France and China. 
NRDC assessed the nuclear arsenals of the five countries as follows: 
The United States: nearly 12,000 nuclear weapons (deployed or stored) are 
located in 14 states. 
Russia: Some 22,500 weapons are deployed or stored at about 90 sites in 
Russia. 
The United Kingdom: The UK stockpile is about to be composed of a smgle 
weapon type; the Trident 11 missile on vanguard class submarines. 
France: The French stockpile totals some 450 warheads of three types at four 
locations. 
China: The Chinese stockpile is estimated at about 400 located at some 20 
sites. 
South Asia's nuclearization, then, presents different dilemmas, 
challenges and problems to the different actors concerned and involved. The 
most important of these are the challenges it presents to the advocates of 
nuclear disarmament and to the peace movements in different parts of the 
world. It is to these challenges that we now turn. 
There is a growing international realisation that South Asia and North-
east Asia are among the major trouble-spots of the world.^ ^ There can be no 
doubt that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union have 
for some time possessed a sufficient stock of nuclear and thermo-nuclear 
devices to destroy each other many times over and still have sufficient 
remaining to deal with any other powers capable of retaliation in kind'*, while 
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these ramifications of the complexities of European power politics were 
building up another event of global dimensions that upset the world balance of 
power was the Sino-Soviet rift which finally became an established fact in 
1960, and gave an impetus to the loosening of the ties between the allies on 
either side of the iron curtain. 
We live in an era in which a military victory can simultaneously 
prove to be major political and diplomatic debacle or a breakthrough in the 
non-violent sectors of the spectrum of conflict, such as economic and 
psychological warfare, may yield far greater results than the employment of 
overt military power. 
The world has reached upto the mark where the runners run a mad 
nuclear race. The original powers, United States, Britain, France, Russia 
and China where following by Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and 
Libya. The new group holds the composition 80 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
J . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Name 
Israel 
India 
Pak 
North 
Korea 
Iran 
Libya 
First device or 
test 
Device as early 
as 1967 
Test in 1974 
Test in 1998 
Device possibly 
in 1990s 
Claims, efforts 
are peaceful 
Recently 
abandoned 
Estimated 
weapons 
75-200 
30 to 35 
24 to 48 
2 to 5 
None 
None 
Program 
Extensive delivery 
capabilities 
Further tests in May 1998 
3,000 centrifuges in 
operation by early 1990s 
Plutonium weapons, 
centrifuge operation starting 
Aims to build 50,000 
centrifuges 
Unknown number of 
centrifuges 
There is a divergence of opinion between the NWS and NNWS about 
the question whether proliferation is a technical problem or a political issue. 
The NNWS or the developing world regard nuclear proliferation mainly as a 
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political issue and not as a technical issue as projected by the NWS.*' "The 
will to go nuclear and the decision making about it is indeed a political 
process no matter at what level the technological sophistication be" *^  The 
decisions by West Germany, Canada, Sweden or Japan not to go nuclear are 
mainly governed by their respective political constraints despite the fact that 
these countries possess sophisticated nuclear technology. 
The denial of nuclear technolog>' by the NWS to NNWS even for 
PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) purposes is biased and unilateral action. 
India after its PNE of 18 May 1974 has been subjected to harsher 
restrictions, and embargoes by the United States and Canada. The 
developing countries including India having been voicing their concern in 
this regard. 
Scene in the West Asia 
West Asia has been for some years now, particularly after the Gulf 
War, the worlds largest arms market. This particularly applies to the 
grouping of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states?'* The total armed 
forces of the GCC comes to approximately 2,50,000. The land forces, given the 
terrain and presumed threat, have concentrated on mechanized forces. The 
combined armies would field about 1800 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) with about 
500 top of the line Ml Abrams and 150 Le Clere. The rest are combinations of 
US M60s and French AMX-30S. The GCC countries have also taken pains to 
strengthen their air forces and can field some 650 combat aircraft, again a 
combination of US and French aircrafts, including F16s and Mirage 2000s. The 
other interesting aspect of the military buildup in GCC is the presence of CSS-
2 missiles in Saudi Arabia. These Chinese missiles have a range of 2,800 km 
and were designed to carry nuclear warheads. 
The other country in West Asia whose military buildup is of interest is 
that of Iran. The current budget of Iran is about $ 5.7 billion. It has 
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approximately 5,50,000 men under arms; the bulk, about 3,50,000 being in the 
army.*^  
South East Asia has been, for some time, the second largest importer of 
arms after West Asia. This is a reflection of the insecurities felt in the region 
due to both the rapid modernization of the Chinese armed forces and the 
gradual reduction of US military presence in the area. 
Presently South Africa has modest armed forces equipped and trained 
for internal security duties. The current strength is about 63,000 personnel of 
which 43,000 are in the Army. Republic of South Africa has however realized 
that it needs to modernize its armed forces particularly its navy and air force. 
Plans in the pipeline call for the purchase of three modem diesel submarines 
and four corvettes for the Navy; 28 JAS Grippin aircrafts from Sweden and 24 
Hawks from the UK. It is also to purchase A119 helicopters from Italy. These 
purchases show a definite intent to play a role in the Indian Ocean and its 
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vicmity. 
In addition to the conventional arms buildup, there has also been a build-
up of nuclear weapons in the whole world. 
INDIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY COMPULSIONS 
India stands at the center of the SAARC region both location wise and 
area-wise. Moreover, with its population and area, India is the largest country 
in the SAARC region. It has an area of 32,88,000 square kilometers and its 
share in the region's area is around 73.4 per cent. The country lies south of the 
Himalayas and extends to the Indian Ocean. India is located between latitude 
8°04' and 37*'18' north and longitude 68°08' and 97°24' east. It is bordered by 
four SAARC countries namely Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh 
besides China and Burma. The other two SAARC countries namely Sri Lanka 
and Maldives, though not connected by common border being Islands, can be 
also considered as border countries. The population of India had crossed 1 
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billion by the time of the census of 2001 and it was over 77 per cent of the total 
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population of the region. 
India's historical development, no less than her recent experience 
inevitably beckoned towards on independent foreign policy stance. India was 
too big a country to become a camp follower of any other country. Besides, the 
country had gone through the experience of a prolonged struggle against 
British imperialism, the mightiest of western imperialists, and was pulsating 
with nationalist urges and impulses. 
India fought a prolonged struggle for freedom. Innumerable people 
courted arrests, resisted the Raj in a hundred and one ways and challenged the 
might of the British Empire. India's entire background was consistently anti-
imperialistic. The history and geography of India could not fail to determine 
the thrust and focus of India's foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out the 
geographical parameters, he said, India was at the gateway to both South-east 
Asia as well as the Middle East. Anything happening in the South Asia, South 
East Asia, the Gulf region. West Asia and the Indian Ocean region affected 
India, and India could not lose her eyes to it. 
The quest for security has led to different courses of action among the 
newly emerging countries. Some have sought to involve the big powers and 
buy security through alignment. Many others decided that security could best 
be ensured by keeping away from international power politics. Under 
Jawaharlal India concluded very early that involvement in military blocs of the 
big powers would not enhance her security but could very well escalate the 
pressures on her and infact encourage destabilization. Staying out of power 
blocs and remaining non-aligned appeared to offer a better mix of security and 
independence. Security, however, remained a primary and continuing concern 
of India's foreign policy.^" 
The general, domestic, regional and international balance in the first 
decade after independence posed a number of complex and uncongenial 
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problems. India's Independence was fragile, the unity of the country was 
somewhat tenuous and integration was still an aspired for goal. Partition of the 
country had brought in its trial large-scale exodus of populations and sufferings 
and serious problems of law and order and economic instability in many parts 
of the country. There were fissiparous tendencies and forces within the country 
and pressures from aboard to make India toe the line. 
India had to function for the first time as an independent country in a 
new regional balance of forces. All the South Asian countries were now 
independent and with some, there were historical problems, and with some 
there were consequences of a large, developing, giant size country like India 
emerging into independence as their neighbour. Outside of South Asia the other 
neighbour China too was be-stir with energy and power and has gone through a 
communist revolution. 
Nevertheless, the regional balance was neither beyond manageable 
negotiation and adjustment nor disconcertingly unfavourable. India's internal 
weaknesses have long been regarded as its distinguishing quality. In the 1950s 
American policymakers viewed Indian domestic politics as a critical 
battleground in the larger war against communism. Fearing that hungry people 
would be attracted to communism, Americans sent massive shipments of food, 
and more creatively, helped India build competence in agriculture and 
scientific research. Other vulnerabilities included the gross inequalities of the 
caste system, India's regional and linguistic based separatist movements and 
the desperate plight of many Indian girls and women. In recent years, there has! 
been evidence of corruption and administrative mismanagement on a very large i 
scale. Of India's weaknesses, the economy has been singled out as a critical 
problem.'^  Economic, ideological, federal, and domestic, ethnic and religious 
considerations were quietly important in shaping India's Policy.''* Nehru and 
his colleagues believed that non-alignment would prevent India from becoming 
entangled in larger global conflicts and thus shield the fragile Indian economy 
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from outside forces as it erected a modem infrastructure. Non-aligmnent would 
also keep the ideological battles of the super powers away from India. 
India's thinking about defence and external affairs was from the 
inception of the freedom movement, coloured by antimilitarism. Leaders of the 
National Congress spoke against large military outlays and the onerous burden, 
which these outlays put on India's poverty stricken people. With the advent 
first of Mahatma Gandhi and later of Jawaharlal Nehru, the external policy of 
the national movement became pronouncedly idealistic. The leadership was 
completely irmocent of the peremptory requirements of national security and 
reasons of state.^ ^ 
When the nationalist leaders took charge of the destiny of divided India, 
they were confronted with the unpleasant reality of rivakies among states and 
had willy-nilly to address themselves to the problems of defence. When the 
tribal leaders abetted by Pakistan, invaded Kashmir, the Government leaders 
realized that non-violence was of no avail. Only Indian ttoops airlifted to 
Kashmir post haste could stem the raiders" advance, save Srinagar and liberate 
a major portion of the valley. Force had to be applied also in Hyderabad and 
Goa. The Prime Minister's statement that Goa was a 'pimple' and could be 
settled "gently" showed a surprising, ignorance of the ways of the Portuguese 
dictator, Salazar. But Jawaharlal Nehru refiised to learn. Even the bitter 
experience of the border war with China did not fully cure the government of 
the malady as events soon after Nehru's death confirmed.'^  
Among those who wielded supreme power in India after 1947, Mrs. 
Gandhi had some instinctive understanding of these basic requirements. But 
she was not able to rise above manipulative politics. It was the second decade 
of independence, which turned out to be more dangerous and more difficuh. It 
was during this period that India's foreign policy and its basic postulates faced 
the harshest challenges both from abroad and from within the country. 
Jawaharlal's foreign policy framework received hammer blows and 
precariously reeled under their impact. The short border war in 1962 wit 
shock and the shame of reversals on the Himalayan heights and the exposure of 
military weaknesses of India that acted as an albatross aroimd the neck (of 
Indian foreign policy) for many a subsequent years, which the country took 
nearly another decade to shake off and to recover from its mhibiting impact. 
Disputes over national policies were sorted out within the congress 
party. According to Indian and foreign observers alike, India's one party 
dominant system - 'the Congress' system, conferred great advantages on a 
developing country. Congress governed at the Center and in most of the states, 
providing over all political stability. Jhdia challenged the assumption that only 
rich countries could be democracies. 
These policies and assumptions have all been challenged in the past 
fifteen years. One by one, the images of a stable, orderly, peaceful, and 
progressive India have given way to a series of interacting social, political and 
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progressive economic revolutions. Since the late 1980's; India has become a 
"revolutionary state" experiencing political, social and economic upheavals. 
The West Indian-British author V.S. Naipaul has called this process "A Million 
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Mutinies Now". There are not so much "bloody revolutions" as "bleeding 
revolutions". As Indian anthropologist M.N. Srinivas has observed, "Indians 
are actually living in a revolution, although it is not always recognized by many 
of them nor, for that matter, by the outside world". ^^  
These revolutions include the Dursting forth of hitherto quiescent 
groups, usually from low castes, with demands for ethnic and linguistic 
autonomy, a changed center-state relationship, a transformed Indian Diaspora, 
and a direct challenge to India's secular order. On top of this, the global 
information revolution is spreading through out the country. All of this has 
occurred at a time when nearby regional conflicts are spilling over into India, 
and Delhi's foreign policy, loosened from its non-aligned moorings, is more 
than ever a function of these profound domestic economic, political and social 
revolutions. 
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India's lone security-related economic and technical success has been in 
the area of missile development and related space launch vehicles and 
satellites. The most prominent spokesman for this position is the current 
president of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. He has frequently argued that Indian 
defense science provides the model for the rest of Indian society. One of 
Kalam's boasts is that India has the ability to design a "state of the-art" ABM 
System, an ICBM, and a supersonic earth-orbiting plane."If adequate funds are 
made available for the project^ '"" Similar boasts are regularly heard from 
India's nuclear establishment. Yet India's Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO) can not produce a modem aircraft or Tank, and some 
now doubt that the May 1998 nuclear tests were as successfiil as claimed or 
that India has more nuclear weapons than Pakistan.'"^ 
Indian economic reforms, the so-called first war, are still in their 
infancy. So far, they have concentrated on improving the climate for foreign 
investors. Surprisingly, some of the greatest problems may arise in the software 
and computer industry. 
The Indian constitution established a 'unitary political system' making 
the centre responsible for defense and foreign policy, and giving the states 
presumptive authority over law and order, education, and social policies. In 
practice, the balance of power has always tilted towards the center. The 
centralisation of power within Congress coincided with an eighteen-month. 
"Emergency" (during 1975-77) that brought autocracy to India. Jhe 
Emergency contributed to a resurgence of regional parties. Dissident Congress 
party leaders who had been rejected by New Delhi but who still had a strong 
base in the states sometimes formed these state parties. This movement of 
power to the states, and perhaps the creation of many new and smaller states, 
has implications for India's role in the region and its relations with other 
countries. 
A new wave of state creation began in 2000 as a result of the BJPs 
pledges when it was in opposition. Three new states were created. India's 
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approximately forty political parties are found mostly at the state level and 
there are at least seven national parties. All but three or four of these forty 
parties have their power in a single state. State-level parties have determined 
election outcomes as well as the fate of coalitions, turning the tables in Indian 
politics. Most of India's state based parties are opposed to Delhi's heavy hand. 
From their perspective, the government of India should be just strong enough 
to carry out minimum security needs and provide financial support to state 
development plans; most would also prefer greater freedom to directly 
negotiate foreign, economic, cultural, and even political ties. 
Political organization, political tradition, structure of government and 
enlightened leadership also contribute to the shaping of an effective foreign 
policy. The traditions of peace, truth and non-violence enabled India to insist 
on peaceful settlement of international disputes and encourage disarmament. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from 
1947 till his death in 1964. The foundations of India's foreign policy were 
firmly laid by him. Nehru, as the head of the Interim Government, had declared 
as early as September 7, 1946 principal objectives of India's foreign policy. In 
a broadcast to the nation he had said: 
We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with 
our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation, we hope to 
develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to cooperate with them 
in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. We are particularly interested in 
the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the 
recognition in theory and practice of equal, opportunities for all races.'°^ But, 
Nehru was not a realist of Kautilya-Morganthan School. He was deeply 
impressed by his leader, Mahatma Gandhi who was an idealist and insisted on 
application of moral principles in the conduct of all politics. Nehru therefore, 
did not find any incompatibility between India's national interest and the 
legitimate interests of other nations. 
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Dealing with "national interest as an end", J. Bandhopadhyaya refers to 
realism and idealism and concludes that, "On the whole it would be correct to 
say that there is a stronger accent on idealism in the modem Indian thinking on 
international relations... than in any other country in the world". '*^  Kautilya 
the master of statecraft in India, in the 4*** century BC; considered politics as 'a 
game of power, and justified increase in the prince's power through conquest 
by all means at his disposal. Among the modem Indian statesmen, "Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel is often regarded as a Realist pai excellence". '"^  
India has a parliamentary executive more or less similar to the executive 
in Britain. Making of foreign policy is essentially the responsibility of the 
cabinet as a whole. Decision-making is a cumulative process involving a 
number of elements and a complex procedure. It is of course, a difficult 
process, because much dependence on such variable factors as individual 
personalities and the nature of the situation whose combined effect can not be 
precisely gauged. But in any proper assessment of the factors shaping foreign 
policy, none of these numerous elements can be ignored.'°^ 
Ever since 1947 when India became independent, she has taken an 
active part in the work of the United Nations. Testifying to the useful and 
effective part that she has played. Lord Birdwood, a member of United 
Kingdom delegation to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, stated 
that India was "an effective and balancing influence in the world affairs so far 
as the United Nations' organization is concemed'"^ : India has taken the view 
that the collective security fimction of the United Nations as envisaged in 
chapter VIII of the Charter should not be emphasized because of the cold war 
which developed soon after the charter was signed.'^ * The cold war has made it 
difficult for the permanent members; the agreements by which armed forces 
were to make available to the Security Council for the maintenance of security 
were never effectively made. 
37 
India has always approached the subject of security in its larger 
framework, beyond that implicit in defence and military forces. The concept of 
security has involved the preservation and perpetuation of the core values. 
Core Values of National Security 
(a) Democratic political setup 
(b) Secular state 
(c) Socialist nature of the state. 
(d) Attainment of egalitarian society 
(e) Maintenance of Internal peace and security 
(f) Economic development and progress 
These values had shaped the Indian civilization and they provide the 
foundations on which modem India could be built taking into account the 
historical and socio-economic conditions in the country. 
Kautilya, the military thinker, had classified four threats to national 
security in Arthashastra: 
(a) External threats with external complicity. Ex- China and Pakistan. 
(b) Internal threat with external complexicity Ex. - The problem of Mizo 
and Nagaland. 
(c) External threats with internal complicity Ex. - Kashmir issue. 
(d) Internal threats with internal complexity Ex. - Naxalite problem 
Further argument is, socio-political dimensions be placed in 'D' 
categories because we have serious problems from socio-political dimensions 
to the national security. *°^  
We have entered the 2V^ century in an age of information and 
technology. Social development will help the nation despite diversities of 
regions, religions, languages, classes, castes and customs; however over all 
integration of identities exist. Political leaders speak of unity in diversity. 
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However, there is no denying the fact that Indian society is being subjected to 
considerable stresses and strains. 
India's main foreign policy objectives are based on peacefiil co-
existence, self reliance and cooperation, non-alignment, support for 
decolonisations, disarmament, restructuring of the iniquitous International 
Economic Order and the global fight against racialism. India's first Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru laid down the basic parameters of India's foreign 
policy and his unique contribution was the concept of non-alignment.''° The 
fundamental aim was to preserve India's fi-eedom of option and decision-
making in an autonomous way, in a world bristling with animosities and bloc 
antagonism. 
If we look at the Indian situation, the seven countries of South Asia, 
which have got 20 percent of the global population within their borders - India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives account for 
hardly 1.2 per cent of the world's military expenditure. That is the international 
situation.'" 
The main preoccupation of Indian foreign policy since the 
achievement of freedom had been relations with Pakistan. Pakistan's military 
link with America greatly strengthened the combat strength of the Pakistani 
Army, although India was much larger than Pakistan in terms of its 
geographical extent and population and also was industrially much more 
advanced. The military link between Pakistan and United States, the Pakistan 
Army had continued to grow both in numbers, in fire power and in strength."^ 
The deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations, the growing American 
involvement in Vietnam, and the liberal sympathies of the Kennedy 
administration all combined together to introduce a new element in the 
triangular relationship between India, Pakistan and the JJnited States. 
Pakistan in its single-minded pursuit of its objective of forging of an 
anti-Indian coalition had established intimate relations with China. From the 
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days Pakistani leaders had taken great pains to explain to the Chinese the real 
significance of their participation in CENTO and SEATO Pacts. The Pakistani 
overture to China at Bandung had thus met with an understanding response 
from China. 
India-Pakistan bilateral relations continued to show a downward trend. 
Pakistan's sustained efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, its unabated 
support to subversion and terrorism directed against India, its intransigence on 
the issue of resumption of bilateral dialogue with India, and its persistent 
negative approach have vitiated the atmosphere and prevented a meaningful 
progress in bilateral relations. In addition to training, equipping funding and 
guiding militants, Pakistan has stepped up its transborder terrorism by 
inducting mercenaries from third countries into Jammu and Kashmir."^ India 
apprised the international community of the politically motivated act by 
Pakistan and emphasized that all outstanding issues between the two countries 
need to be resolved peacefully and bilaterally within the framework of the 
Shimla Agreement. 
Pakistan acquired the nuclear capability on the pretext of "security" 
threat from India's PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) of 1974. In Sept. 1965, 
after western media circulated reports from New Delhi that India would shortly 
explode a nuclear device, there was a flutter in Pakistani media. 
Since Pakistan can beat back an attack supported by the bulk of the 
conventional arms possessed by India, the only course open to that country is to 
acquire nuclear arms and keep them ready for use against Pakistan... If India 
decides to let its nuclear ambitions have free scope... its purpose will be to 
black mail its small neighbours especially Pakistan.''"* 
The late Z.A. Bhutto, who is considered as the architect of Pakistan's 
nuclear policy, wrote in 1967 that India was determined to detonate a nuclear 
bomb and if Pakistan restricted or suspended its nuclear programme, it would 
enable India to blackmail Pakistan"^. Despite India's declared declaration it 
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would never use nuclear energy for military purpose and that the PNE of 18 
May 1974 was part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear 
explosions"^, Pakistan has continued to have apprehensions. Pakistan's then 
Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, in a press statement on 19 May 1974 said, 
"....Given the brutal fact of 18 May explosion, Pakistan can not be expected to 
rest on technicalities and protocol. Despite repeated efforts by the then Prime 
Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi to make it clear to the whole world 
particularly Pakistan that all these nuclear explosions are for peaceful purposes, 
Pakistan has sought refuge in the security argument and embarked on its 
massive programme of acquiring nuclear capability and to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. The "Security" argument has thus been the main plank to acquire 
nuclear capability by the NNWS. Thus, the industrial and scientific potentials 
of the PNE attracted various countries, mostly the developing ones like, India, 
Egypt, Brazil, Australia, Romania and many others to harness this potential for 
their economic development."* The potential use of PNE evoked considerable 
interest both among the NWS as well as among the NNWS. 
The nuclear curtain in South Asia is finally lifted following multiple 
nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998, chased immediately by Pakistan, 
declared themselves "nuclear weapon states" but the P-5 (Permanent members 
of the Security council and nuclear weapon states) have refused to give them 
entry into privileged nuclear club, arguing that post-NPT nuclear states are 
legally debarred from joining it. The US, including G-8 members in retaliation 
announced economic sanctions against both countries and has urged them to 
sign the CTBT unconditionally. But to the dismay and anguish of America, the 
Indian Prime Minister has refused to sign the CTBT under the duress of any 
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power. 
The strategic neighbourhood of a country extends beyond its 
immediate neighbours. This is the area where its important commercial and 
security interests lie. In the long-term perspective, countries situated on the east 
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coast of Africa from South Africa to Somalia, including Sudan and Egypt, and 
the Gulf countries are ot strategic interest to India. For somewhat similar 
reasons, and for the additional reason of tangible Chinese presence, the region 
to the South East of Myanmar, including the States of Laos, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia is of great strategic interest to 
India. These two regions may be described as India's extended neighbourhood. 
However, the core area which is of immediate strategic concern to India 
consists of Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Internal and external developments in these countries 
impinge on India in a major way. This region is to be regarded as India's 
immediate neighbourhood. 
India's security is vitally dependent on developments in this region. In 
recent years India has faced the biggest threat to its security from the low-
intensity war waged by Pakistan against the Indian State over the issue of 
Kashmir.'^ ° 
What have made India the only major factor in Pakistan's foreign 
policy are not merely the disputes, which bedevil their mutual relations, but 
also the more basic factors involved in making of attitudes. Keith Callard has 
summed up some of these in his political study of Pakistan. Maintaining that 
problems of relations with India have dominated foreign affairs", defense and 
economic policy and has lain, behind many of the moves of internal politics, 
Callard continues, 'In large measure Pakistani feeling towards India has been a 
continuation of the political struggle before partition....'The idea that a country 
has a foreign enemy is easy for the mass of the people to understand, and it also 
provides a powerful stimulus to unity. For Pakistan India has filled this role.'^' 
A number of questions were raised about the Government of India's 
decision to go nuclear in terms of its defence capacities. They need answers. 
The answer lies simply in the security environment around India stretching 
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from Diego-Garcia in the West in an encircling are right upto Pakistan, the 
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. There are a number of countries with a nuclear 
weapons presence in this region, one of which Pakistan has threatened to use 
nuclear weapons missile capacities against India. More than once Pakistan's 
relations with other nuclear weapons powers such as China and the US cannot 
be ignored by India. 
The ongoing process of normalisation between New Delhi and Beijing 
must continue through various CBMs. The only significant irritant between the 
two, as on today, is the sensitive border issue. Both Beijing and New Delhi 
must find ways of avoiding war or a war - like situation, for any war could go 
nuclear.'^ ^ 
China's modernization and military build up has concentrated on the 
navy and air force. It has a large submarine force of some 71 submarines of 
varying vintage as also one nuclear submarine. It is trying to modernize its 
conventional submarines and design and build better nuclear submarines.'^ '* 
To India, the Chinese military build up poses two threats. One is direct 
to our northern borders using the unsettled Sino-Indian border dispute as a 
pretext. China has considerably improved its military infrastructure in Tibet, by 
constructing some 13 air bases and laying the Gormo-Lhasa oil Pipeline that 
eases its problem of supplying fuel to its forces in Tibet. China's growing 
influence in Myanmar opens another possible thrust line to the North-East 
States.'^ ^ The second, more insidious and long term threat lies in China's effort 
to become the sole Asian 'power'. 
Crucial developments have taken place in the strategic neighbourhood 
of India. Some have emerged as threats while others have offered opportunities 
on which future strategies could be based. There are only minor irritants in 
India's relations with its smaller neighbours but they are no less significant. For 
instance, the ISI is using the Nepalese territory for anti-India activities. North-
east insurgents and militants are using southern Bhutan for their purposes. The 
43 
ISI also tried to get foothold in Sri-Lanka when its army was in trouble. India's 
ties with Myanmar have improved but it is nowhere near multifaceted relations 
of the Chinese. Though Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh deteriorated at the 
governmental level, the ISI has been able to develop links with ascendant 
Muslim fundamentalists. India needs to devise a cohesive policy to deal with 
these security concerns. In spite of India's efforts for arriving at a long term 
comprehensive and equitable arrangement on water sharing, Bangladesh 
continues to raise the issue in international fora. 
Nuclear Politics 
Like all age-old games of politics, nuclear weapons in South Asia are 
the offspring of nuclear politics played by India and Pakistan. South Asia has 
turned out to be one of the most dangerous nuclear'^ hotspots". When India 
conducted multiple nuclear testing in May 1998 which was followed by 
Pakistan's tests of 28 and 30 May 1998. Records assiduously maintained and 
collected by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey Institute of 
International studies, California; indicate that Pakistan went into high gear to 
become a nuclear weapons state from 1977. 
The nuclearisation in South Asia has caused a great anxiety to the 
entire world community, staunchly condenming the nuclear tests conducted by 
India and Pakistan. The P-5 advised India aiid Pakistan to resolve their bilateral 
disputes, especially the Kashmir problem, peacefully. The root cause of the 
nuclear arms race in South Asia is the persisting psycho-cultural 
incompatibilities between India and Pakistan stemming from the historical 
hostility between them. 
Indian Ocean Region and the Issue of Peace 2k)ne 
The old dictum "if you want peace understand war" was true in the 
past but in the present context, particularly after the second world war, it has 
become more significant, because of the "enormous damage, the maiming and 
loss of lives"'^ ^ caused by war. It left the man shaken and broken, of course 
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with conviction and desire for establishment of perennial peace. But the efforts 
made by various agencies and leaders have failed to create an atmosphere free 
from tensions and conflicts. Although no major war engulfing the whole world 
has taken place, there have been serious conflicts, particularly in Asia, which 
certainly brought the world nearer the precipice of another world war. 
Therefore, the present peace based on the theory of deterrence is dangerous as 
it aims at increasing war capabilities of nations. Moreover, such a policy 
ensures a short term but elusive and slippery stability. It is bound to either 
breakdown at any time, or with the passage of time, would cease to deter.'^ * To 
quote Headley Bull, "Arms control is relevant when tension is at a certain 
point, about which it is impossible and beneath which, it is imnecessary". 
There is, therefore, a great need in some regions of the world, which 
are susceptible to tensions in the near future, such as Indian Ocean, to establish 
a zone of peace. 
The Establishment of Peace Zone 
The idea of 'zone of peace' seeks to ensure that neither would the non-
littoral states in future have permanent naval forces stationed in the Indian 
Ocean nor would they seek military bases in the region. Militarization of the 
Indian Ocean by the outside powers is a matter of serious concern primarily to 
the countries of the region. It has also been argued 'one of the immediate 
dangers of this apparent trend is that the Indian ocean, which has been 
relatively free in this respect is in danger of becoming a satellite of the security 
system of major powers, both as a launching area as well as a target?^ ^® 
The idea of nuclear weapon free zone has been invoking considerable 
interest in as much as it entails the regional prescription of nuclear weapons 
through self-renunciation by the regional states and the inhibitions of the 
external nuclear powers. According to Felix Calderon, the establishment of a 
nuclear weapons free zone has, stricto sensu two aspects one related to its 
adoption de jure, and other relates to its validity defacto.'^' 
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The de jure adoption of NWFZ (Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) implies 
the solution of a series of problems of theoretical nature where as the defacto 
adoption pertains to a process which can be prolonged mdefmitely, especially 
when new developments occur. However Calderon is of the view that the 
creation de jure of a NWFZ is one thing and its de facto application is 
another.'^ ^ 
The main difficulties in establishing the NWFZs are primarily of a 
theoretical nature for want of adequate consensus among experts regarding the 
meaning and scope of NWFZs concept. Even the condensed study carried out 
in 1975 by the adhoc group of qualified governmental experts on behalf of the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), which was published in 
1976 by the Ui>[ under the title, comprehensive study of the Question of 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its aspects, '^ ^ did not include a definition of 
the NWFZ. The other crucial question like transit, the zone application and 
PNE were left out by the above mentioned study. 
The general impression has been created that the creation of NWFZs 
could "contribute to the general purpose of preventing the horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear weapons"'^ '* such an attitude has been developed 
mainly due to the adoption of Tlatelolco Treaty, India's PNE of 18 May, 1974 
and the intense debate in the UN which followed India's PNE. 
No precise definition of NWFZ has been advanced so far. The 
available definitions are either confined to the simple use of synonyms or more 
emphasis on legal formalities and yet some combine both with the political 
dimensions of the concept. 
In the context of the peace zone in the Indian Ocean, it has been 
suggested that not only "measures of arms control and disarmament, but also 
political measures to promote peace and security in the region, be 
strengthened". '^ ^ The increase in American naval patrolling in the Indian 
Ocean leads to an impression that 'US will with draw fi-om its forward 
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fortresses* on the Asian mainland and re-establish them instead on the oceanic 
region.'^ ^ The strategic characteristic of future warfare in the region will place 
greater reliance on the oceans as it would provide bases for launching of 
submarines and missiles. It is redundant to discuss whether or not the American 
presence in the Indian Ocean is due to the Soviet naval presence because the 
rivalry in the Indian Ocean has a wider context than the regional power 
conflict, and therefore, is a part of their policy of "maintaining a stable 
worldwide balance of power." The united front, which was formed for the 
"maintenance of international peace and security", '^ ^ has rightly assessed that 
with the end of colonialism in the Indian ocean littoral here has been 
"intensification of big power rivahy in the region'^ *, causing threat to the 
freedom of Afro-Asian nations". 
The adoption of the policy of non-alignment by a majority of the 
regional nations is a step towards the fiilfilhnent of their 'desire to transform 
the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace as a necessary condition for maintaining 
and preserving their political independence and sovereignty'. Therefore, the 
origin of the idea of establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean can be 
traced from the Cairo Conference of the non-aligned states held in 1964 (5 to 
10 October). It condemned the efforts of the imperialists to establish bases in 
the Indian Ocean as a calculated effort to intimidate emerging countries of 
Afro-Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neo-colonialism and 
imperialism.'^ ^ In the Conference emerged a mutual agreed resolution 
regarding the establishment of a nuclear free zone''"' in different parts of the 
world including Afro-Asia; It was also accepted that the intrusion of big powers 
rivalry into the Indian Ocean would threaten the political freedom of the 
countries in the region. At the present movement, we are telling the United 
States and other powers 'please, all of you go away from here', let us keep the 
Indian Ocean as an Ocean of peace.^ *' Even though that resolution was passed 
decades ago no body has left the Indian ocean, on the other hand, they have 
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been putting more vessels into the Indian ocean and they have been building 
more bases in the Indian Ocean. 
The creation of a zone of peace was expected to be a positive step 
towards the goal of reduction of tensions in this region and as such to 
contribute to the strength of international peace and solidarity. It was also 
found most essential to restrict the mad race of rivalries because under the 
"impact of future changes in technology and strategy, the oceans are likely 
to be of ever more military interest in the future than now". '''^  
A peace zone in the Indian Ocean will provide countries of the 
region with time to develop trends towards integration and co-operation so 
that, in course of time, the Indian Ocean region could move from an area of 
low solidarity to an area of high solidarity. Needless to say that the concept 
also aims at opposing the establishment of military bases in the regions that 
would destabilize the region and threaten its security.*"*^  
In tune with the spirit and ideals of Bandung (1955) and Cairo 
(1964) conferences of the non-aligned nations, the concept of Indian Ocean 
as a peace zone was first formulated in September 1970 in the Lusaka 
Conference of the non-aligned nations. It was declared that the defensive 
and offensive armaments should be excluded from the entire high sea area of 
the Indian Ocean, within limits to be specified later.'"^ ^ It was also accepted 
that the warships and other ships carrying war material would have no right 
of transit except for emergency reasons of a mechanical, technical or 
humanitarian nature. There would be a ban on naval menoeuvres, naval 
intelligence operations and weapon's tests. Army, navy and airforce bases 
would also be prohibited.*''^  After this the efforts were to be concentrated on 
the removal of the existing external military bases from the territories of the 
littoral and, if possible, fi-om the hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. 
The concept of peace zone has five major aspects: (1) The 
Resolution of a nuclear-free zone, which figured in the 1970 Lusaka 
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Conference and was confirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1971, urged 
the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France which have the 
capability of deploying nuclear weapons in the area to renounce the nuclear 
build up. It also enjoined upon the regional countries to give an undertaking 
that they would neither allow external powers to build up nuclear bases in 
their territories nor would they develop nuclear war potential themselves. (2) 
The Resolution aimed at halting the future escalation and expansion of 
military presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean. (3) To eliminate the 
great powers rivalry from the ocean region. (4) The Resolution also stressed 
the need for settling regional disputes through peaceful means and mutual 
negotiations without any external interference. (5) The Resolution envisaged 
elimination of colonialism and racism from the oceanic islands and the 
mainland of Afro-Asia. The resolution in the end called upon all states to 
"consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great 
power rivalries and competitions whether army, navy or airforce - are 
excluded. They should also be free of nuclear weapons". '"'^  
Till the post World War II the British played a dominant role in the 
Indian Ocean basin throughout and then gradually moved out after being 
forced to grant independence to the countries of the Indian subcontinent in 
1947. Some ten years later Britain announced its intention to withdraw from 
East ofthe Suez Canal.''** 
For centuries the old colonial powers - Britain, France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal were ihe masters of the Indian Ocean and its 
coasts. From the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began its 
political and economic penetration into this sea.*'*' 
Since then, US is playing a leading role in this region, the very idea 
of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean and of an international conference to 
create that zone is plainly repugnant to the US ruling quarters. To the 
Pentagon it is not a zone of peace but a zone of US military pre-dominance^ 
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to that extent that they want to turn the Indian ocean into a hot bed of 
rivalries, and to this end they are setting up new military bases and 
modernizing old ones in the region, stationing there a Rapid Deployment 
Force poised against the Indian Ocean countries and the Soviet Union.'^° 
The big power presence is a fact, which cannot be wished away by 
the non-aligned powers in their resolutions to make the area a zone of peace. 
What can be realistically sought under the present set of circumstances, is a 
modus Vivendi which ensures that the contest is kept within bounds.'^' The 
progress of the concept in the United Nations and elsewhere seems largely 
illusory and that the opposition to it from some quarters is greater today than 
it was in 1964. Despite the rivalry between the big powers, there has always 
been a threat that the same force will be used against these states in case of 
an emergency'^ ^ to achieve their imperialistic interests. 
The failure of the 1971 UN Resolution declaring the Indian Ocean 
as a zone of peace and free from the big power competition was evidently 
exhibited in Feb. 1974 with the Anglo-American declaration to expand their 
military facilities to the extent of turning the Island of Diego Garcia into a 
full-fledged naval-cum-air force base. The great powers rather than caring 
for the regional sentiments have been working more to realise their 
expansionist policies, and any pressure by regional powers against the 
wishes of the big powers might lead to a refusal by the latter to help the 
weak and under developed nations "even in case of a natural calamity". ^ ^^  
In the light of the developments, that balance of power un-
accompanied by the conditions of arms limitation would make the threat of 
war an imminent reality for the increasing supply of arms in this region 
tends to escalate crisis into war. In the past, efforts were made from time to 
time for a negotiated disarmament and strategic limitation talks. Test Ban 
Treaty 1963, Nuclear Free Zones and Non-Aligned Nations efforts and the 
negotiations for demilitarisation have also been regarded as the prerogatives 
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for the establishment of the perennial peace. Though much success could not 
be achieved, yet at least, future catastrophe can be delayed and the 
destruction can be minimised. 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America was signed on 14 February 1967.'^ '* It is the only 
agreement concluded so far for establishing a nuclear weapons free-zone in 
a densely populated area. Despite the fact that Tlateloleo Treaty establishes 
Latin America as a NWFZ, yet it suffers from two loopholes. Argentina and 
Brazil, two leading countries possessing nuclear capability are main 
holdouts. Besides the Additional Protocol II has not been ratified by the 
Soviet Union. 
A proposal was put forward by Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrei 
Gromyko to the United Nations on 7 December, 1964 in the form of a 
"Memorandum on measures for further easing international tension and 
restricting the arms race." Regarding the developments in the Indian Ocean, 
it proposed, in Section 3 dealing with 'Dismantling of bases on the 
territories of Foreign States, in view of attempts of some states, particularly 
the Anglo-Americans' 'to set-up new military bases in the Indian Ocean 
against the clearly expressed wishes of the people of that region, must be 
vigorously condemned. There can be no justification for the preservation or 
the establishment in future, of military bases on dependent territories where 
those bases serve as an instrument of colonialism.'^^ Whereas, Section 6 of 
the Memorandum relating to the establishment of nuclear free zones'. '^ "^  
Similarly, the regional states can exercise tremendous pressure both 
diplomatic and political by not entering into the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Although the political fragmentation and diversity of their interests do not 
permit the implementation of any positive collective proposal. 
The dilemma faced by the Indian Ocean countries with regard to the 
establishment of a military presence in the region as it affects the regional 
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development, they cannot also force the outside powers to vacate the area 
and; their consent to a limited military presence of the outside powers would 
only legitimise it. 
Convinced of the utility and popularity of the concept of Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace, Sri-Lanka's Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, 
found an opportunity in the Conference of Commonwealth prime ministers 
held on 21 January 1971, at Singapore, to elicit commitment of the 
Commonwealth countries to the concept. She called the member countries 
"to give serious considerations to accept the principle, a formulation 
acceptable to everybody on the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone 
of peace and a nuclear weapon free zone. 
At the initiative of Sri Lanka, the 26"" session of UN General 
Assembly adopted a Resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 
The Resolution submitted by thirteen nations was put to vote at the 2022"'' 
plenary meeting of the 26"" Session of the UN General Assembly on 16'* 
December, 1971.'^Mt was passed by 61 votes in favour and 55 abstentions 
with none voting against it. It forms a significant landmark both in 
philosophical and theoretical aspects. Its operative part, in the opinion of 
K.P. Misra, is more important than the preamble. It has been the main target 
of criticism for it deals with immediate and practical problems. It involves 
almost all countries - the major powers, the maritime uses of the Indian 
Ocean and the littoral states. Its ambiguity relates to the extent of Indian 
Ocean, boundaries of the zone of peace, the great power rivalry, the 
response and reaction of littoral states. The multidimensional aspect of this 
part of the resolution of course, makes it vague and amorphous. 
It is noteworthy that India's maritime security concern is dictated by 
its enormous responsibility in safeguarding the far flung Island territories.'^^ 
This aspect of the security problem came into sharp focus in 1965 (during 
the Indo-Pak war) when Indonesia offered to support Pakistan by carrying 
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out diversionary naval attack on the Andaman Islands. Also, the war with 
Pakistan in 1971 exposed some other vulnerabilities. The Pakistani 
submarine PNS Ghazi, which was on a mission to torpedo INS Vikrant was 
lying in wait in the harbour chaimel of Vishakapatnam port when a chance 
discovery led to its destruction.'^" If to this is added the big power rivalry 
for bases and 'recreation' facilities in the Indian Ocean and specially their 
military strategic linkages with some of the littoral powers - US 
Administration's decision to move the nuclear powered aircraft carrier 
'Enterprise' to the Bay of Bengal in 1971 in support of Pakistan is an 
example - the rationale (and the compulsions) behind India's opposition to 
the big power presence in the Indian Ocean becomes understandable.'^' In 
addition to the diplomatic efforts Indian decision makers have also taken 
care to strengthen the country's naval capabilities. 
Since Sri Lankan effort of 16* December 1971 UN General 
Assembly Resolution, the first concrete step in the direction of establishing 
peace zone in the Indian Ocean, its true nature was embryonic which was 
yet to assume a fuller shape. It is interesting to notice that while Sri Lanka 
(then Ceylon) and Indonesia protested strongly to the entry of the US 
Seventh fleet into the Indian Ocean in December, 1963,'" India's reactions 
were somewhat mild and low keyed. India however supported in 1964, the 
declaration of the second Non-Aligned Conference held at Cairo in October 
1964. 
Nevertheless, the attainment of the resolution was expected to help 
the people "to exclude the Indian Ocean from their policy of competitive 
expansion of armaments in that area in not too distant fliture.'^ ^ 
In January 1973, the UN General Assembly at its 27"" session 
passed a resolution 2992 (XXVII) '^^ which among other things, decided to 
establish an Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. The Adhoc Committee 
which was to consist of fifteen members was entrusted with the task of 
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studying the implications of the peace zone proposal with special reference 
to the practical measures that may be taken to the fiirtherance of the 
objectives of the Resolution, having due regard to the security interests of 
the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. The Resolution urged 
all the States concerned to extend their cooperation in the discharge of their 
functions. 
On 13 December, 1973, the General Assembly passed another 
Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) reaffirming its conviction that action in 
furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial 
contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.'^^ The 
significance of the Resolution 3080 lies in the fact that it requested the 
Secretary- General to prepare a factual statement of the great powers 
military presence in all its aspects in the Indian Ocean, with special 
reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great 
power rivalry. The Expert Committee, which was constituted by the 
Secretary- General, submitted its report in May 1974, which included a 
factual statement of the military presence of great powers. 
India considers the Indian Ocean rivalry as a regional issue, 
threatening not only its security, but that of the countries of the entire littoral 
and hinterland states. Accordingly, India wanted the countries of the region 
to take up the issue collectively and orient their foreign policy towards 
eliminating the big power rivalry in the region. 
The strategic environment in the Indian Ocean region began to 
deteriorate, in the wake of Arab-Israeli Conflict (1973). The then US 
Defence Secretary, James Schlesinges's disclosure at a press conference 
about Pentagons new policy of increasing the US naval strength in the 
Indian Ocean'^ ^, drew a firm protest from India. India's Ambassador in 
Washington T.N.Kaul refusing the US argument, that, the US presence is 
not directed against India's security, emphasized that the presence of the 
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naval forces of the super power injected elements of tension into the region 
and as a littoral state, India has just cause for conceml^^ In the aftermath of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States renewed its efforts to increase its 
presence in the Indian Ocean resulted in the US-UK agreement on naval and 
air base in Diego-Garcia in February 1974. 
One of the Strategies adopted by the western powers was to favour 
and support proposals aimed at regional denuclearisation by making the 
concept of peace zone totally ambiguous. For example. The proposal for 
declaring South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone, as proposed by 
Pakistan "especially after India exploded a nuclear device" in May 1974'^ ^ 
The Pakistani proposal came up before the 29* session of the General 
Assembly. The proposal side-tracked the main issue involved, viz. the 
dangers from the presence of nuclear arsenals in the Indian Ocean, got the 
unanimous backing of the western powers.'^' The U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 3259 (XXIX, 1974) which referred to the need for cooperation 
among the regional states as one of the conditions for the establishment of 
the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean meant, in some respects, a dilution of 
the 1971 Resolution. 
Yet another important strategy employed by the western powers in 
their attempts to scuttle the 1971 Resolution was the proposal for a balanced 
presence of the powers in the Indian Ocean. Familiarly known as the 
Kennedy-Pell Resolution. The operative part of the Resolution said that the 
President of the United States should seek direct negotiation with the USSR 
designed to achieve agreement on limiting deployment of their respective 
naval and other military forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral states. 
The proposal for balanced presence came to be projected by the 
United States again when Carter became the President. The former Soviet 
Union responded to the President Carter's proposal positively and thus 
began the first Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) at Moscow in June 
1977. 
|^-nA^\^ 55 
ij { ^\c. No.) 
The second, the third and the fourth rouhdon^ALT^^j^were held, 
but no significant change resulted. The breakdown of talks was due to 
differences between the two superpowers. 
India expressed disappointment over the failure of the NALT 
between the super powers. In addition to the diplomatic efforts undertaken 
as analyzed, India's Indian Ocean policy also took care to strengthen and 
modernize the country's much-neglected navy. 
So far India had been raising objections to the activities of big 
powers in the Indian Ocean at every opportunity. It is important to mention 
here in a meeting of Adhoc Committee in 1974, India was chosen as a target 
by some of the delegates, particularly of China and Pakistan, who expressed 
their concern about India's nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974. 
The American decision to send the nuclear powered aircraft carrier 
'Enterprise' to the Bay of Bengal in Dec. 1971, as a gesture of their strategic 
military support to Pakistan, developments in the Iranian Navy in the 
Seventies, was a clear indication of the fiiture big power presence in the 
Indian Ocean. Expressing India's concern at the presence of two super 
powers in the India Ocean, the then Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai 
stated on 30 October, 1978 that "India is keen to ensure that the Indian 
Ocean which is of potential tensions, is kept free of great powers?'^'' Six 
months latter, on March 12, 1979, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee repeated the 
apprehension of the previous government in Indian Parliament. 
In order to divert India's attention from the Indian Ocean as a zone 
of peace, Pakistan tried to twist the concept by mooting the idea of regional 
collective security. To counter the concept it was proposed that the peace 
zones must be envisaged through "a system of universal collective 
Security"*'^  by India's permanent representative of United Nations, Rikhi 
Jaipal. The American interest in the Indian Ocean emerged as a part of the 
"Global Strategy" in the post world war II period to contain the expansion of 
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communism in the Afro-Asian region. With the passage of time it assumed a 
variety of dimensions especially politico - military.'^^ Since the end of the 
second world war, external powers are following a policy to have a 
dominant position in this region.'^^ The Pentagon strategists believe that the 
"Diego Garcia" base will enable them to exercise a far more effective 
control over the political and economic policies of South Asian, Middle 
Eastern and East African countries . This process is designed to demonstrate 
US resolve to protect oil routes and with out contributing to an arms race in 
the region. 
America, like any other major power, still relies heavily on force 
and the threat of force to gain political objectives in the third world. ^^* 
Confronted with the Soviet expansionism, American primary concern is to 
make the Soviet Union retreat to its national boundaries. The 'superpower 
interventions' (Editorial, The Tribune, 25 October, 1979). Soviet naval 
entry into the Indian Ocean can only be traced from the year 1968 much 
after the US had already established a chain of bases, including those from 
where the nuclear propelled submarines too could be operated.^ ^^ 
The American military build up in the Indian Ocean was a potent 
danger to India's security and integrity. The US government, however, 
assured not to violate the declaration of 1971 about the Indian Ocean. 
Ignoring its assurance, the US started looking upon its naval and air bases in 
the Indian Ocean and even increased military build up. Since the beginning 
of the eighties the US had been holding regular military exercises in the 
Indian Ocean, particularly in the Diego-Garcia which was unlawfully 
occupied by Britain. The US took steps to ensure that if the situation 
compels it would deploy military forces both in quantity and quality. The 
American move was a clear manifestation of violating UN declaration of 
making Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 
The Indian Ocean was becoming an increasingly dangerous seat of 
international tension. The non-aligned countries were trying to raise world 
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public opinion in favour of zone of peace. The Soviet government was even 
ready to work actively in that direction together with other states 
concerned . '^ ^ In a Seminar on Indian Ocean, External affairs minister P.V. 
Narasimha Rao stated, 'if the Indian Ocean is made a zone of peace, it 
would contribute significantly to reduce international tensions and in 
eliminating the problems that had arisen among the littoral countries'.'^^ 
Increasing numbers of American fleet alarmed the coastal states of 
the Indian Ocean. The non-aligned countries took up the issue in their 
meetings. It was believed that the US was virtually transforming Indian 
Ocean into an American Ocean. 
Supply of sophisticated arms, nuclear weapons and aircraft to 
Pakistan created consternation among the adjoining nations of the Indian 
Ocean. Then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, argued that, 
"India was earnestly trying to prevent the cold war in the Indian Sub-
continent.*'* The USSR was eager to resume bilateral talks with the US on 
the limitation and reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean." It 
stood for the relaxation of tension, for removing the threat of war, for 
broadening peaceful cooperation throughout the world. 
As a principal country on its shores India had vital stakes in keeping 
the Indian Ocean an area of peace from military bases, nuclear weapons and 
big powers rivalry, particularly the deployment of RDF (Rapid Deployment 
Force) of the US. To protect the interests of the littoral states and to keep the 
ocean free from the US battleground, the NAM has to play a major role; the 
non-aligned nations should show exemplary solidarity in realising the 
goal.''' 
The security environment of India is complex and somehow always 
tense. There were multiple threats to India by China's modernization 
programmes and its border dispute with India, acquisition of sophisticated 
weaponry by Pakistan and its terroristic and proxy war activities within the 
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Indian territory and bilateral, although narrow frequency, disputes with other 
neighbouring states, were few of them. The quest for security is ihe utmost 
importance to the government of India, so it insisted on the obedience to the 
declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In this regard and in the 
wake of the Kargil War (1999), and the recommendations of the Kargil 
Review Committee (1999), the Indian Prime Minister set up a group of 
Ministers (GOM) "to review the national security system in its entirety" in 
April 2000. On the Indian Ocean, the GOM report states: 
'The heavily militarised Indian Ocean will continue to adversely 
affect India's economic, political, and military interests in the area. India has 
a vital interest in the security and stability of the Sea Lanes of 
Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean; our energy security is closely 
linked to maritime security. The cardinal principle of India's ocean policy 
was based on peaceful approach, which opposed military installations of big 
powers in the Indian Ocean*. 
India could not depend either on US or the USSR as in case it 
depends on USSR,it would be disastrous because it would have international 
repercussions with potentialities to develop into the Third World War. Nor 
India could depend on China. The growing Chinese nuclear capability was 
itself a matter of concern. It is surprising enough why the militarisation 
continued even after the UN declaration supporting India's stand of a zone 
of peace? The growing inter-regional rivalries and lack of enthusiasm 
prompted foreign powers to intrude into the Ocean and the Zone of peace 
has been turned into a zone of conflict. 
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Chapter - II 
SOUTH ASIAN CRISES: OPTIONS FOR INDIA 
South Asia today constitutes a distinct international sub-system. Its 
entire area was under British colonial subjugation and naturally it hardly 
played any role in global politics prior to Second World War but with the 
liquidation of British colonialism in this part of the world, one could foresee 
a number of permutations and combinations in international politics. Until 
that war, five great powers namely; Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Australia, Hungary and Russia were dominating the show. 
In the post war period, as a result of the great ideological divide 
between the capitalist world and the communists, the cold war 
overshadowed the horizons of the world. Every political development or 
interaction was measured through a coloured glass of power politics. It was 
in such a distorted world order that the newly emergent nations of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, had to find out a role for themselves. Instead of 
individually trying to influence the course of world politics, these small or 
medium powers, decided to interact with the outside world in a cluster. Even 
the political and socio-economic relations amongst them were given a 
significant momentum through some regional forums like the European 
Economic Community (EEC), Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). South Asian Association of 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which is the latest of such groupmgs. All 
these are primarily regional experiments for solving the mutual socio-
economic or politico-security problems.' 
Most of the South Asian states are ex-colonial societies and have yet 
to resolve the problems of national identity and statehood. The thrust of the 
anti-colonial struggle was to get rid of the aliens and thus little thought was 
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given to the problem of developing a genuine national consciousness and 
cohesiveness: linguistic, tribal, ethnic and religious differences were 
overlooked with a mistaken assumption that all forms of particularism with 
the sole exception of nationalism were archaic, had no relevance to a 
modem society and would disappear with the end of colonialism. It was 
only after the advent of independence that they realized that the so called 
transfer of power was merely the transfer of government machinery from 
colonial rulers to the indigenous elite. There was little national consensus 
about the nature and character of the post-colonial state. 
In South Asia, most of the periphery conflicts that emerged have roots 
in demands asserted by smaller ethnic groups against the dominant ethnic 
group controlling the center. Ethnic diversity by itself does not necessarily 
generate ethnic conflicts. In societies where various ethnic groups feel 
socially, economically and politically contended there is lesser room for 
vulnerability to conflicts emerging from ethnicity. Problems arise when a 
particular ethnic community develops a sense of deprivation and 
discrimination either perceived and/or real regarding social, cultural, 
linguistic, economic and political opportunities as a distinct group 
competing for access to limited resources and opportunities available. 
Failure of the state to accommodate these demands and aspirations of a 
particular ethnic group produces disaffection, which eventually leads to 
articulation of political demands ranging from local political economy to 
secession. 
The relevance of language in the intra-regional relations in South 
Asia lies in the fact that two major states (India and Pakistan) are essentially 
multilingual. Besides, a number of languages are either spoken or 
understood in more than one country in the region. For instance, Urdu is 
spoken by a large number of North Indians and by a considerable number of 
people in South India especially in the areas of old princely state of 
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Hyderabad. In Pakistan it is recognized as the official language. Bengali is 
the official language of Bangladesh and is one of the regional languages in 
India. Nepali the official language of Nepal is largely spoken in Darjeeling 
district of West Bengal in India. Tamil one of the regional languages in 
India, has been recognized also in Sri Lanka as a second language. So, on 
the whole, one notices a unique feature in this region, where international 
boundaries do not necessarily coincide with the linguistic boundaries. 
Moreover, one hardly notices the co-relation of any religion to a particular 
linguistic group."' 
Because of the overlapping of some languages in the South Asian 
states, one often notices concern of the leaders of one nation for the 
recognition and uplift of a particular language in the neighbouring country, 
provided that it is also largely spoken or used as an official language in their 
own country. Obviously it has a negative impact in the intra-regional 
relations in South Asia. 
The factors, which design the setting of South Asian countries can be 
classified as "push factors" and "pull factors". The "push factors" 
encompass the colonial legacy, the problem of immigrants, religion and 
language. Under the external factors which are otherwise known as the "pull 
factors" are the basic goals and interests of major global powers in the South 
Asian region, particular among which are the policies of great powers like 
USA, Soviet Union and China. 
Almost all the South Asian nations like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka had to experience the rigours impact of British colonialism. 
More or less the economy of South Asia became an appendage of British 
economy. Even the peripheral land locked states like Afghanistan and 
Nepal, which apparently enjoyed a certain amount of political autonomy, 
were heavily dependent on British imperial power for their economic 
survival, because their lifeline was controlled by the latter."* 
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A major offshoot of British imperialism in South Asia was the 
growing bitterness and distrust between the core-nation India and other 
peripheral nations, especially Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Therefore, 
after independence, most of these nations planned their economies and trade 
patterns in isolation from one another. Because of such an unnatural 
diversion of the intra-regional trade in South Asia, the external economic 
relations of the regional states have become more or less competitive at the 
global level and quite negligible at the regional level. 
The "Push factors" that shape the foreign policies of different South 
Asian countries is the diplomacy of trans-regional powers. South Asia is 
characterized by a low level of political integration economic development 
and collective self-reliance in defence. With the end of the imperial rule the 
processes of social and economic unrest became manifest and contributed to 
the sprouting of the perpetual problem of insecurity in the region. Internal 
turmoil s, inherent contradictions and separatist strains within the region 
rendered it susceptible to the influences of external powers. Economic and 
political instability as a rule, not as an exception, invite subversive activities 
by outside powers. Their task is made easier when the ruling elites 
themselves fall into the booby traps of provocateurs in the hope of winning 
favours from them. In fact the new leaders in the quest of restructuring their 
societies aroused the socio-economic expectations and aspiration of their 
peoples. ^ 
As far as the policy postures of extra-regional powers are concerned 
they cannot be identical but are in fact divergent due to their varied national 
interests, which are mainly determined by their military capabilities, 
resource priorities, commitments and geopolitical needs. Geographically, the 
US is at the farthest distance, while the USSR and China are proximate to 
the region but Beijing has a relative advantage over both Moscow and 
Washington. China considers its security stakes to be much greater than 
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those of the US and USSR. Without exaggeration, the US-Soviet rivalry and 
Soviet-American-Chinese influence building process in the region have 
tended to deepen conflicts within the region. As a result, the pre-
independence's strategic and spiritual unity has been shattered. 
Alongwith the socio-economic factors as already mentioned, the 
socio-cultural factors like religion and language, play no less an important 
role in the shaping of intra regional relations in South Asia. South Asia is a 
unique region in the sense that it provides a platform for a wide variety of 
religions and languages. Several religions and languages in the region 
invariably cut across the territorial boundaries of the nation - states. They 
have therefore, naturally become important factors in the shaping of foreign 
policies of the respective states and especially in projecting their outlook 
towards their South Asian neighbours.^ 
There is no denying the fact the "strikingly different social values, 
institutions and patterns of behaviour" of different nations in South Asia are 
rooted in their diverse religious traditions.^ 
While analyzing the relevance of religion in the intra-regional 
relations in South Asia its three aspects have been focussed. These are: (i) 
Religion as a great ideal; (ii) Religion as a national identity and (iii) Religion as 
a communal irritant. Broadly speaking, one cannot dispute such an analysis. As 
a matter of fact a great amount of tension in the intra-regional affairs of South 
Asia has occurred because of the lack of realization on the part of the ruling 
elites of this region on the grounds that religion is a great ideal, a nationalist 
symbol and also a communal irritant.^  
In a nutshell, while summing up the relevance of religion in the intra-
regional relations in South Asia, the following scenario emerges. Instead of 
playing a unifying role in this region its role has primarily been destructive. 
Instead of drawing the people of neighbouring nations together, it has taken 
them apart by fomenting tensions and antagonism. 
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Crucial Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia 
The attainment of political independence by the peoples of South Asia in 
the late 40s opened a realistic way to the solution of their problems and to 
bringing about economic and social progress. But the rallymg of the newly 
independent states on a common platform of independence, peace and progress 
was exactly what imperialism, above all US imperialism, was against, since 
this ran counter to its plans for political and economic world domination.^  
This is why, from the very beginning of independence, the countries of 
South Asia have found themselves being the victims of a course pursued by the 
imperialist circles aimed at stirring up the regional hotbeds of tension, sowing 
disunity and creating conflict situations. 
South Asia is facing an increasingly mounting pressure from the crisis in 
state and nation building. The region consists of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, 
multi-cultural and multi-racial entities. It is besieged by many ethnic conflicts 
both old and new. The task of nation buildmg has proved to be one of the most 
intractable problems and lies at the root of much of the political turmoil in 
many parts of the region. In most cases the conflict arises from lack of 
consensus in the ruling elites and diverse ethnic groups regarding the ideals of 
the state. 
The constant inflow of economic migrants or influx of refugees due to 
internal conflict has brought about a significant shift in the ethnic composition 
in different areas of most of the South Asian states resulting in the alienation of 
the local population and sharpening of local tensions and also causing inter-
state tensions. This is witnessed in northeast India, Sindh (Pakistan), Bhutan, 
Nepal and Bangladesh. The sharing and management of water resources, both 
within and between the South Asian states, have created problems having 
bearings on the internal as well as external security of these states. ^ ° We would 
now analyze the position of major players in the region: 
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(a) Pakistan 
The State of Pakistan that came into existence in 1947 was the 
expression of a particular historical experience- that of the Indian Muslims. 
Even its disintegration in 1971 was also a product of that experience. 
Elsewhere in India Islam remained a conqueror's religion. But in the delta 
lands of eastern Bengal, where Brahminical Hindu culture had never struck 
deep roots the native inhabitants were peacefully converted to the faith of their 
Muslim rulers during the first three centuries after the Afghan-Turkish 
conquerors entered Bengal at the beginning of the thirteenth century. This 
popular conversion to Islam under a Muslim aristocracy whose origins and 
affinities lay outside Bengal established the necessary condition of the Muslim 
civil war in Pakistan in 1971 out of which has now emerged the new state of 
Bangladesh.'' 
Pakistan is also a muhi-ethnic, muhi-lingual and multi-cultural state. 
The country has been facing strong ethno-national and ethno-regional 
movements ever since it came into being. Major ethnic groups of Pakistan are: 
Punjabis 68%, Sindhis 13%, Pathans 8.5%, Urdu speaking 7.6% and Baluchis 
2.5%.'^ Ethno-nationalism remains a formidable danger to Pakistan's security 
"politicized ethnic consciousness may be found today among Muhajirs, 
Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Baluchis, Saraikis and even Punjabis". In fact, Pakistan's 
politics has been punctured by "failures to establish a modus vivendi among its 
ethnically varied citizens and also among its elites? As a consequence, it has 
experienced virtually all varieties of internal conflicts, i.e., tribal insurgencies 
ethnic and sectarian struggles, civil war, secession, border conflicts, 
irredentism and conventional war. 
At present, ethnic conflict in Sindh seems most intractable. Sindh is the 
most ethnically diverse of Pakistan's four provinces, both, due to international 
transfer of peoples into the province during and subsequent to partition in 1947, 
and domestic internal migration since 1947. The 1981 census disclosed that 
Sindh province had a population of 193 million oMj^ onij^  10.6 millijM<^.7%) 
are indigenous Sindhis; 4.6 million (24.1%) Urdu ^ a i ^ ^ ^ g ^ g ^ ; over 2 
million (10.6%) Punjabis; 1.1 million (6%) Baluchis and 0.7 million (3.6%) 
Pathans. Besides, there are about one million illegal Bengali migrants, mainly 
living in Karachi. As most of the migrants have settled in the urban areas of the 
province, the native Sindhi's have become a minority in Sindh's two largest 
cities, Karachi and Hyderabad.'^  
The native Sindhi population fears that the influx of Urdu speaking 
refugees would not only marginalize them politically and economically but 
would also undermine their language and culture. The ethnic conflict is largely 
a result of political and economic disequilibrium between Sindhis and Mohajirs 
and other migrants such as Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Baluchis and Afghans. The 
"sons of the soil" believe they have been dispossessed by the new immigrants, 
and also have been reduced to a minority in their own province. The 
discrepancy between disproportionately over-representation of Muharjirs and 
under representation of Sindhis in Pakistan's civil and military bureaucracies 
and business elite lies in the root of the problem. 
Ethnic tension in Pakistan has reinforced center-periphery conflict and 
accentuated intra-regional discord. The imbalance between the power, the 
population and the economic potential of Punjab and those of the smaller 
provinces, has made ethnic politics and regionalism unavoidable issues. It has 
not only influenced the center-province but also inter-province relations and the 
process of nation building itself. The federal bureaucracy and the armed forces 
are dominated by Punjabi-Pukhtoon elites, which has been greatly resented to 
by the smaller ethnic groups like, Sindhis, Baluch and Muhajirs. The officers 
and the rank and file of the armed forces are mainly Punjabis and Pukhtoons, 
the former generally believed to be nearly 70% and the latter 25% to 30%.''* It 
should be underlined that Pukhtoons over a period have been co-opted in the 
nation building process. Presently, in the senior civil bureaucracy, the Punjabis 
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and Pukhtoons have a disproportionately high representation, and the Urdu 
speaking group, a one time dominant fraction, still retains a disproportionately 
large presence. On the other hand Sindhis, despite some recent appointments to 
high positions, are still under-represented. The Baluchs are also under-
represented and being a small group may have little influence even if given a 
proportional share in power. 
The attitude and policy of the dominant elite in Pakistan has remained 
unchanged even after the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. After 1971 ethnic 
movements developed in Baluchistan and Sindh. Like Bengalis, Baluchis, 
Sindhis and Muhajirs have risen in complaint against mistreatment or neglect 
by the federal government, or inadequate access to political power and to 
economic and cultural resources. Adding to Pakistan's problem is a "new and 
aggressive sense of reverse discrimination and chauvinism that is growing in 
Punjab". The sharing of waters and the construction of multipurpose Kalabagh 
dam over the river Indus has also triggered provincial chauvinism and 
belligerence, splitting up the country across the political divide along the 
provincial loyalties. Both Sindh and the NWFP are opposing the project tooth 
and nail. Baluchistan is also unhappy with the amount of royalty it is receiving 
for its natural gas. 
The problems relating to refiigees, rural poverty and proliferation of 
small arms and drugs have only radicalized local ethnic and sectarian tensions 
in the country. The large scale inter-province migration mainly from Punjab 
and NWFP to Sindh and international migration such as influx of 3.5 million 
Afghan refiigees (about 1.55 million continue to live even after Soviet 
withdrawal).'^  About one million Bengali immigrants largely concenfrated in 
Karachi has disturbed the existing demographic character of the cities and 
towns bordering Afghanistan and cities of Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi. 
The Afghan refiigees have a deep impact on Pakistan's politics and 
society. These refiigees affiliated to various Mujahideen groups have developed 
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contacts with Pakistan's political and religious organizations. The connection 
has become a source of supply of weapons to religious and political parties 
enabling them to establish militant wings of their respective parties.'^ 
In recent years Islamism in Pakistan has acquired a new face. Religio-
political groups and their existence is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. They 
have been existing and playing a role in social and political life since 1947. 
What is certainly new is their political activism, in some cases militancy, and 
most importantly their rapid expansion in the country. Currently, there are 58 
registered religious political parties and 24 armed religious militias.'' Similarly,; 
deeni madrasas (religious schools) have also been in existence for centuries but 
what is new, is their proliferation, sectarian overtones, expansion in support 
base and diverse and ambiguous sources of funding. 
The madrasas developed into sanctuaries of religious zealots and 
political power. The factional religious leaders began to encourage some form 
of military training; therefore y/Tiaf/was portrayed as a tool to achieve a higher 
goal for the glory of Islam, and was thus propounded as a legitimate concept to 
wage war against infidels. According to Ahmed Rashid, during 1947 and 1975, 
about 870 new madrasas were set up. He points out that in 1976-90, 1700 new 
madarasas emerged, most of them were established in 1977-78.'^  John L. 
Cooley in his book "Unholy Wars, Afghanistan, America and International 
Terrorism" has given graphic details of how the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) of the US and the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency in Pakistan 
developed a nexus with the religious groups to sustained military and political 
war in Afghanistan. This nexus was built around the concept of Islamic Jihad 
against the 'infidel' Soviet forces. 
For decades Pakistani generals and politicians raised the spectre of 
Islamic fundamentalism to elicit westem support for their regimes. The alleged 
is the reason why the military, under President Pervaiz Musharaf^ helped MMA 
(Mutahidha-Majlis-i-Aamal) win power in North-West Frontier Pro 
fact the country's rulers cultivated the militants as a vital foreign policy tool. 
(b) India 
India stands at the center of the South Asian region, both location wise 
and area wise. The population of India had crossed 1 billion by the time of the 
census 2001 and it was over 77 percent of the total population of the region. 
The annual exponential growth rate of population during the period 1991-2001 
was around 21.3. The life expectancy at birth is estimated to be 62.3 years 
during 2000-01. In 1990, the crude birth rate per thousand was 26.4 and crude 
death rate per thousand was estimated to be 69. The percentage of literacy rate 
was 65.38 in 2000-01. The density of population per sq.km. is around 324 
according to the census 2001 in the country.^ " 
India is an agriculture-based country nearly 31 percent of the GDP in 
2001, while the share of industry is 30 percent; the manufacturing sector alone 
contributes nearly 20 per cent in 2001. 
Historians often divide Indian history into three distinct periods; Hindu, 
Muslim, and British. Each of these periods has left its impact on the culture and 
socio-political structure of the country, leading to a composite culture enriched 
by these diverse sources. 
In South Asia, India is the largest and most heterogeneous state. It is a 
multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. 
Autonomy and separatist demands have been raised from time to time, but 
somehow they havejbeen managed, some times satisfactorily, some times not 
so satisfactorily. XccQrdingtolV^pnJ^einei^j^^ four types of minorities 
in India. Linguistic, religious, caste and tribal. These can be fiirther divided 
among the dimensions: whether minorities have a conception of a territorial 
homeland; the extent of the sense of cohesion within the community, and 
whether the community regards itself as a disadvantaged or as an achieving 
minority.^ ^ - ^ 
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India's difficulties in nation-building, economic development, and 
political stability have been strongly influenced by a host of complex factors. 
Of these most prominent are its geographic setting and its socio-cultural 
history. India is the largest state on the South Asian subcontinent. One-third the 
size of the United States - about 1,127,000 square miles. It is a country of great 
distances. From Himalayan Mountains in the north to the Indian Ocean in the 
south is 2,000 miles and 1,700 miles from the western border with Pakistan to 
the eastern border with Bumia.^ " 
India's internal weaknesses have long been regarded as its 
distinguishing quality. In the 1950s American policy makers viewed Indian 
domestic politics as a critical battleground in the larger war against 
communism. As a result, India 'had' to be built up to withstand the threat from 
the Soviet Union and communist China.^ "* The British impact however, was not 
uniform through out India. 
In the nation building and modernization process, the unevenness of the 
British impact created problems for the elites in the post independence period. 
India is an ancient civilization but a new nation; therefore, the values and 
attitudes of its citizens, the nature of its political culture, and its political 
processes are influenced by both, its traditional past and its contemporary 
experience. 
Given the enormous complexity of the Indian socio-cultural structure, it 
is not surprising that Indian political values and norms of behaviour have often 
given contradictory signals. Various surveys suggest that these values are in 
fact becoming increasingly integrated into the personality structure of the 
newer generations of the population.^ ^ 
Broadly speaking ethnic demands in India can be divided into four 
categories. The first group contains all those demands which are located in the 
border region and which have, at some point of time or the other, exhibited 
strong secessionist impulses. The separatist movements have been witnessed in 
L^  
82 
northeast India, Indian Punjab and previously in Tamil Nadu where vernacular 
leaders aspired for a separate sovereign state of Dravidistan. The case of Indian 
held Kashmir (IHK) is entirely different because it is internationally recognized 
as a disputed Territory.^ ^ 
At present several separatist groups are operating in the Northeastern 
region of India, such as National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCL) in 
Nagaland, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur, the United 
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Bodo Security Force(BSF) and Bodo 
Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) for the creation of Bodoland in Assam, and the 
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) in Tripura. India accuses Pakistan and 
Bangladesh for helping the separatists and dissidents in the northeast India, 
India also alleges that narco-terrorism is a big business in the northeast in 
which Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Ealam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka are involved. '^ 
The second category consists of all these demands, which are not 
secessionist but are in favour of more autonomy, which can be possible, 
through the creation of more states in the Indian union. The agitation for 
Uttrakhand in Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand in Bihar, Gorkhaland in West Bengal, 
Vidarbha in Maharashtra, and Bodoland in Assam is for the creation of 
separate states within the Indian Union. The reorganization of states in 1956 
partitioned Punjab, Assam, Madras and Bombay on linguistic lines, therefore, 
demands for the creation of more states continued to crop up from time to time. 
The third category includes demands of more autonomy within the states to 
manage their local and developmental affairs. The agitation of Gorkhas of West 
Bengal, Bodos of Assam, Jharkhandis of Bihar, and Tribals of the northeast 
and other parts of the country fall in this category. 
In 1953, the government was forced to create a separate state of Andhra 
Pradesh for Telugu speaking people following the long drawn agitation and 
death of Potti Sriramulu after a hunger strike of 50 days.^ * 
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The fourth category pertains to demands on religious and caste basis 
and are purported by communities and groups who generally feel deprived and 
disadvantaged. This is evident from the communal conflict between Hindus ' 
and Muslims, which has grown alarmingly during the past one-decade or so. 
It is a fact that many of those who witnessed the growth of Hindu radical 
forces in the years around the Second World War were afready convinced of 
the Sangh's fascist outlook. There is no need to mention the aheady well-
known opinion of Nehru, who right from the beginning, had pointed at these 
organizations as communalist and fascist. Less well known is the fact that, as 
shown by a confidential report circulated by the congress most probably at the 
time of the first ban of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh), after 
Gandhi's assassination, the similarity between the character of the RSS and that 
of fascist organizations was already taken for granted.^' The incident of 28^ 
February 2002 in Gujrat and the consequences thereupon accused, put a black 
spot on Indian socio-cultural fabric. All evidence suggests that what happened 
there was an ethnic cleansing. 
The politics of communalism along Hindu-Muslim divide has led to 1 
potentially serious internal security problems in India. Although the 83% i 
Hindu majority and the 12% Muslim minority communities are fragmented 
along class, caste, sectarian, linguistic, socio-cultural, regional and ideological' 
lines, distinct Muslim and Hindu Communal identities have emerged due to 
historical, political and economic factors.^ " The problem took a new dimension 
in the 1980s with the rise of militant Hindu nationalism manifested in the 
movement for liberation of Ram Janambhoomi, claimed that Babri mosque was 
buih at that site. 
A prominent Indian strategist, K. Sundeiji has indicated that in the 
coming years internal threats to India will loom large than ever before, and the 
most extreme danger would be possible break-up of the country. He identified 
several factors that could work towards the break-up. '^ 
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The problem of illegal migration, ever since the partition, has 
complicated not only tlie process of nation building in various parts of India but 
also created security threats from within having implications for external 
security. 
According to an estimate, in 1992, the number of migratory refugees in 
India was nearly 4000,000 (4 million), including Srilankan Tamils, Tibetans, 
Bangladeshi Chakmas, Nepali refugees from Bhutan and over 11,000 Afghan 
refugees assisted by UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees). On August 29, 1994. The Government of India stated that a total of 
325,182 refugees were then residing in India. These figures do not take into 
account the refugees assisted by the UNHCR.^ ^ The biggest refugee community 
is, however, that of Sri Lankan Tamils, mainly living in the state of Tamil 
Nadu. 
Regarding the problem of resource development, sharing and 
management of water, India is facing a major confroversy about a large scale 
infrastructure project in Gujrat, the Narmada valley project which threatens to 
dislocate a large number of tribals in order to provide the peasants with 
irrigation water.^ ^ Another dispute involving the state of Tamil Nadu, Kamatka, 
and Kerala relates to the utilization of Cauvery rivers water. One of the major 
issues in the Akali agitation in Punjab was that of fairer allocation to Punjab of 
the waters of Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, including control over canal head works 
and hydroelectric installations based on them. 
The refugees and illegal migrants have an impact on the maintenance of 
internal socio-political questions especially in the northeast India and have 
aggravated ethnic tensions there. In Assam, aliens (as they are called there) 
constitute 40% of the state population. The Assamese caste Hindus fear that 
they will lose power to migrants. The migration to Assam was primarily due to 
economic reasons. Congress party tried to create its vote bank and thus gave 
them the voting rights. The All Assam Students Union (AASU) began agitation 
taBSiS 
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in the early seventies to have a stricter check on the border to stop 
Bangladeshis from crossing into Assam, The AASU gave birth to Assam Gana 
Parished (AGP), a political party which later came into power in Assam.^ '' 
The line between terrorism and insurgency, also called "Wars of 
Liberation" is blurred in India, whether it is Kashmir or North east, terrorism 
and insurgencies are metrically mixed. 
What we are witnessing in Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) is a mixture of 
terrorism, incipient insurgency and proxy war - all rolled into one. 
An acceptable definition of terrorism has never been formulated. "The 
problem for observers is that every one knows what terrorism is until they 
attempt to define it".^ ^ And yet, terrorism defines itself, through certain features 
- its finger prints. The very first feature is obvious it has to inspire terror 
through violence and blood shed. The 'War' may be against the state but it is 
the people who have to suffer, the state, after all, is a mythical entity.^ ^ 
The trans-national angle of terrorist support structures needs to be kept 
in mind. Even as the Sikh community's support for terrorism was waning in 
Ptmjab, organizations like the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), the 
Khalistan Council led by Jagjit Singh Chauban in UK, and the World Sikh 
Organization (WSO) headed by Gurmit Singh Anlakh in USA were leading the 
anti-Indian lobbies abroad and urging the youth there to come to Punjab and 
take up the fight against the state. Many did come fi-om England and Canada. 
Every terrorist organization here, whether it was the Damdami Taksal or 
Babbar Khalsa, had a wing abroad that was a committed as any in Punjab 
during the heyday of terrorism. 
What is remarkable between terrorist and insurgent groups is their 
networking. They all gang up, provide each other help, strengthen a weak outfit 
with arms and ammunition. The links may be tenuous, but the left extremists 
have in the past met up with JKLF, LTTE and insurgents in the North East. 
86 
This is not the place to go into the unique features of the North-east the 
two hundred - odd tribes that inhabit these seven states; the immense linguistic 
diversity; the history of isolation under British, the sudden transformation of 
certain communities from animism to Christianity, and from a primitive 
economy sfraight into the modem world. More prominent is that, the northeast 
has only 22-kilometer border with the rest of India while it has a 4500 KM 
international border. Lack of communication - rail, roads has reinforced 
separate identities.^ * 
(c) Bangladesh 
Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan as a result of civil war in 
1971, the action was seen by many as the logical division of two disparate 
wings of a country united only by Islam, mutual concern about India and -
partly facetiously - the routes of Pakistan International Airlines, but divided by 
language and social customs. 
Bangladesh is largely formed by the delta of two of the world's major 
river systems, the Ganges (called Padma in Bengladesh) and Brahmapufra 
(Jamuna). The interlacing sfreams that cover most of Bangladesh provide the 
country with a valuable network for boat transport of people and goods, but 
they can be both a blessing and a curse during the flood season. 
The principal crops are rice and jute both of which require substantial 
amounts of water, but the market for this fiber is not growing.^' 
The majority of the people are Bengalis. A number of fribal groups 
remain within Bangladesh, Although they constitute only about 1% of the 
population, they are important for the political problems they have caused.'*" 
Bangladesh has 86.6% Muslim population. The balance of the 
population is mostly Hindu (12.1%), with small Christian (0.3%), Buddhist 
(0.6%), and animist groups.'" 
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Bangladesh suffered like Pakistan from terrible identity crises from the 
very outset of its creation. The internal colonialism pursued by the rulers of 
Islamabad in undivided Pakistan, East Bengal in spite of providing a large 
chunk of foreign exchange, continued to languish in poverty. Even after the 
new state emerged on the global arena its ruling elites had to face the 
insurmountable challenge of eradicating poverty, malnutrition etc. 
Looking at the crucial role-played by the armed forces in a large number 
of developing countries in general and that of Bangladesh in particular, one 
tends to believe that democracy in these countries is either guided or 
controlled, some charismatic leaders either from the civil or military continue 
to rule their respective countries by adopting some authoritarian measures. 
They often violate the normal democratic norms even while getting elected by 
the people. The army is often treated as a guardian and liberator of the people. 
As a complement to the above proposition Wittfogel's theory of 
"Oriental Despotism" suggests that most of the Asian States being primarily 
agricultural in nature lack a well-organized and systematic administrative 
machinery.'*^ 
The predominantly Bengali speaking Muslims (83%) and Hindus (16%), 
of Bangladesh, is experiencing ethnic conflict with Buddhist/Christian Chakma 
tribals in Chittagong Hill Tracks (CHT) that constitute only one percent of the 
population.'*^ The tribals are ethnically allied to the Mongoloid race and differ 
much from the rest of the Bengali majority of the country. Since 1975, Shanti 
Bahini has launched an armed struggle to establish a separate homeland in 
CHT, bordering India and Myanmar. The conflict has not only jeopardized 
nation building process but has also created sources of insecurity for 
Bangladesh with cross border ramifications. Bangladesh alleges that India is 
stoking the Chakma unrest in the CHT, and that Shanti Bahini is getting Indian 
help. The Chakma insurgency is a manifestation of the scale of problems that 
the country is facing. 
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Besides Chakma unrest, Bangladesh is facing intermittent influx of 
Muslim Rohingya refugees from Arakan region of Mayanmar, which has 
threatened both the internal and external security of the state. Bangladesh is a 
land scarce developing country with the highest density of population and with 
second lowest per capita income in the world. 
(d) Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka stands out totally in a different category of the developing 
countries as one examines the nature and sources of crisis of governance that 
includes systematic instability manifested in the adopting of four constitutions 
in less than half a century. Further it is also a state highly ethnicized and shaken 
by interstate conflict, which has contributed to militarization of the state. 
Sri Lanka was among the first countries in South Asia uhich got self 
government in internal affairs and universal adult suffrage under the 
Donoughmore constitution of 1931.'*^  The country was not politically prepared 
for self government.'*^ The Donoughmore Constitution was enacted essentially 
to be operative in a political environment devoid of a viable party system, even 
though some political parties had come up. Prominent among those were 
parties like the 'Ceylon National Congress, the Sinhala Mahasabha, Lanka 
Sama Samaja Party', and the Tamil Congress, of course. 
Since no consensus could materialise among the parties so all the 
political powers were given to the British Governor. Both the National 
Congress and Sinhala Mahasabha later merged to form the 'United National 
Party (UNP). The UNP leadership belonged to the westernized elite who had 
little understanding of their society and little appreciation of the established 
parliamentary values and usages. 
In this regard, having obtained independence in a soft way in Feb. 1948, 
the Sri Lanka ruling elite made the transition from colonialism to independence 
smooth and easy. The old colonial administration and political institutions. 
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however, remained practically unchanged except that white skins made way for 
hrowns at the upper strata of the bureaucratic pyramid. 
When the 1947 Soulbury constitution was promulgated, it neglected 
some democratic principles and also the interests of the minority communities. 
The 1942 constitution failed to fulfil the aspirations of the people. 
Parliamentary system with a unitary form of Government provided by the 
constitution was to function with out fundamental rights. However, in the post 
independence era it became a debatable issue between the two ethnic groups of 
Sri Lanka - Tamils and Sinhalese. Thus, the 1947 constitution adopted the 
multiple safeguards against some established democratic norms. These 
safeguards were used as a guise through which a powerful elite could maintain 
status quo.''^  Thus Soulbury Constitution lacked perspectives that would guide 
the nation building strategies in free Sri Lanka. 
Republican constitution of 1972 cemented more the centralization of 
power rather to care for different ethnic groups. It changed the official name of 
the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka (Sinhala name) and provided a very 
special place for Buddhism. 
Despite the constant agitation of Tamil Political parties, the 1972 
constitution enshrined the expectations of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists 
without single concession to the Tamil speaking community. These changes 
could not be popular among the Tamils. Their feelings of alienation and anger 
with the govenmient were intensified. Tamil representatives took no part in the 
discussions and debates; therefore, they did not accept the final product. All the 
Tamil parties decided to protest against the constitution.'** 
In 1977, the UNP headed by J.R. Jayawardene, was voted into office 
with an unprecedented five sixth majority in elections held under a democratic 
parliamentary system. 
Thus, if the 1972 constitution under Mrs. Bandaranaike turned out to 
provide in effect a prime Ministerial government, the 1978 constitution 
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promulgated under Jayawardene turned out to be Gaullist in nature. The 1978 
constitution provides autocratic powers to the President. 
So far as the Tamil aspirations are concerned there was no qualitative 
change in the constitution of 1978. Sri Lanka remained a Unitary State (Art.2) 
Buddhism, continued to enjoy the constitutional status (Art. 9), and Sinhala 
remained the official language of the Island (Art. 18, 12, and 24). The new 
constitution too did not provide for devolution or decentralization of powers. 
The Tamil-Sinhala conflict has led to a prolonged armed conflict 
between the army, security forces and militant Tamil outfits. 
Meanwhile, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by 
Velupillai Prabhakaran emerged as the most formidable faction among the 
other militant groups, which are Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), 
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam People's 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)' Eelam National Liberation Front 
(ENLF) and Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). Thus the 
process of constitutional manipulation eroded the confidence of the people in 
the system of governance and they began to question the legitimacy of the 
rulers to continue in power. 
Instead of granting significant concessions to assuage Tamil feelings 
the Sinhalase majority government became more provocative. Subsequently, in 
May-June 1987, then President Jayawardene laimched a full scale military 
initiative against the Tamils in which thousands of innocent Tamil civilians 
here gunned down by the solidiers.'*' At this juncture, at least, 1,50,000 Tamils 
fled to India after the nightmare.^ " The repercussions of the Sri Lankan 
situation transgressed the Sri Lankan boundaries. 
Tv/o aspects of Srilankan society and polity have been significant: a 
special relationship between Sinhalese and Buddhists, and fear of domination 
by Tamils who draw their ethnic linkage to India. The minority complex 
91 
among the Sinhalese compelled them to follow a cultural nationalism which 
has ultimately drawn the country into a vortex of deep ethnic conflict/' 
The problem of Muslim minority has also come up in Sri Lanka. The 
Muslims are confronting both Sinhalese and Tamils. 
(e) Bhutan 
The Bhutanese Sangrila of peaceful hill Kingdom was conveniently left 
to itself by the world, and even by her immediate neighbours till 1980 s. By 
1990, the Bhutanese scenario was turning eventful. Ethnic demands, arrests, 
demonstrations, trials, convictions, police actions, assault, arson, loot and all 
resulting into a full-blown ethnic conflict. 
There is a conflict between two ethnic groups, the Bhutanese of Tibetan 
origin who inhibit northern Bhutan and happen to be ruling elite, and the 
Bhutanese of Nepali origin who resided in South-western Bhutan. They are 
Nepali Hindu immigrants and form a distinct linguistic and cultural group. 
In Bhutan, the recent ethnic upsurge has taken the shape of a political 
movement led by the Nepali migrants of the southern Bhutan demanding 
democratization of the polity and abolishment of monarchy. The ethnic conflict 
in Bhutan is rooted in the fear among Drukpas to their cultural identity from 
immigrant Nepalese. 
They are apprehensive of their marginalisation by Nepalese immigrants, 
which happened in the case of Lepchas in Sikkim. Consequently, the Bhutani 
rulers have tried to bring the Nepalese under the fold of Drukpa culture by 
imposing a code of cultural conduct. They have also tried to confrol the 
economic resources of southern Bhutan. Thus, the growing ethno-Nepali 
nationalism in the kingdom is considered by the Bhutanese as the threat to their 
national identity, integrity and security.^ ^ 
The signs of ethnic conflict emerged in 1989 when Bhutan under its 
newly introduced policies, resolved to preserve its indigenous culture and took 
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several actions, including the expulsion of several tliousands of Indians who 
had been long term, if not exactly legal, residents of Bhutan. In Bhutan many 
ethnic Nepalese were illegally migrating over a period of decades into Bhutan. 
The Drukpa government of Bhutan prohibited Nepali migration in 1988. The 
census of 1988 created such a legal situation for the Nepalese that they had no 
other alternative but to leave Bhutan.^ '' 
The ethnic Nepalese on the other hand have strongly resented against 
the cultural hegemony of the Drukpas on the one hand and discriminatory 
economic policies against them on the other. 
The repressive measures followed by Bhutan government resulted in 
fleeing away of thousands of Nepalese, thereby creating a new category of 
refugees, and adversely affecting Bhutan-Nepal relations.^ ^ The net result is 
that southern Bhutan has come in the grip of violence and terrorism in recent 
years. They have also demanded citizenship rights and political and economic 
rights, 
(f) Nepal 
Nepal is a multi-ethnic and multilingual mini state of the Himalayan 
region. The Shah Kings of Nepal founded the Nepalese society on the basis of 
Hindu caste hierarchies. The upper layer of these caste Brahmins and 
Kshatriyas - began to dominate socio-economic and power structure. 
The indigenous people who constitute majority of the population are of 
Tibetan origin with a considerable Hindu mixture and the plains or Terai 
people, who are in minority, are mostly of Indian origin and speak Indian 
languages. Both these groups are subdivided into many ethnic groups. 
The indigenous people were concentrated in the hill region, therefore, 
regional identity also became an important factor in their ascendance to power. 
Although efforts were made to bring various tribal groups within the fold of 
Hinduism, they were not given a share in power and economic privileges 
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The Indian settlers of the Terai region were also deprived of these 
privileges despite their caste and religious affinities within the hill people. This 
happened because they were considered as outsiders, people not representing 
the hill culture. 
Nepal's national unity and integrity is strained by a simmering conflict 
between majority hill people and the minority Terai people. The authoritarian 
nature of the panchayat regime, which lasted for about thirty years, only a 
subdued ethnic feeling was observed withm the regional (Tarai) and hill 
communities. Nepali language developing over at least seven centuries has 
been considered a major component of Nepalese nationalism even though it 
was opposed by some Terai groups in the 1950s.^ ^ 
After 1950, Terai people began to assert for their rights and proper share 
in the politico bureaucratic structure. During the 1950s, Terai people raised the 
citizenship and language issues. Most infrastructure activities in the Terai 
region are attracting peoples from different directions including from across the 
border. Though Terai people are highly unlikely to demand integration of Terai 
into India, their grievances have often been raised by the Indian government 
souring relations between the two countries. '^ 
The Nepalese government tried to bring Terai people within the fold of 
Nepalisation process by imposing upon them Nepali language, etc. On the 
other hand they encouraged migration from hill areas to Terai with a view to 
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controlling economic resources of Terai. The people of Terai region have 
sfrongly reacted against the discriminatory policies of the government. 
Demand for regional autonomy and 'Terai for Teraiwalas' have often 
been raised. In hill areas on the other hand, there has been resentment against 
the Indian migrants, particularly the Marwaris who have a strong hold over the 
Nepalese economy. 
The Mongoloid ethnic groups have also begun to assert recently. Their 
major discontent has been against Brahmin Chettri domination and Hindu 
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character of the Nepalese state. In recent years a number of political 
organizations of Mongolians such as Organization of Mongol People, Nepal 
Rashtriya Janta Party, Nepal Janta Party etc., have come into existence.^ ^ Nepal 
Janjati Maha Sangh has been strongly reacting to the suppressions of tribal 
groups. Various ethnic groups like Magar, Linbu, Rai, Kiranti etc have raised 
voices for their autonomous regions like Limbuwan, Magarantik, Kiratvan etc. 
Nepal is also experiencing a two-way international migration straining 
its relations with most of its neighbouring countries while Nepali speaking 
people have been coming from north-eastern India, Bhutan and Burma, the 
Nepalese have migrated into Sikkim, a state of India, north eastern India, West 
Bengal and Bhutan. The Diaspora of all types of Nepalese extending from 
Bangladesh to Burma and the northem part of India with a heavy concentration 
in the north east is very large - somewhere ten to fifteen million. The 
citizenship rights of this group are very lenuous and controversial and have 
caused tensions with Bhutan and India. The influx of Bhutani refugees into 
Terai region has fiirther deteriorated the problem of internal migration. 
(g) Maldives 
Maldives is largely a homogenous state in the region with one religion 
Islam and one language, Divehi; the micro-state comprises mainly Muslims of 
Arab descent and have only small Hindu Tamil and Buddhist Sinhali 
minorities. The micro-island has not experienced any ethnic strife as yet. 
INDIA'S PURSUIT OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
Geographically, South Asia is bounded on the north by the Pamir Knot 
and the great chain of mountains, which flow out, from it - the Himalayas, 
Karakorum, Hindukush - and in the south, by the Indian ocean. Historically, 
from the earliest times, the people of this region have been Ultimately linked by 
race, culture religion and some times, by political allegiance. 
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As a consequence of geography and history, every country in South Asia 
is intimately connected with India. The same ethnic and religious groups to 
which their peoples belong are also found in India, which is a vast and 
heterogenous country. Marital ties overlap at all levels of society. Social 
organizations and styles of managing the environment are similar between each 
South Asian country and it's nearest equivalent in India. For example, between 
Nagaland and northern Burma, West Bengal and Bangladesh, Kerala and Sri 
Lanka. For better or for worse, this intermingling of peoples, cultures and 
religions imparts a familial quality to inter state relations in South Asia. 
National identity is as important to each South Asian country as self 
identification is to the members of one family. Sensitivity on the issues 
increases in direct proportion to proximity with India. 
Identity problems are well defined in Nepal and Bangladesh, as in 
Pakistan. Having contributed to and drawn from the wide river of Indian 
civilization, these countries underline contradistinctions from India as they 
build their modem nations and participate in the international system. Nepalis 
who were educated in India, married in India, and who often own property in 
India, are frequently anti-Indian in international politics.^" 
Some of Bangladesh's identity problems arise from the fact that most of 
its inhabitants are both Bengali and Muslim. Opposition to Mujib and many 
failings was naturally against India which bolstered him a fact well recognized 
by Indira Gandhi problems of national identity among India's neighbours are 
matched by India's failure during the period under review, to consolidate its 
own national identity as a secular, socialist democracy. 
Cultural ties could be and were used by Indian diplomats to cultivate 
goodwill. New Delhi's celebration of the 2,500* anniversary of the birth of 
Gautam Buddha (1956) was the most striking example. 
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The Indian High Commission in Dacca published as a non-political 
journal, Bharat Vichitra, catering to the cultural mainstream in Bangladesh. Its 
voluntary subscription reached 25000 by 1980.^ ' 
South Asia can surely be regarded as a region where the benefits of 
democratic peace would be more than desirable. South Asia's image as a 
region of chronic instability was only to be seconded by U.S. President 
Clinton's remarks in March 2000 that the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir is 
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the most dangerous place in the world. Besides the well known conventional 
and nuclear security risks, South Asia is also among the poorest and least 
developed regions in the world according to international social and economic 
indicators. 
During most of the 1990s, South Asia was the biggest democratic region 
after the transition from authoritarian rule in Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. 
Moreover, South Asia is the only region where western political institutions go 
hand in hand with a variety of non-western civilizations and where religion 
plays an active role in current politics. The only forms of Hindu and Islamic 
democracies are to be found in Nepal and Bangladesh, and Buddhism received 
a foremost place in the Sri Lanka constitution. 
All democratic governments in South Asia have to cope with violent 
conflicts that threaten the integrity of their statehood showing the failure of 
democratic institutions to deal with these challenges. Unfortunately, democratic 
governance is also not positively correlated with the rule of law or positive 
human development. 
The relations with India are an important part of the bilateral relations 
and the domestic debate not only in Pakistan but also in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
and Nepal. 
Regional relations in South Asia are still dominated by India's security 
concerns on the one hand and the apprehensions of her smaller neighbours 
against it on the other. 
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India's negative image in the neighbouring countries due to various 
bilateral conflicts persisted even after their democratic transition. The far-
reaching changes that India undertook in her regional policy with the Gujral 
Doctrine in the mid 1990's did not seem to have altered the perceptions of 
India as a regional hegemon. 
The remarks of one Bangladeshi home minister Altaf Hussain 
Choudhury in march 2002 about India's still expansionist designs can be 
regarded as representative for the perception of many intellectuals and political 
decision makers in the neighbouring countries. 
The most dominant players in South Asia and their relationship vis-a-vis 
India can be summarized here under certain subheadings. 
India-Pakistan : Bilateral Ties 
Relations between any two sovereign states, especially those between 
India and Pakistan which are bound together for centuries by common history, 
cultural heritage and above all by inter-dependence of economy, could have 
become a model for good neighbourly relations. That this did not happen after 
India and Pakistan came into being in 1947, after the British rulers had to hand 
over power to the people of these two countries, is in itself quite a disturbing 
fact of history. On the contrary what had happened is that Indo-Pak relations 
have never been on an even keel except for a short period after Simla 
Agreement had been signed in 1971.^ '* 
Before the advent of British rule, there was no trace of the type of the 
Hindu Muslim conflicts that followed it. There were wars between states which 
might have had Hindu or Muslim rulers; but these wars at no time took on a 
Hindu-Muslim complexion. It will not be incorrect to say that Hindu-Muslim 
division and conflicts were the direct product of the British policy of "divide 
and rule". 
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Nonetheless, the truth remains that till the goal of physically splitting 
India into India and Pakistan was achieved, the British rulers used every 
instrument to drive a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims. After 1947, the 
same policy acquired the new garb of fomenting Indo-Pak tensions - an 
extension of the old policy in the new situation. 
The compulsions, both economic and geo-political, continue to operate 
even now, though the United States has assumed the major role for itself 
Whenever these compulsions become acutely pressing - either concurrently, as 
whole, or in part - the stage is set for Indo-Pak tensions, which on occasions 
escalates into open confrontation such as 1947, 1965 and 1971.^ ^ 
In every escalation there was a specific scale of importance of the 
"stimulating factors" such as the dispute over Kashmir in 1947 and in 1965 and 
liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, But the range of the confrontation did not go 
beyond the framework of Indo-Pak conflicts. The conflict over Kashmir has 
been complicated by the mterference of Britain and the United states. 
New wedges were driven between South Asian States in the 50s when 
the United States, guided by the thesis of John Foster Dulles - the US Secretary 
of State - on the "amorality" of the non-aligned doctrine, openly began 
working to surround India with a ring of hostile regimes. One of the best ways 
to achieve this aim was to strengthen Pakistan's military machine. Under the 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed by the USA and Pakistan in 
May 1954^ ^ the United States undertook to supply Pakistan with weapons, 
military equipment and materials, and to send its military advisers there. 
In September 1954, Pakistan joined the treaty of South east Asia's 
defence that formalized the formation of the SEATO military bloc and in 
September 1955 became a party to the Baghdad Pact (called CENTO after 
1959) Pakistan's ruling circles agreed to allow the country's territory, airfields 
and sea ports to be used, under certain circumstances, by the armed forces of 
the parties to the aggressive military grouping. '^ 
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A flow of supplies of American aims enabled Pakistan to build a 
powerful military machine which was used to launch aggression against India 
in 1965 and again, in 1971. 
Other sources of friction between India and Pakistan may be subdivided 
under five sections, viz; Pakistan's acceptance of western alliance; Sino-Pak 
agreement and the transfer of Pak-occupied Indian territory to China, the canal 
waters dispute; and the Kashmir issue; and the last but not the least, the 
important problem of Indo-Pak border dispute.^ * 
About the first two, reference has already been made. It should be noted 
here that although Pakistan continues to receive western patronization, she left 
SEATO on 8^ November 1978, in a huff Subsequently Pakistan left CENTO 
also and in 1979, she was welcomed by India as a member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. The canal water dispute was somehow resolved through an 
agreement in 1948 (Indus Water Treaty), but still remains alive as a crucial 
factor on the face of Baglahar power project. 
India-Pakistan bilateral relations continue to show a downward trend. 
Pakistan's sustained efforts to internationalize Kashmir issue, its unabated 
support to subversion and terrorism directed against India, its intransigence on 
the issue of resumption of a bilateral dialogue with India, and its persistent 
negative approach have vitiated the atmosphere and prevented a meaningful 
progress in bilateral relations. In addition to training, equipping, funding, and 
guiding militants, Pakistan has stepped up its transborder terrorism by 
inducting mercenaries from third countries into Jammu and Kashmir.^' India 
has strongly urged Pakistan to conduct inter-state relations as a responsible 
member of the international community and to eschew the threat of terrorism 
held against India. 
The Kashmir conflict saw a new escalation of violence during the 1990s 
with the number of victims going up steadily.'*' Internationally, Pakistan tries 
desperately to gain support from the Islamic world. It paints a lurid picture of 
100 
happenings in Kashmir before OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries). 
(Pakistan does all the drafting for the OIC - its command over the English 
Language, such as it helps?) The Hizbs and the Lashkars and the Harkats of the 
valley get taken in/' State sponsorship of terrorism/militancy has been a strong 
component of Pakistan's foreign policy right from the days of the October 1947 
intrusion into the valley by the marauding tribal raiders, to the infiltration in 
1965, Code named operation Gibralter by Ayub Khan, and now Kargil in 1999, 
where a mix of Jihadis with members of the NLI (North Light Infantry), were 
made to occupy the heights in Kargil/^ 
The Kargil war of summer 1999 deserves special attention. The nuclear 
factor was already a threat before the tests of 1998 as the crisis of 1990 
illustrated. The nuclear tests of 1998 demonstrated the will of both democratic 
governments in India and Pakistan to pursue the military logic to achieve their 
foreign policy goals. 
The debate about policy options available to India to counter Pakistan 
sponsored terror against this country has once again sharpened with several 
ominous developments taking place in the region. These include the gruesome 
massacre of numerous Indians including 22 Army personnel at Kaluchak in 
Janrniu, a series of missile tests conducted by Pakistan, heavy shelling by 
Pakistan forces along the India - Pakistan border, Pakistan's reported decision 
to shift some of its forces deployed along Pakistan- Afghanistan borders to the 
eastern side bordering India, the killing of a moderate and peace - inclined 
Kashmiri leader, Abdul Gani Lone, and President Pervaiz Mushraf s address of 
27^ May 2002, in which he simply declined Pakistan's involvement in cross 
border terrorism in India and appealed the global community to ask "India to 
move towards normalization of relations" with his country. 
India has described this statement as "mere verbal denials" about 
Pakistan's 'lethal export of terrorism' and in India the domestic pressure 
increases to a frequency of great depth that the government of India should take 
the decisive action against Pakistan.''^  
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Though Pakistan is yet to unveil a concrete nuclear doctrine its 
arguments for nuclear weapon provide some insight into the Pakistani thinking 
on the subject.'^  The Indian threat is described as a single most pervading factor 
that has dominated the Pakistani security landscape'^. Explaining the 
importance of nuclear capability and its significance to Pakistan's national 
security. Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of Army Staff vwote, "to give 
up the nuclear capability would tantamount to committing a national suicide. 
To acquire this capability is totally in congruence with our defence 
requirements".^ ^ 
According to Pakistani Security analyst's nuclear weapons have a 
greater deterrence value. There exists a belief that conventional war was 
prevented both in 1987 and 1990 due to nuclear factor.^ * According to him, 
"apart from providing a strategic deterrent against India's superiority in 
conventional forces and size, it will also act as potential equalizer in political 
parleys with India". ^ ' 
The arguments in favour of nuclear option for Pakistan are interlinked 
with the India's nuclear capability as well as providing protection to Pakistan's 
covert operation in Kashmir. Such views are articulated by K.M. Arif, retired 
Vice Chief of the Army staff, and Munir Ahmad Khan who was the former 
Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Commission.^ ^ Both of them believe that India's 
nuclear capability is a threat to Pakistan's security and Pakistan's nuclear 
option is for a defensive purpose to forestall nuclear blackmail and hegemony 
of India. Former Army Chief Mirza Aslam Beg said in a seminar on 2 April 
1994 in Karachi that, in spite of having superiority in conventional weapons; 
India couldn't attack Pakistan because of the fear of nuclear retaliation.*' 
"Adoption of no-first use concept on the part of Pakistan would make 
non-sense of the concept of nuclear deterrence", stated some nuclear analysts.*^ 
According Pakistani security analysts deterrence had worked during the India-
Pakistan crisis in 1987 and 1990. According to them deterrence factor of the 
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nuclear weapons also worked during the Kargil conflict confining the war to a 
limited conflict. 
Apart fi-om Kashmir issue, the history of Indo-Pak relations centers 
round border disputes and attempts to solve it. 
Terrorism poses the most serious threat to Indian territorial integrity and 
internal security. Terrorist attacks are becoming increasingly lethal, and they 
now aim to kill maximum number of people. This trend reflects the changing 
motivations of terrorist groups, and easy availability of sophisticated weapons; 
around the world.*^ Many terrorist groups are in a position to use biological, 
radiological or nuclear weapons. 
Thus the Jihadi groups became their first line of defence, and India was 
kept militarily engaged in a proxy war without the Pakistan army getting 
directly involved. New Delhi on its part just chose to absorb for more than a 
decade the pain fi"om Islamabad's strategy of bleeding it through a thousand 
cuts. This convinced Pakistan that India would not retaliate against it for 
supporting cross-border terrorism and that it had a free hand in fomenting 
violence across the border in Jammu & Kashmir and take it to high value 
targets, like 13 December 2001 Indian Parliament attack and like targets in the 
rest of the country.*'* 
But the attack on the parliament house obliged India into moving 
towards confronting the source of the threat once and for all, as the attack on 
Parliament, 13 Dec. 2001 came after Pakistan's repeated betrayal of several 
peace initiatives by the Vajpayee administration. Thus, for instance, when 
Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee, took a bold and imaginative step of visiting 
Lahore for inaugurating the New Delhi-Lahore bus service, Pakistan rebuffed 
this initiative through its Kargil perfidy in 1999. When he took another bold 
peace initiative by implementing a unilateral ceasefire in Kaslimir in the 
Islamic holy month of Ramazan in Nov. 2000 and later on invited President 
Mushraf for talks in the historical town of Agra in July 2001, Islamabad once 
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again replied these peace initiatives by engineering attacks on Jammu and 
Kashmir State Assembly on 1 October, the Indian Parliament House in 13 
December 2001, the Rughunath temple in February and the Kaluchak massacre 
in May 2002.^ ^ 
It may be noted that whether India likes it or not, the international 
community concerned about the situation in Kashmir. The worries that the 
Indo-Pakistan tension could escalate into a nuclear one continue to rive those 
policies towards the subcontinent since India lags behind Pakistan for the 
propaganda stakes on the intemational stage and the recent conmiunal carnage 
in Gujrat has eroded its image as a tolerant and secular nation.*^ 
Pakistan's military is so deeply committed to a proxy war in Kashmir 
and is so convinced that India has no answer to it, that it is almost 
inconceivable that it will allow India to call its bluff and get away with it. On 
the other hand, India's military thinkers seem convinced that Pakistan's 
response will not be nuclear. This rock solid belief in each country that the 
other is bluffing is the root cause of the threat of nuclear war in South Asia.*^ 
India and Sri Lanka 
The strategic location of Srilanka influences the Indo-Sri Lankan 
relations. Sri Lanka is located at the Southern tip of the Indian peninsula. A 
Palk Strait which is not wider than 20 miles in certain places. Disparity of size-
India is 50 times of Ceylon in size. 
Pandit Nehru, as early as 1945, had pointed out of the ethnic, linguistic 
and cultural unity of India and Sri Lanka and supported the formation of a close 
Union as an autonomous unit of the Indian federation.** All these had created 
some misgivings in Sri Lanka. Later on. Pandit Nehru himself in a special 
message to the Sri Lankan government repudiated any such suggestion and said 
that India did not wish to interfere with the Island's sovereignty and assured 
them of Indian goodwill and peaceful intentions, towards Sri Lanka. Since 
then, almost all the Prime Ministers, have assured them that India had no 
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intention to harm her sovereignty and territorial integrity, yet Sri Lankan 
politicians always create the fear psychosis of the danger from the big 
neighbour. 
India and Sri Lanka have been members of the Common Wealth and 
also been members of the non-aligned movement. South Asian State 
Conference; both of them took a common view on many international issues 
including disarmament and regional military pacts. This does not mean that 
there were no differences on various issues. 
Apart from the question of people of Indian origin the first issue, which 
cropped up between the two countries was the question of possession of Island 
oiKachcha Thivu in Palk Strait. 
Indo-Sri Lankan relations got strained when China attacked India in 
October, 1962 and Ceylon did not criticize the attack and failed to brand China 
as an aggressor Sri Lanka's role as a peace-maker in the SinoJndian conflict 
was motivated by her sincere desire to prevent the continuation of hostilities 
between the two countries. 
Following this Sri Lanka entered into a maritime agreement with 
China. Sri Lanka gave China the Most Favoured Nation status and provided 
facilities to Chinese Warships, knowing fully well that it was against Indian 
interests. 
In March 1971, insurgency occurred almost all over Sri Lanka. 
American Embassy was attacked, VA of police was killed. Emergency was 
declared on 16 March, 1971. Mrs. Bandaranaike in a broadcast to the nation 
stated certain points including an appeal to many countries for help. India 
responded favourably. 
In return during Indo-Pak conflict of 1971, Sri Lankan government 
granted air passage to Pakistan through Colombo. Even Sri Lanka opposes the 
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recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state. These events did affect 
Indo-Srilankan relations but not very seriously. 
In 1950 s there was hardly any problem between India and Sri Lanka 
except the question of granting of citizenship to the people of Indian origin, 
mostly Tamils. Though the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka was going on 
for the last 30 years, yet India was not directly involved in it. 
In July 1983, riots for the first time involved India in Sinhala-Tamil 
conflict. The then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi told the Sri 
Lankan President that the problem of Tamils was a matter, in which India could 
not be treated just another country It is matter which concerns both India and 
Sri Lanka.^ ° She made it clear that India supported the territorial integrity of its 
neighbour, Sri Lanka, and believed in the policy of non-intervention in its 
domestic affairs. '^ 
Since July 1983 riots, Sri Lanka's foreign policy has been taking shape 
in such a way that it can not be called friendly towards India. The Indian 
foreign minister visited Sri Lanka after July riots and within 3 days of his 
return Sri Lanka government made request for military assistance to the USA, 
the UK, Pakistan and Bangladesh though, this report was later on contradicted 
by Sri Lanka, but British Foreign office confirmed that such requests have been 
made by Sri Lanka government. 
The Sri Lankan government has adopted such a line in foreign policy, 
which directly affects security in this area and particularly security of India. 
The Revival of Defence treaty with UK, the Trincomalee Tank Farm Deal, 
expansion of scope of the voice of America Sri Lanka's collaboration with 
Isreali Special Air Services (SAS) and many such steps are creating 
disharmonious relationship between India and Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka's geopolitical location was important factor that compelled 
India's anxiety over any destabilizing development in the Island. Sri Lanka 
sought help from Israel and Pakistan in it? fighting against the Tamil militants. 
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The Israeli secret service MOSSAD gave counter insurgency training to Sri 
Lanka's security forces and Pakistan readily responded with arms and military 
training for the Island's army. China, South Africa, Singapore and Malaysia 
were the other countries, which supplied arms to Sri Lanka. To counter these 
trends India developed her doctrine of regional security. India has no intention 
of intervention in internal conflicts of any South Asian country and strongly 
opposes intervention by any country in the internal affairs of any other. India 
will not tolerate external interventions in a conflict situation in any South Asian 
country if the intervention has any implicit anti-Indian orientations, analyzed 
Bhabani Sen Gupta. 
The bomb blast in a crowded Colombo market killed many civilians. 
The Jayawardene government was asked to resign. Jayawardene opted for 
military solution and military action was initiated in Jaffiia peninsula to wipe 
out terrorist element in May 1987.^ '* The government of India warned the Sri 
Lanka government that India would not remain an indifferent spectator to the 
plight of Tamils in Jaffiia. The Indian government ran for the humanitarian aid 
but the Sri Lankan government refused. 
It is obvious that Sri Lanka's geopolitical location is an important factor 
that compels India's anxiety over any destabilizing development in the Island. 
Indian role in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and changed regional policy needs to 
be understood in this perspective from the point of view of India's security. 
K.M. Pannikar had advocated the sfrategic unity of India, Burma and Sri 
Lanka, which is one of the prerequisites to a realistic policy of Indian 
defence.'^  
India-Nepal: Relationship and Regional Security 
The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal is a small country the size of the state 
of Illinois. Sandwiched between its two giant neighbours, the People's 
Republic of China and India, It is land locked and thus has access to the sea 
only through Indian Territory. Linked with both China and India by all-weather 
motorable roads, Nepal today occupies a strategic position in the Southern 
subcontinent. 
Nepal achieved its territorial consolidation in the eighteenth century 
under a dynamic Gorkha King Prithvi Raj Narayan Shah, who organized the 
Nepali army along western times. In the 1814 war with the British rulers of 
India, Nepal not only suffered a defeat but also lost considerable territory to 
British India. It is only after 1947 Nepal emerged from its seclusion and 
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became active in regional politics. 
The ethnic compositions of Nepal's population and its cultural heritage 
have been deeply influenced by India and Tibet, two of its immediate 
neighbours. Its population is divided into two predominant racial groups, 
Caucasoid and Mongoloid. 
Indo-Nepal relations have generally been on even -keel, minor irritants 
now and then notwithstanding. It is because of historical geographical 
economic and socio-cultural factors. There are hardly any two countries in the 
world that share more commonalties than Nepal and India do. 
The occupation of Tibet by China in 1950 aroused the sensitivity of 
India about her own security, as there is no natural barrier between India and 
Nepal. Thus, threat perception of India increased because in some Chinese 
maps Nepal was shown as Chinese territory as early as 1939 and Mao Zedong 
had said that Nepal was the dependent state of China. In fact the Chinese had 
regarded Tibet as palm and Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Laddakh and NEFA as five 
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fingers of Tibet. With such a background it is but natural for India to be 
deeply concerned with the security of Nepal as its own security. 
Nepal's India policy from 1947 to 1950 was exclusively aimed at 
winning over the Indian governments sympathy for the Rana rule. To achieve 
this aim, the Rana's repeatedly pleaded with New Delhi which resulted in the 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship is 
still the cornerstone of Indo-Nepal relations, which some Indian Scholars refer 
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to as almost "defence pact" between the two countries.'^ While accepting the 
complete independence and sovereignty of Nepal, India also sought to bind 
Nepal down to its own strategic and foreign policy needs more than ever 
before, since Nepal has been taking of the unequal nature of the Treaty and 
wants to review it. 
Nepal and India, therefore, generally agree to talk over the Treaty 
provisions. When, for example, the then Nepalese Prime Minister, G.P. 
Koirala, came to New Delhi on 31 July 2000, exactly 50 years after the signing 
of the Treaty, Prime Ministers of both the countries directed their Foreign 
Secretaries to undertake a review of all issues pertaining to the 1950 Treaty. 
Another issue that needs scrutiny pertams to the Indo-Nepal border. 
India and Nepal share 1760 km. open border.'"* One of the present day border 
problems, which bedevil the relations between India and Nepal, pertains to a 
small stretch of land in far west of Nepal - over looking China. Situated at the 
tri-junction, Kalapani is claimed by Nepal as its territory while India maintains 
as Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) outpost there since 1962 and claims 
sovereignty over it. This is a nice slope of the Mahakali tributary in Dracula. 
Both India and Nepal are claiming the territory on the ground of map and 
border demarcation evidences, though minor, the dispute remains a thorn in the 
flesh of bilateral relations. 
The open border between India and Nepal, which characterizes the 
special relationship between the two countries has of late, taken a new 
dimension affecting the security situation in the region. Certain levels of 
smuggling and criminal activities were always there. But now the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISl) of Pakistan not only uses Nepal as conduit for its 
infiltration into India, but also uses its territory as safe haven and recruiting 
ground. The porous nature of the border enables ISI agents to slip into India 
with ease and along with arms, explosives and counterfeit Indian currency. 
There is a feeling in some quarters in India that Nepal is not doing enough to 
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curb the ISI activities on its soil in spite of its official commitment to do. The 
feeling was buttressed by the hijacking of the Indian Airline's plane in 
December 1999.^ "' 
India-Bangladesh 
Ever since the emergence of Bangladesh in the political map of South 
Asia, its relations with neighbouring India has most of the time remained 
fragile. No doubt, till the late Mujibur-Rehman ruled the country, he saw to it 
that Indo-Bangladesh relations in spite of occasional irritants, must be 
stabilized at any cost. In fact, because of his personal and warm relationship 
with Mrs. Indira Gandhi, many of the misconceptions between the two nations, 
were pushed to the background.'"^ 
With the dramatic exit of Sheikh Mujib from the political scene of 
Bangladesh, the short-term benefits derived from the Pakistani factor in Indo-
Bangla relations no more remained in force. The late Prime Minister Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto clearly understood this real politic in the sub continental drama and 
lost no time to recognize the new regime led by Khondkar Mostaque Ahmed. 
Zia-ur-Rahman, the Strongman in Post-Mujib phase laimched his political 
career with an anti-Indian plank. There was a dramatic U-turn in Pak-Bangla 
relations. 
But very soon Zia's regime realised the situation of the subcontinent. In 
his search for legitimacy, the late Zia had no other option but to placate New 
Delhi. Fortunately for him the Janata Government was vigorously pursuing the 
so-called policy of positive bilateralism'. With the result in November 1977, 
the much-publicized Farakha Agreement was signed between India and 
Bangladesh. The late Zia-ur-Rahman also championed the cause of regional 
co-operation in South Asia.'"^ 
Unfortunately, Bangladesh saw another coup against General Zia-ur-
Rahman who was elected president in February 1979. The aforementioned 
coup took place on the 30 of May, 1981, when Zia-ur-Rahman was at 
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Chittagong wherein the circuit house he was killed by Maj. General Manjur.'^ '* 
The anarchy and confusion led another General, General Ershad to grab power 
and declare himself President of Bangladesh on ll*** of December, 1982. He 
continued Marshal Law, imposed a new in 1985 in the new regime. 
The movement to restore democracy was launched by Awami League 
President Mujib's daughter. Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Mrs. Khalida Zia, who 
now became one of the leaders of Nationalist Party, alongwith other parties, 
and forced Ershad to agree to hold elections and to restore democracy in 
Bangladesh. 
The administrators of Bangladesh were not reconciled to the present 
Farakka arrangement under which 40,000 cusecs of water are to be discharged 
into the Hooghly. Dacca expressed its desire to internationalize the Farrakka 
issue by placing the whole question before the United Nations Organization. 
India, however, suggested bilateral negotiations and peaceful solution.'°^ 
India's relations with Bangladesh are complicated by the latter's 
turbulent politics, its location, and the concern that other states might gain a 
foothold to India's disadvantage.'°^ 
Despite Bangladesh's strategic and ideological importance, relations 
with India have not been smooth. Like Nepal and Sri Lanka, Bangladesh feels 
it is taken for granted by New Delhi. If resents the proconsular style of some 
Indian officials and feels overwhelmed by India's vast economic capabilities. 
Senior Bangladeshi civil servants, diplomats, and army officers remember the 
•^ Pakistan days" when they were part of a larger and strategically important 
state. 
Until recently Delhi has resisted Bangladesh's attempts to be part of 
any larger international framework that might impinge upon its own regional 
dominance. This is especially true in the case of managing river waters that 
flow from India to Bangladesh, Bangladesh draws its water supply from two 
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great rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, which are, therefore, vital for its 
very existence. 
Since mid 1990s there emerged another phase of bilateral relationship 
between the two countries, that eventually led to signing of Ganga Waters 
Treaty of 1996'"^ and developments leading to the repatriation of Chakma 
refugees from Indian state of Tripura. This certainly marks a new beginning 
from the good and cordial relationship, particularly when one side calls it a 
"big achievement" and the other a "landmark" in India Bangladesh ties.^ *^ ^ 
Because of the great increase in social violence and separatist 
movements in India's northeast, as well as conflict along India's border with 
Burma, Bangladesh's location and geography have also assumed strategic 
importance. 
Because of social and cultural ties, the domestic ethnic politics of one 
state often resonates in the other. Furthermore, because Bangladesh is 
overwhelmingly Muslim, Indian strategists fear that it might harbour extremist 
and anti-Hindu, anti Indian groups, possibly with support from Pakistan. The 
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has been the latest group to benefit 
from this Pakistani design to destabilize India."*' However, the present 
Bangladeshi government has often reiterated its resolve not to give any 
assistance to such groups but it is yet to nab Bangladeshi conduits to bring this 
problem to and end. 
New Delhi still worries that outsiders will become involved in 
Bangladesh's affairs. There have been frequent news paper accounts of 
Pakistani intelligence operations mounted from Bangladesh and of activities of 
radical anti-Indian and anti-Hindu Islamic groups. New Delhi is also concerned 
about possible American assistance to the Bangladesh Army. The latter has 
been very active in intemational peacekeeping operations and American 
officials have considered such aid to enhance Bangladesh's capabilities."' The 
worry for Indian strategists is not that this will encourage an attack from the 
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miniscule within Bangladeshis, but that it might tiU the political balance within 
Bangladesh. Given the army's record of political involvement in the past and 
coup attempts as recently as 1998, this is not an unreasonable concern. 
India and Bhutan 
India's relations with Bhutan have remained cordial over the years. 
There are only two issues which merit consideration from India's securit>' point 
of view. The first is the use of Bhutanese territory by Indian militant and 
insurgent groups belonging to India" north-east region such as the ULFA and 
Bodo militants of Assam over the past three years or so these groups have set 
up operations in Southern Bhutan which offers them a safe haven in the event 
of pressure from Indian security forces. While India is encouraging the Bhutan 
to launch joint military operations against the militant groups, the latter has 
been reluctant to do so.''^ 
The Bhutanese government has been unable to persuade the militants to 
leave Bhutan and has been reluctant to take military action against ULFA. The 
other issue of concern has been the ongoing differences between Nepal and 
Bhutan over the Southern Bhutanese Refugee issue. 
In 1949 the ten article treaty replacing the 1910 treaty, signed by Bhutan 
and India, confirmed the treaty obligations of the two nations; that is Bhutan 
accepted Indian advice on foreign affairs and India pledged not to interfere in 
Bhutan's internal affairs. In short, India and Bhutan, each faced with threats 
Grom the People's Republic of China. "^ 
TERRORISM AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA 
Words and attitudes wrap around meaning especially when there is some 
difficulty in distinguishing 'a terrorist' from 'a guerrilla' or from 'freedom 
fighter'. With these three, they contrast each other in their recourse to violence. 
• the terrorist targets civilians 
• the guerrilla goes for military personnel and facilities. 
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• The freedom fighter conducts a campaign to liberate his people from 
dictatorial oppression, gross discrimination, or the grip of an occupying 
power.'*'* 
What distinguishes the terrorist from others is not the extent of violence, it 
is the choice of target and mode of activity, whether guerrilla or freedom 
fighter, if violence is used against innocent civilians then you are most 
certainly a terrorist."^ No end can justify such means. ^ '^  
The Tamil Tigers, fighting savagely in Sri Lanka for their independence, 
are regarded as terrorists rather than as a liberating force because they destroy 
villages and assassinate political figure heads. When Chechen 'rebels' fighting 
for their national autonomy, spring violence upon Moscow, they are bunted as 
terrorists, if at home in Chechnya they sabotage Russian military bases they are 
lauded by their fellows as brave patriots. 
Difficulties, though, remain short of an acceptable international definition 
of terrorism. In reality, any state can sign a declaration against terrorism 
without needing to put obligations into fiiU practice. States, party to a 
convention, tend to define the phenomenon of terrorism in different ways. 
Since New York's fraumatic 9/11 there has been a great deal of 
international effort to put what is understood to be unacceptable terrorism at the 
very top of the agenda. The United Nations system of specialized agencies and 
programmes is continually devising a draft of counter-terrorist measures to 
supplement those of the 1960s and 1970s. Now there are 12 anti-terrorism 
treaties and just as many conventions compelling all 189 supporting nations to 
work together against aiding, supporting, harbouring, organising and 
sponsoring terrorists."^ 
Whatever be the reasons or the ground realities for terrorism, such as; 
socio-economic deprivation, ethno-political aspirations, ideological 
inspirations, suppression or oppression of weaker sections or communities etc; 
the fact is that terrorism has now assumed a true transnational dimension and 
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has all the potential and prospect of being globalised in all senses of the term. 
No wonder, therefore, experts say that terrorism is "widespread geographically, 
and diverse, ideologically". "^ 
The latest victim of transnational terrorism would seem to be the 
hitherto tranquil Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. The bomb blast on November 
7, 1998, at Changlimiltran Stadium in the capital city of Thimpu is worrying 
the authorities a lot. They link this incident with the series of small terrorist 
type activities which began in the late 80s in the southern parts of the country, 
to the problem of mass migration detected at the last national census. 
After the end of cold war, a serious problem affecting a large number of 
countries of the world, irrespective of their size, religion or ideology, is 
terrorism. Terrorism has created social and political disorder, chaos and 
instability in countries and deprived its victims of basic human rights. Though, 
there is unanimity among the countries suffering from the menace to control it, 
there is no sign of the end of terrorism."^ It is well recognized that no single 
country can control it, not even the super power, America. 
Terrorists, now a global community, are part of our world no matter 
which part of it we inhabit. India, the U.S., Canada almost all the Latin 
American countries, Ireland, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Turkey, 
Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, and Japan have had a taste of it in the last two decades.''^ The 
number of countries in which terrorist incidents have taken place have 
increased. The South Asia is the worst affected area in Asia. 
Terrorism in South Asia is as old as history, nay, even mythodology. In 
the Ramayana epic, which is read and revered all over South and South-East 
Asia, perhaps the abduction of Sita by the Lankan king Rawana by luring her to 
the glitter of a golden deer was an act of terrorism.. And so also was the burning 
of Ravana's "Golden Lanka" by the monkey god, Hanuman as an act of 
retaliation. The political consequences of Ravana's first act of terrorism led a 
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war between his state Lanka and the refugee king of Ayodhya, Lord Rama 
resulting in the elimination of Ravana and destruction of his Lanka. On 
substantive aspects such mythological tales can as well be compared with 
forms of terrorism in the modem world, including the "Post-9/11 war against 
global terrorism". ^^^ 
In South Asia, states have consciously and persistently used force as an 
instrument of strategic and foreign policies towards other states. In doing so, 
terror as a method and a consequence of the use of force has been sought to be 
justified. 
In the South Asian situation between India and Pakistan, significance of 
terrorism is critical and decisive in conditioning inter-state relations. 
Terrorism and its political consequences have directly and visibly 
affected inter-state relations in South Asia. Particularly so, when force has been 
made an instrument of conscious state policy and the resulting terrorist 
violence has been rationalised. Such terrorism has vitiated interstate relations 
and brought about a drift and acrimony in neighbourhood interactions. In 
situations where terrorism has affected states negatively, in a similar manner, it 
has also brought the neighbours together, to cooperate in common interest.'^' 
In the western region of South Asia, namely, Afghanistan, Central Asia, 
Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, Islamic fundamentalist groups are operating at a 
large scale. They terrorize to achieve their political objectives. The appearance 
of this form of Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia is a comparatively recent 
but significant development, because it has come about through American 
assistance to various obscurantist groups operating in Afghanistan.'^ ^ 
The assertion of a medieval Islamic personality and the emergence of 
transnational terrorism in its wake is the most disturbing development in the 
regions because Islamic terrorist organizations have a formidable global reach. 
In South Asia fundamentalists can create destabilization, conflicts and chaos. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have become the main launching pads for militant 
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Islam. Transnational terrorist groups have been launched into Kashmir, 
Xinjiang and Tajikistan since 1992. 
Pakistan intensified its efforts to induct mercenaries into Kashmir to 
carry out sabotage killings and attacks on security forces. The Pak-sponsored 
mercenaries have been employing the local Hizbul Mujahideen cadres for 
securing hideouts logistics and also to act as local guides in their terrorist 
operations. Pakistan, however, has denied direct links with these groups. 
In Southern region of South Asia, the ethnic differences between the 
Sinhalese and Tamils turned into violent conflict in which terrorism played a 
dominant role from 1983 onwards. Widespread ethnic riots aggravated the 
situation. The army and police, largely Sinhalese in composition, played a 
partisan role forcing the Tamils to organize their own defence. The LTTE 
(Liberal Tamil Tigers Eelam) eventually converted Jaffiia into a string fortress 
and ran a parallel government in the Tamil dominated areas of northern and 
eastern Sri Lanka. The LTTE's most spectacular terrorist attack in 1997 was a 
truck bombing directed at the newly opened Colombo World Trade Center on 
15 October.'^ ^ 
Insurgencies and tribal conflicts have been endemic in the eastern region 
of South Asia. The international borders are highly porous and insurgents can 
move across them with ease. Indo-Mongoloid ethnic stock is dominant in the 
entire region and most tribes of India, Myanmar and Bangladesh have close 
cultural and ethnic affinities. The Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, north of the 
Indian state of Assam, is also used by insurgents to escape from the security 
forces, who caimot pursue them across the international borders. 
Northeast India comprises seven states. Most of them are insurgency -
prone due to their inaccessibility and isolation from the natural mainstream. 
External support comes from Pakistan and China in the form of training and 
financial assistance. Insurgents from India frequently operate from bases in 
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. The increased flow of arms in north east 
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India, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh and the 
dangerous potential of the situation in Myanmar, has the potential to generate 
wide spread violence in the region. One could not also miscalculate the designs 
ofLTTE in Sri Lanka.'^ ^ 
South Asia, over more than two decades, has been a scene of domestic 
ethnic wars involving the big and small states. More internal conflicts have 
occurred in recent times than inter-state wars. As against the five regular 
military to military wars in the region since 1947, including the Kargil war, 42 
wars of irregular type erupted besides a much larger number of armed conflicts 
at a lower scale going down to terrorist acts. Such wars have distinguished 
themselves in their intractability and internationalization.'^ ^ 
In the management of internal conflicts the South Asian states 
fundamentally face two elements of global dimension, viz., the 
internationalization of internal conflict and procurement of arms by militant 
groups from globally differed sources. 
The first element, the internationalization of an internal conflict, is the 
most formidable political factor that the South Asian States have to counter. 
Extra regional states and international NGOs are the major actors in the field 
through whom the ethnic groups which are challenging the state authority for 
more autonomy or secession are escalating pressure on the state. To be more 
specific, the western states like US, UK, France, Germany and Netherlands and 
the UN on the one hand, the voluntary bodies like the Amnesty International, 
Asia Watch and the European Human Rights Association are the major 
Agencies through which the dissident groups articulate their cause and appeal 
for action against State repression.'^ ^ 
Given the western understanding and sensitivity to the human rights 
abuse militant groups were able to muster considerable support to their cause in 
Europe and America and also subject their state to external pressures for 
redressal. It is a well-known fact that the National Human Rights Commission 
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in India owes its establishment to the western pressure during the Punjab and 
Kashmir secessionist movement. 
What seems in the prevailing scenario of militancy in South Asian 
region is that the sovereignty of the state is defining and exercising its power to 
control the anti-state movements and their outfits is sought to be externally 
managed. Hence, the State is asked to allow foreign visiting groups into the 
disturbed areas, permit neutral human rights inquiries, appoint human rights 
conunissions, etc. to address the militant's cause. The bare truth is that wide 
spread and uncontrolled proliferation of illicit arms around the world fuels the 
ongoing ethnic wars in South Asia. 
Terrorism is an interstate problem in South Asia. Its threat to the region 
is multidimensional. It is a complex intermix of religious - separatist -
conmiunal overtones. Though, no state is fi-ee firom terrorist activities, regional 
cooperation is not forthcoming to deal with it. This is because ahnost all the 
states seem to have consciously adopted the policy of supported extremist 
outfits against the neighbours. The South Asian states have not come forward 
to meet the challenge collectively as they used support to terrorism to 
pressurize neighbours. In the post cold war period terrorism assumed the form 
of Frankenstein as the global community is emphasizing respect for human 
rights to self determination leading to strengthening insurgency and autonomy 
movements of various types in South Asia.'^'In South Asia, India has been the 
major victim of militancy and terrorism. Many groups, both within and outside 
the country, employ terrorist tactics championing their cause. 
Sources of Religious Extremism in South Asia 
South Asia has witnessed various types of terrorism. There are many 
religious ethnic and sectarian groups that are adopting violent and terrorist 
means and seeking to destabilize civil societies. In the recent past, Jehadi and 
extremist forces have become active in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. 
They have also established closer links with the insurgent movements in the 
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northeastern parts of India. Other forms of terrorist activities were precipitated 
by Muslim and Hindu zealots in India. There are also revolutionary movements 
like Maoists and ethnic insurgencies led by the LTTE in Nepal and Sri Lanka, 
respectively. 
The unique feature of terrorism in South Asia is the strong state support 
it receives. Almost all the South Asian states seem to officially sponsor and 
encourage terrorism as an instrument of state policy to pressurize others. 
Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir or, Bangladesh has encouraged and 
shehered many groups from northeast India against the Indian government. 
Often, Bangladesh played a conduit to ISI supported activities against India. 
Similarly, India encouraged and supported Tamil militants in Sri Lanka by 
providing money and ammunition to LTTE cadres before the India Sri Lanka 
accord was signed. Even smaller states like Bhutan and Nepal are no exception. 
Nepal, increasingly faces Maoist insurgency. Bhutan faces a nexus between 
militant groups and Nepali refiigees. Tensions between Bhutan and Nepal have 
been increasing on account of Nepal's suspected support to the Nepalese in 
Bhutan.* '^ 
Another feature of terrorism in South Asia is religion-fuelled terrorism 
practised by Jihad activity supported by the states in the region. Most of Jehadi 
groups made Pakistan as the centre for their activities and used hit and run 
tactics. Their activities are supported by both political and military leadership 
of Pakistan. In due course, the Jehadi elements spread their tentacles into 
neighbouring countries in raising similar organisations.'^ ** 
The origin of the so-called Islamic extremism can be traced back to 
various historical factors. A lot of misinterpretations exist over what happened 
a few centuries ago. The prophets of Islam or the Quran do not sanction 
violence or extremism in any form. Terrorism occurs because of various 
reasons. Similarly, no other religion advocates extremist views. But, whenever 
a rigidity of views exists, extremism follows. When people want to achieve 
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political power by the use of force, terrorism is bom.'^' The influence of the 
'Muslim Brotherhood' idea spread through Syed Qutab of Egypt and Maulana 
Abul Alam Mouli of the previously unpartitioned India and subsequently, 
Pakistan and their extremely violent means of powder, was justified to fight 
against non-believers. These were the people who affected a large number of 
people in South Asia and the contemporary fundamentalist movement started in 
the form of Jihad, as a violent form propagated by them. Various Pakistan 
based fundamentalist and extremist militant organizations unleashed political 
violence in the name of Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir through the 
1980s. Religion was manipulated to achieve political ends, especially since, 
in the Indian subcontinent, religion holds almost an obsessive appeal for the 
common man, and can be easily used to sway the passions of people. 
People responded to the Fatwa given by Osma bin Laden to eliminate 
radicals and civilian allies on the belief that every Muslim considers it his 
primary duty to fight against western elements, the corrupt indigenous Muslim 
societies. 
Of late, religious extremism has emerged in India as well. Hatred against 
certain religious minorities is openly being propagated by certain radical Hindu 
organizations. Such religious fanaticism has repeatedly led to violence and 
similar reactions. It has not yet led to widespread terrorism but possibility of 
such an eventuality cannot be easily ignored. Until now, India has only 
witnessed 'sponsored' terrorism. 
Role of Pakistan in Abetting Terrorism in South Asia 
Pakistan has been the driving force of terrorism in South Asia. It 
supports, encourages and aids all types of miscreant, elements in the name of 
the right to self-determination in Kashmir, Islam and Jihad. From the 1980s 
onwards Pakistan has become a base and transit point for outside operations for 
many Islamic groups.'^ ^ 
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Pakistan has never been able to accept Kashmir as a part of India. 
Having failed to resolve the issue through negotiations and war, Islamabad 
found a new way in the form of low-intensity conflict by training and 
encouraging militancy in Kashmir. It has been spreading the cult of militancy 
and terrorism to create ethnic and sectarian divide and conmiunal backlash. 
During General Zia's regime, Pakistan launched 'Operation Topac* 
which aims at proxy war against India. The main features of this operation 
were (a) initiate low-level insurgency (b) exert pressure along the line of 
control (LOC) by infiltrating mercenaries and special force to attack vital 
targets (c) using religion as a motivating and binding factor and giving a nudge 
to the Jihad.'^ '* 
State sponsored terrorism took several hundred lives in Punjab when the 
insurgency broke out in 1980s. An analyst observed that "over the years, the 
ISI had stirred the Punjab insurrection arming and training Sikh extremists". 
Thereafter Pakistan has taken the ULFA men to the North-West, Frontier 
province (NWFP) where the worlds biggest open and illegal arms are sold,'^ ^ 
Having failed to realize the establishments of an independent Khalistan, 
Pakistan upgraded its policy towards Kashmir and changed tactics there in the 
1990s. Islamabad recognized the effectiveness of cross-border terrorism in 
achieving its goal in Kashmir after the cold war. The post-cold war period has 
witnessed the rise and phenomenal growth of religion - fiielled terrorism in 
different parts of the world. The 11* September events have shown that 
terrorism runs in the veins of radical religious beliefs. Out of the 100 active 
terrorist groups, 64 are identified as religiously motivated.'^ ^ Most of these 
groups operate from South Asia to Central Asia through West Asia and from 
East Asia to South Asia to central Asia through West Asia and from East Asia 
to Southeast Asia some of these groups extend their operations to Afiica, 
Europe and North America by collaborating with transnational criminal groups 
of gun runners, narcotics traffickers and smugglers. 
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Neighbours have quarreled and compromised in contemporary 
international relations. Examples can be multiplied, France and Germany, Iran 
and Iraq, India and its neighbours namely Nepal, Bangladesh Sri Lanka, Russia 
& China, China & Japan etc. The two neighbours India and Pakistan, however, 
are parts of one civilization represent the culture and history of the Indian 
subcontinent, but are always in a tug of war. They have been forced to divert 
their vast and valuable resources towards defence requirements retarding their 
most urgent social and economic development. Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar 
Khan admitted that throughout its existence Pakistan 'fought four wars with 
India without clear objective.' '^ ^ Terrorism fuelled by religion took a new turn 
with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In its fight against the Soviet Union, 
Washington not only trained religiously influenced Mujahideen elements but 
also provided arms, economic aid and gave diplomatic support. During this 
period, an International Tabligh Jammait Convention was held in Illinois 
attracting over 6,000 Muslims from different parts of the world.'^ * Later on, 
the Jammait had run training camps for the Mujahidden of Afghanistan. During 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan collaborated with the U.S. and 
acted as a frontline state in supplying arms and training to the Mujahideen 
elements. 
During the last 13 years Pakistan sponsored proxy war in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir has created havoc of worst variety killing tens of 
thousands of innocent people including a large number of security forces and 
causing colossal damage to both public and private properties worth hundreds 
of crores.'^' Pakistan has claimed that over 75,000 Kashmiris had been killed in 
the last 13 years. India holds that the total number of casualities is between 
30,000 and 31,000 of these 2500 were the members of the security forces. Out 
of the total number of 28,000 Kashmiris killed, 9,800 were killed not by the 
security forces but by the militants''*", of these 1,180''*' were Hindus, but more 
than 8,600 were Muslims. It would not be out of place to mention that 11,800 
militants were killed by security forces.'''^  Most distressingly, it needs to be 
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highlighted that Pakistan trained terrorist groups have remained actively 
engaged in systematic campaign of ethnic and religious cleansing in the 
state.'''^ 
Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
With repeated occurrence of average terror attacks the impact seems to 
wear off over time and the urge for moving towards catastrophic terrorism 
gains predominance. The new "terrorists have a number of characteristics -
including fanaticism, apocalyptic ideology and most frightening of all, desire to 
intimidate by mass murder.''*^ In a competent work, Jessica stem analyzes the 
terrorists' motivations to use unconventional weapons. Terrorism, she argues, 
is not a static phenomenon and new modes of terrorism have emerged with 
regularity. But terrorist groups are unlikely to resort to weapons of mass 
destruction (following the rational actor model) as they hope to influence 
policy and not to kill for its own sake. Still, the terrorists can be motivated to 
use unconventional weapons if they get insufficient attention from the press of 
governments if they become decreasingly receptive of their demands. They 
also innovate as countermeasures compel them to search for alternatives.''*^ The 
terrorists have used violence including bombing, kidnapping and hijacking - to 
promote their political agenda. If the agenda become vague, blurred and clearly 
not discernible, aims and goals become diffused; and the terrorists can use the 
weapons of mass destruction. 
Over the last two decades, particularly after the end of the cold war, 
there is a free play of lethal weapons in the international society. As cold war 
structures and rationale for continued arming of client states disappeared, states 
declined in their territorial authority, borders became fragile old states 
splintered into new nations and arms manufacturers flouted international arms 
control regimes. Requisition of weapons by unorganized rebel groups and 
smugglers became an easy task. Light and small arms proliferation has 
emerged as the most dangerous phenomenon in the global civil society and 
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governments all over the world, including the UN, are seriously aware of this 
growing phenomenon but with least control. Most of these weapons are 
transferred through illegal means and diverted in a variety of ways.''*^ 
Afghanistan is a classic example of the spread of light weapons. Arms 
supplied, procured and captured by the Afghan Mujahideen in their fight 
against the former Soviet Union forces flooded into the NWFP area of 
adjoining Pakistan. It is by now too well known and documented history that a 
large proportion of arms into this area were supplied by the US through the 
CIA in its counter offensive against the former Soviet Union. The CIA (Central 
Intelligence Agency) in turn pipelined an estimated $ 6 billion worth of arms 
from its own as well as other sources through Pakistan's ISI which include the 
Kaleshnikov variants, RPG-7 anti tank weapons and varieties of machine guns, 
SAMs and explosive weapons from sources other dian the CIA supplied 
included weapons from China, Egypt, South Africa and Israel.'''^ 
The great arms bazaar that franscends the Pak-Afghan border in the 
NWFP region is shopping centre for a varied number of customers who include 
embargoed states, rebel groups, private armies, drug peddlers and criminal 
gangsters whose choice of weapons, used by the Punjabi and later Kashmiri 
militants came from this area.''** 
Even China is no exception to the phenomenon of small arms 
proliferation. In fact, China's Pingyuan city in its southwest province of 
Yunnan bordering Myanmar and India's NEFA region has reportedly become a 
semi-open arms bazaar. 
Besides India, Srilanka is another country, which suffers from a serious 
proliferation of illegal weapons procured by the Tamil militants from any 
available source m the world. It is an established fact that the Tamil groups 
were trained in several camps in India and were permitted to run their own 
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camps. 
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Terrorism in India - Challenges 
India, at the dawn of the new millenium is facing a gigantic threat 
emanating from terrorism. India is surrounded by not too friendly neighbours 
and, even after more than fifty years of independence, it still has unresolved 
land and maritime boundary disputes with its neighbours, beset with cross 
border smuggling of weapons, explosives and narcotics. Its international land 
border of 15,120 kms is shared on the east with Bangladesh (4,096 Km), China 
(3,917 Km) to the north, and Pakistan (3,310 Km.) to the north and west. It also 
borders Nepal (1,752 Km) Myanmar (1,458 Kms) and the Himalayan Kingdom 
of Bhutan (587 Kms) India's 6,100 Km. long coastline and 1,400 km. of Island 
territories border Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Myanmar. Besides disputed territory with China, the border with 
Pakistan is the most volatile with Kashmir, as only 200 Km. of its border is 
demarcated with the Line of Control (LOC) extending for 790 km. About 125 
km. of its border is disputed with Bangladesh. With this backdrop of disputed 
borders with our neighbours, India faces problems of infiltration, migration, 
transborder smuggling and transnational crimes.'^ ° 
Pakistan poses the most serious threat to India today, which primarily 
emanates from terrorism. The terrorist movements in Punjab, if not completely 
wiped out, had been effectively controlled by state police and Para-military 
forces of the country. Discussing the terrorist's new game plan to revive 
militancy in Punjab, P.C. Dogra, Director General of Police, Punjab, revealed 
(July, 1998) that over 4000 Punjabi youth, who illegally migrated to the west, 
came under the influence of Khalistani protagonists. They were being brain 
washed and sent to India through Nepal and Pakistan. According to him 
Khalistan Liberation Force (spearheaded from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.) 
were active in Punjab and Delhi. A new outfit - the Kamagata Maru Dal of 
Khalistan based in Germany and U.K. had also come up. To some extent, the 
Babbar Khalsa was also active in Punjab.'^' 
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A substantial involvement of Pakistan and its ISI agency with the 
extended support of other pan-Islamic countries led to marked deterioration in 
the law and order situation. In India, the ISI has spread tentacles in majority of 
the sensitive states. The ISI operations in India involve North East insurgency, 
militancy in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir, bomb blasts in Bombay in 1993 
and in Coimbatore in 1998. Gujarat is a hunting ground for ISI. 
The pan-Islamic groups such as "'Harkat-ul-Ansar, hashkar-e-Toiba, 
Markaz-Daawa-al-Arashad" had been collecting funds for jihad in Kashmir. 
ISI spends each month more than Rs. 25 million on terrorism in Kashmir.'^ ^ 
Violence and terrorism in Kashmir are the by-products of Jihad taught in 
Pakistgani unrecognised religious schools popularly known as madrassas. 
Most of these schools inculcate the spirit of jihad in their students. It was even 
reported that every madrassa has been supplied books on jihad and war front 
reports from Kashmir, Chechnya, etc. some of the students were even sent to 
the war front. *^^ The leadership of madrassas is opposed to any reform plans 
describing them as "against Islam". Any takeover of them by the State is also 
opposed on the ground that the madrassas are the supply Ime for jehad. ^ '^* 
The mushrooming of madrassas and the size of jihad culture in Pakistan 
have their impact on the South Asian region. Pakistani political and military 
establishment forged an alliance with madrassas and jihadi elements in 
nurturing them and exporting terrorism in the name of Islam to the 
neighbouring states. The goals of Pakistani government and jihadi groups have 
become more or less similar. Lashkar's popularity has grown since its role in 
the Kargil conflict and sending suicide missions into Kashmir. Its annual 
gatherings draw thousands of new followers who would be willing to go to 
Kashmir to fight. Lashkar 's parent organization, Markaz Dawa wal Irshad had 
a humble obscure beginning but had grown into a formidable force. In 1997, 
the group was running 30 schools with 5000 students geared towards producing 
Mujahidden to wage jehad. The head of the organization had said that 'jehad is 
carried out to establish the system of Allah in the world.' '^ ^ 
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A silent revolution has been taking place in Bangladesh that may disturb 
peace in the region and may create trouble for the region as well as beyond. 
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, religious intolerance, militant Muslim 
group's linkages with international terrorist groups, a powerful military ties 
with militants and the mushrooming of madrassas, churning out militant and 
radical students are transforming the Bangladeshi society and the nation. The 
second half of the 1980s witnessed a phenomenal rise of madrassas and 
hundreds of Bangladeshi youth joined the mujahideen According to an 
estimate there are roughly 64,000 madrassas in Bangladesh, most of which 
mushroomed only during the last decade. Most of these are funded by 
proselytizing Arab charity organizations as in Pakistan.'^ ^ 
Suicide Terrorism 
The suicide terrorism has assumed greater significance after attack on 
the US in September 2001. In South Asia, Sri Lanka and India (Kashmir) have 
been witnessing this phenomenon. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation of Tigers of 
Tamil Ealam (LTTE) began their suicide offensive in the late 1980s, whereas 
Kashmir has been witnessing suicide bombings and Fidayeen attacks after the 
Kargil war in 1998. Suicide terrorism, to a great extent is a post-1980 
phenomenon. In the past there were a number of isolated incidents in which 
individuals had given-up their lives in committing terror acts but the major 
differences between them and the modem day suicide bombers is that the latter 
covers himself with acting as a human bomb, where as the former were using 
bombs and other related weapons. Suicide terrorism was closely related to the 
Khomeni revolution in Iran. HizbuUah (Army of Allah), the first to carry out a 
suicide attack was a Shitii terrorist group, and had very close links with Iran.'^ ^ 
Emile Durkheim, the first sociological thinker to propound a systematic 
and structural theory on suicide, lists three basic types of suicide, egoistic. 
Suicide, anomic suicide and altruistic suicide.'^ * The fmal category led 
individual to commit suicide due to over integration of himself with the 
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society, suicide terrorism fails in this category in wliich the individual feels that 
he is part of a whole. Ke believes that the 'self has no relevance, if the whole 
is under threat. The individual gives his "self so that his "whole" would 
survive. 
Suicide terrorism in South Asia has manifested in two countries - Sri 
Lanka and India (Kashmir). The LTTE in Sri Lanka and the so-called 
Fidayeens in Kashmir are significant while talking about suicide terrorism in 
South Asia. India has also become vuhierable to Narco - Terrorism as it is 
placed between the two major narcotics growing centers of Asia - the Golden 
Crescent (GC) Pak-Afghan border comprising Pakistan Afghanistan and Iran 
and the Golden Triangle (GT) Myanmar-Thailand border comprising 
Myanmar, Thailand and Laos. Nobody has a precise estimate of the quantum of 
money involved in the narcotics in the regard. 
Conflict Resolution and Building Peace in South Asia: India's Role 
In 1998, India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and subsequently 
both governments emphasized that these weapons would form a key part of 
their national security policy. Other political, diplomatic and military aspects 
became clear soon afterwards. 
Nuclear weapons are unrelenting. Managing them has been a hard and 
costly task for the major nuclear weapon states. It has made building the bomb 
appears easy in comparison. History may show that managing the bomb is 
impossible in the political, military, institutional and technological environment 
that prevails in South Asia. The proof may be tragedy beyond measures.'^' 
Shortly after May 1998 nuclear test conducted by India, L.K. Advani, 
the then home minister in the BJP led coalition government, claimed: "India's 
decisive step to become a nuclear weapon state has brought about a qualitative 
new state in India-Pakistan relations, particularly in finding a lasting solution to 
the Kashmir problem?'^ Within three weeks Pakistan tested its own nuclear 
weapon and indeed brought about a qualitatively new state in India and 
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Pakistan relations. Indicative of this new state was the fact that barely a year 
later, in May 1999, India and Pakistan were involved in bitter fighting on 
mountains in the Kargil-Dras sector in Kashmir. According to one study, high 
level leaders on the two sides exchanged at least a dozen nuclear threats.'^' 
Pakistan's official internet page warned that Kashmu- was a "nuclear flash 
point". ^^^ 
The situation in Kashmir is different from the proxy wars fought 
between the US and the former Soviet Union during the cold war. The two 
adversaries fought those conflicts away from their vital territorial interests, and 
losses in battles never directly threatened their survival. In South Asia, 
geography does not allow such a possibility, and any conflict, no matter how 
small and confined, will always pit the two sides directly against each other.'^ ^ 
Backdrop of rivalry that one needs to work towards reducing the risk of war 
between India and Pakistan, and also find a model to manage their nuclear 
arsenals.'^ '* 
The prime objective of a national security doctrine is the preservation of 
the core values of the nation. In the conceptual framework there stands three 
core values for India's security viz., democracy, secularism and federalism. 
Any erosion of any of these values, for whatever reason, erodes the legitimacy 
of the Indian nation - state and hence poses a threat to its security.^ ^^ 
Pakistan adopted a different set of core values, emphasizing religion as 
the defining basis of national identity and ideology. This did not admit of 
equality of human beings as a key principle. To that extent, Jammu & Kashmir 
represents an ideological struggle between the core values adopted by India and 
Pakistan.'^ ^ 
Bangladesh, bom out of the resurgence of Bengali nationalism and a 
sense of discrimination by the western wing of Pakistan, inherited some of the 
contradictions as a state based on religion. At the same time, the fragility of 
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political institutions inherited from the earlier period has had its own negative 
impact on building of the nation state. 
Sri Lanka adopted democratic values and norms, but secular values, 
which are an essential ingredient of democracy, receded into the background as 
ethnic divisions gained ground. The ultimate militerization of the ethnic 
conflict is now a matter of history. Nepal and Bhutan had remained 
independent even when the subcontinent was colonized. They have, as a 
consequence, inherited the advantage of a continuum of identity and the core 
values, although Nepal suffered somewhat when it was not able to adopt an 
adequately broad based political decision making framework for many years.'^' 
The fimdamental contradictions characterize the core values and even the 
strategic interest of the states of South Asia. On the other hand, all countries of 
the region face common strategic challenge; that of ensuring rapid socio-
economic development. The youth is particularly affected, and the 
manifestation comes in the shape of resort to violence to change the existing 
order. The major non-military challenges to security in South Asia revolve 
around drug trafficking, the proliferation and spread of small arms and light 
weapons, and trans-national terrorism. The absence of war for more than a 
quarter century has not translated into peace. 
India has approached the exercise of confidence building with her 
neighbours with the following objectives: 
1. To provide an assurance of non-aggressive intent; 
2. To prevent any attempts at misrepresentation of regular activities for 
political ends; 
3. To reduce the likely hood of escalation of tensions, and 
4. To create an environment for reduction of weapons through 
negotiations.'^ * 
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The problem before India is that the regional environment has been 
nuclearised for more than three decades. The centrality of China in the nuclear 
question has continued to influence thinking and policy in India, 
India provides identity to South Asia, There is no commonality of 
interests between post-independence Bangladesh and Pakistan, nothing binds 
them. There is very little that binds Sri Lanka with Bangladesh or Pakistan. 
There is very little that binds any of these states to South Asia or to Nepal, for 
that matter. It is India that provides the glue and is the centrepiece that binds 
the region as a whole and creates what we know as the Indian subcontinent or 
South Asia, Hence, the criticality of the experiments, political ideas, 
institutions and economic growth models that India employs and implements 
are critical in terms of the experience of the rest of the region, as well as 
shaping of the other countries of the region,'^' 
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Chapter -III 
INDIA AND THE DETERMINANTS OF SOUTH ASIAN 
NUCLEAR POLITICS 
South Asia has many things in common, culturally, geographically, 
socially and economically but, unfortunately, not politically. Regional 
cooperation has, however, been a welcome sign for an enduring peace and 
prosperity. South Asia has been one of the greatest cradles of human 
civilization. 
The post-independent political history of South Asia has been full 
of vicissitudes that have ranged from problems relating to demarcation of 
boundaries, disputed lands and waters, illegal immigration to persistent fears 
of hegemony by core nations towards the peripheral states. 
India stands at the center of the South Asian region with its heaviest 
population and largest area. In addition to that, one can not forget the 
geographical position of India when one considers any question relating to 
Middle East or South East Asia, India inevitably comes into the picture. In 
addition to this, there are some other countries whose military postures and 
buildups could impinge on India's security concerns, notably South Africa 
and Australia. 
Extra-regional involvement in nuclearisation of South Asian Politics 
The extra-regional powers that greatly influence the South Asian 
politics are United States of America, USSR, France and China. Ignoring the 
Arab world can be an utter ignorance as it plays a significant role in the 
nuclearisation of South Asian politics. No doubt, the substantial military 
presence of USA plays a more significant role in the region. 
Existence of China and Russia close to South Asia, proximity of 
American naval facilities at Diego-Garcia and the significant change in the 
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strategic environment brought about by the implosion of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the cold war invest this region with a nev/ salience. 
Given the existential reality, it is tempting to hypotheses that a geo-
strategic construct, "South Asia" is inherently flawed. Being the major 
player in South Asian region, India's relations with other five SAARC 
countries excluding Pakistan are fairly normal apart from a few disputes and 
problems which are not of so high sensitivity as with the other major player 
in South Asia, Pakistan. 
It is a fact that the creation of Pakistan was strongly supported by 
the West with the conviction that, "a muslim majority state in North-west 
India would serve to check Soviet (Russia) expansion in the oil rich West 
Asian region, so critical for meeting its rising energy and security needs".' 
South Asia like many other developing regions, is experiencing an 
explosion of awareness, aspirations and identities. This is the result of 
shrinking global distances, expanding communication networks and 
advancing frontiers of technology in almost all the fields that affect human 
life.^  
The explosion of awareness, aspirations and identities in South Asia 
have also created new and intensified social tensions which have taken the 
forms of agitations and protest movements on the one hand and violent 
conflicts and organised insurgencies on the other, along religious political 
and ethnic lines. 
There is no state in South Asia, perhaps with the exception of 
Maldives, which is free from such violent conflicts. India and Pakistan, the 
largest of the South Asian states have the largest number of such conflicts, 
concomitant to this has been an increasing use of violence in the articulation 
of demands, political bargaining, territorial secessions and even to capture 
state power. Increasingly, armed struggle has become a dominant mode of 
political action. 
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The influence of superpowers in the South Asian politics has been 
in evidence since the dawn of bipolarism and rivalarism. The US interests in 
South Asia are based on three basic considerations. First, to prevent the 
absorption of the area in Russian influence. Second, USA wanted the 
maintenance of regional stability by preventing the nuclear proliferation and 
the third consideration is to contain Indian power in South Asia. The USA 
seems to have consistently tried to prevent India from emerging as an 
independent power center. 
The USA tried to contain and counter balance Indian power through 
the instrumentality of Pakistan thereby keeping alive the bitterness, hatred 
and confrontation originally sown by the Britishers. USA created and 
strengthened the military machine of Pakistan seeking to establish an 
artificial parity between India and Pakistan. 
The unending contentious issues between India and Pakistan in 
particular and their other neighbours in general have not helped the matters 
as far as security in South Asia is concerned. This situation prompted the 
countries, particularly India and Pakistan, to indulge in an arms build-up, 
even the very thought of going nuclear, which they ultimately achieved in 
1998.^  
The United States entered the subcontinent principally through the 
Middle East. There was a vague but general feeling that by extending 
military assistance, Pakistan's friendship could be won and its opposition to 
the communist nations strengthened.^ 
While Washington was moving ahead slowly, Pakistan was 
becoming increasingly anxious to obtain US military and economic 
assistance. After Prime Minister Liaquat All's death, Pakistan went under 
the control of men aptly labeled the 'hierarchs' the senior military officers 
and civil servants. In the 'hierarchs' the most prominent of whom were 
Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, Defence Secretary, Sikandar Mirza 
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and Army Commander-in-Chief, General Ayoub Khan, had initiated the 
earlier attempts to secure military assistance from the United States.^ 
Indian government soon learned about the prospective programme 
and privately made its objections known. The then Ambassador Bowels of 
USA in New Delhi also strongly opposed any arms aid for Pakistan. Non-
alignment, he was convinced, was a firmly established Indian policy and not 
incompatible with US needs in Asia.^ If the United States extend military 
assistance to Pakistan, it would be excerbating the tense relations between 
India and Pakistan, partly by upsetting the established balance of power and 
partly by adding differences over their approaches to the cold war to their 
already formidable antagonism. The then Indian Prime Minister Nehru 
warned that the US-Pakistani alliance would bring the cold war to India's 
borders with far reaching consequences in South Asia. Determined to protect 
his domestic position, Nehru directed the Indian congress party to mount 
public protest and demonstrations against the military assistance program. 
India tried to dissuade Pakistan by warning that a military pact would 
damage the chances of reaching a settlement on Kashmir, and to get the 
United States to hold back by hinting that arms aid might cause India to 
move closer to the USSR. The Soviets and the Chinese also denounced the 
proposed progranune. In response American News paper. New York Timesy 
denounced the Indian government for "playing with fire** by the manner in 
which it opposed the programme. The arms agreement was approved on 
February 8, 1954 by the National Security Council. The decision was 
generally accepted by the USA. 
While United States went ahead with its plans to aid Pakistan over 
Indian objections, it was at the same time anxious to limit the damage to US 
Indian relations. The then President of US, Eisenhower wrote to Prime 
Minister Nehru, stressing that military aid for Pakistan was not directed 
against India, assuring him that the United States would come to India's aid. 
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if Pakistan were ever to use the arms for aggression against India, and 
offering to give sympathetic consideration to any Indian request for arms. 
The latter had the opposite effect what he intended. Nehru regarded such 
assurances as meaningless. 
The impact of the US Pakistani arms agreement and alliance on the 
international relations of South Asia raises a number of questions and 
reflections on what led each country to enter the relationship. 
The primary goal of Pakistan was to obtain military equipment to 
modernize the armed forces. Pakistani leaders apparently also believed that 
being an ally of the west would afford them some military security against 
India. 
In return for these benefits Pakistan was willing to abandon its 
policy of non-alignment or its policy of friendship for all, as it had been 
called by Pakistani leaders at that time. 
The various explanations offered for Pakistani alliance with the 
United States, leading to her membership of a chain of western - sponsored 
military alliances against communism^ could be summed up as, Pakistani 
disillusionment with Britain, the commonwealth and still-bom Islamic Bloc, 
as effective levers against India' and her desu*e to ensure western support in 
the United Nations on the Kashmir dispute against India.*" 
Among more persuasive arguments explaining the motivations for 
Pakistani military alliance, have been those in terms of her need for aid, both 
economic and military. In fact, Pakistan's defence outlay increased after her 
military alliance. In 1954, the first year after the formation of the South East 
Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) of the $ 71.36 million was given to 
Pakistan, out of which $ 65.31 million were for defence support." 
The United States economic aid to Pakistan increased substantially 
after their military alliance and that the factors determining the aid have 
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essentially been political.'^ A comparative analysis of United States aid to 
India and Pakistan suggests that the latter received twice as much per capita 
aid as India. There are many other evidences to prove these conclusions.*'' 
Hence, in anticipation of larger amount of American economic aid-both in 
absolute terms as also in comparison with India - as a possible motivating 
factor for Pakistan's military alliance, cannot altogether be ruled out. 
The Chinese and American overtures in 1971 to establish a new 
relationship provide further uncertainties regarding US relations with Asia 
and with the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet desire to contain China and vice-
versa could have some beneficial effects for the United states.'^ 
A certain defacto downgrading of American involvement has 
occurred. The United States did not provide significant amounts of military 
equipment to either country between 1965-70 despite the willingness of 
USSR to send arms to both, Pakistan and India and China's willingness to 
exclusively supply armament to Pakistan.'^ 
Probably nothing has been as important in determining international 
political relationships in South Asia as the regional conflicts involving the 
subcontinent itself. These conflicts have created both opportunities and 
dilemmas for India and Pakistan and for outside powers attempting to 
advance their own interests and gain influence in South Asia. While anti-
colonialism, the desire for close relations with other Asian countries and the 
need for economic and military assistance have been and will remain 
important concerns for India and Pakistan, their mutual hostility and Sino-
Indian dispute have played crucial roles in the evolution of their foreign 
policies.'' 
Even if the temporary crisis can be resolved India and Pakistan will 
still be confronted with the Kashmir dispute. There has always been 
considerable disagreement among Indian, Pakistani and outside observers on 
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the importance of the Kashmir issue. There are some other domestic 
considerations behind India's stand too. 
From the signing of the US-Pakistani military aid agreement in 
1954 until the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 the united States supplied its ally 
with arms worth between $ 700 and $ 800 million.'* It sold India a modest 
amount of military equipment before 1962 conflict with China and the 1965 
war with Pakistan. To preclude the Soviet Union and China from becoming 
major arms suppliers seemed both impossible and unnecessary, for the 
American experience demonstrated the limits of the influence that could be 
obtained by such means. 
As far the support of the West Asian nations to Pakistan's position 
on Kashmir, countries like Iran, Jordan, Turkey and Indonesia did support 
Pakistan, especially during the Indo-Pak war of 1965. 
Pakistan's politico-military linkages with western powers, 
especially its bilateral/multilateral defence arrangements with the United 
States and the forging of a strategic relationship with China since 1963 were 
perceived by India as constituting major challenge to its national security. 
The power struggle between India and Pakistan explains clearly the 
reasons behind the two countries constituting a significant factor in the 
foreign policies of each other.'' 
Civilian and military leaders of Pakistan have repeatedly linked 
their country's nuclear weapons programme with what they maintain is the 
core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. This linkage with a territorial dispute 
distinguishes Pakistan from all other nuclear weapon states.. The United 
States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France had no territorial disputes to 
settle among themselves. China and Soviet Union did have a border dispute 
which, in late 1960s even led to border skirmishes. Neither country, 
however, produced nuclear weapons in order to settle the dispute. 
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Cognizant of his country's low scientific industrial level, Bhutto, 
the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, later entered into a secret understanding 
with China whereby Chinese assistance in the Pakistani effort was ensured. 
In his last testament, "If I am Assassinated" he claimed that this agreement 
was an achievement for which he would be remembered. China assisted 
Pakistan in the pursuit of the enrichment and the plutonium routes to the 
bomb, it provide the delivery system well.^° Unlike the Anglo-American 
nuclear collaboration that was rudely interrupted for many years before it 
was restored, and the Soviet nuclear assistance to China that was for a short 
duration, the Sino-Pakistani nuclear axis is the most enduring of the nuclear 
age. 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made Pakistan a front line 
state in the American crusade against what President Reagan calls the 'evil 
empires Billions of dollars were poured into this crusade. It also opened a 
new chapter in the Pakistani quest for nuclear weapons. American 
intelligence sources discovered in 1983 that China has supplied to Pakistan, 
the complete design of the nuclear device carried by a ballistic missile in its 
fourth test in 1966. 
While relying on India as its main ally in the area, it avoided 
alienating Pakistan despite the latter's participation in the US alliance 
system. The 1960s altered the situations in the aftermath of the Sino-India 
war (1962), changing US policies towards the region, and a perceived fear 
of joint US and USSR encirclement, China came to look upon Pakistan as 
the only reliable partner in South Asian region.^' According to US reports, 
Pakistan remains one of the major importers of Chinese weapons.^ ^ Beijing 
has reportedly supplied Pakistan with missile related technologies required 
for missile manufacturing.^^ There have also been reports that China has 
supplied Pakistan some naval surface-to-air missile systems (CSA-N-2). 
Pakistan is to receive F-22 frigates from China. And more importantly, the 
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two countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 
institutionalise their annual defence and security talks. Judged on this 
criterion, China continues to be perceived as a reliable ally by the Pakistan 
government. This view emanates from a history of Chinese political and 
military support for Pakistan during and after the Indo-Pakistan wars of 
1965 and 1971. That China choose to extend military assistance to Pakistan 
in the 1960s and the 1970s remains part of the "historical memory" 
Islamabad draws upon for its view of China as a reliable patron state. 
This extreme indulgence has to be understood in terms of Beijing's 
strategic vision of emerging as the Asian leader that has a direct bearing on 
the South Asian security environment. To give one example, during 
November 1985, China's 3,000 ton guided Missile Destroyer had paid a 
"friendly visit" to Karachi and Colombo and it completely omitted ports of 
the largest littoral state, India.^ '* This was despite the fact that by this time 
the Sino Indian ties had overcome their post 1962 problems. 
During the 1965, Indo-Pak war, China not only supplied Pakistan 
military equipment and provided indications of intervening in case India 
extended war to East Pakistan, but the Chinese media clearly condemned 
India as the aggressor. The 1971 Indo-Pak war had come at the time when 
China was obliged to Pakistan. Pakistan's defeat in 1971 strengthened 
Bhutto's conviction. He took the decision that Pakistan should have nuclear 
weapons capacity two years before India's 1974 tests in Pokhran.^ ^ 
Pakistan consistently increased its nuclear weapons and missile 
capacities from 1972, onwards. During 1987 and 1988, Pakistan improved 
its military missile arsenal, with Chinese help, culminating in a situation 
where, between 1996 and 1997, Senior Pakistani political and military 
figures asserted that they were capable of adopting a nuclear and missile 
posture against India. The firing of the potential IRBM missile, Ghauri in 
April 1998 and the claims of the creator of the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
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programme Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, that, Pakistan had an effective military 
arsenal, could not be ignored by India. 
Pakistan today has 14 laboratories and nuclear facilities in the 
Chagai Hills, Kundian, Chashma, Lakki, Isakhel, Wah, Golra Sharief, 
Rawalpindi, Sihala, Kahuta, Khushab, Lahore, Multan and Dehra Ghazi 
Khan.^' 
In May, 1974, when India exploded an atomic device for peaceful 
purposes. Pakistan made it an object of malicious propaganda against India. 
On August 20, 1974, Pakistan asked the UN for inclusion of an item 
entitled. Declaration and Establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in 
South Asia. On September 6, 1975 when 'Defence Day' was celebrated in 
Pakistan, leaders stressed the need to have "our own nuclear deterrent"^* 
The great powers found the South Asian conflict an essential 
regional component of their own conflict as signified in the cold war, the 
Sino-Soviet rivalry and the redefined cold war, that exists as a part of the 
complex process of superpower detente. 
Thus the two superpowers in their mutual rivalry came to select one 
of the two South Asian adversaries as their local favourites. These linkages 
have since then been fairly consistent in character.^ ^ 
The Nuclear Curtain in South Asia has finally lifted following 
multiple nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998, chased immediately 
by Pakistan. In an euphoria, both the countries have proudly declared 
themselves as "Nuclear Weapon States"^ ** but the P-5 (Permanent members 
of the Security Council and nuclear weapon states) have refused to give 
them entry into privileged nuclear club, arguing that post-NPT nuclear states 
are legally debarred from joining it. 
The nuclearisation of South Asia caused a great anxiety to the entire 
world community staunchly condemning the nuclear tests conducted by 
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India and Pakistan. Like the age-old game of politics, nuclear weapons in 
South Asia are the off-spring of nuclear politics played by India and 
Pakistan with the back up of external nuclear powers, particularly USA,UK, 
China and erstwhile Soviet Union. Moscow's policy towards South Asia 
always accorded, and continues to do so to this day, priority to India. 
Pakistan, the second most important South Asian State, joined the western 
military alliance system and became one of the staunchest ally of the West, 
which naturally aroused Soviet hostility and ire. However, even when Soviet 
relations with Pakistan were at their lowest, the former did not completely 
shut doors on Pakistan. 
The politico-strategic cold war against the West and on rivalry with 
the communist China, Soviet Union began to appreciate India's policy of 
non-alignment and established itself as an important player in the region. 
Efforts to wean Pakistan away from the West-and subsequently from China 
also with offers of trade and aid continued Moscow's Tashkent diplomacy in 
January 1966 was the epitome of Soviet effort to take both the South Asian 
countries with it and play the role of neutral peacemaker between the two. In 
December 1971 Indo-Pak war which led to the liberation of Bengladesh, 
Moscow reverted back to a pro-India policy. Earlier, on 9 August 1971, 
India and the Soviet Union signed a 20 year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation that further cemented their ties. 
America jettisoned its non-proliferation policy and turned a blind 
eye to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. Ishfaq Ahmad, who was 
chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) at the time of the 
tests, had selected Chagai for the tests. Work on building the tunnel at 
Chagai started as early as 1976. According to Brigadier Mohammad 
Sarfaraz who led the Special Development Work that built it, the job was 
completed in 1980. It was 3,325 feet in length and 8 to 9 feet in diameter, 
and was designed to be self seeking. At least two dozen 'cold tests' were 
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conducted between 1983-1986. KRL (Khan Research Laboratories) 
conducted its cold test in March 1984, a year after'PAEC test. Hafeez 
Qureshi headed the team that conducted more than a dozen cold tests. 
A.Q.Khan has claimed that Pakistaji achieved the capability to explode a 
nuclear device in 1984.^ ^ 
It manifested itself with an announcement made in April 1988 that 
Pakistan had flight tested two ground to ground missiles, code-named Hatf I 
and Hatf II with payloads of 500 kg each and ranges of 80 km and 300 km, 
respectively. '^* 
In the light of what is known about Pakistan's general technological 
base, it is unlikely that these missiles were indigenously designed as 
claimed. Active Chinese assistance is therefore, suspected.^ ^ 
US, China and Nuclear Pakistan 
A decisive factor in Pakistan's Nuclear Policy is that many aspects 
of this policy are linked with what happens in India.^ ^ After Chinese nuclear 
test, Pakistan was apprehensive that India would go nuclear. Thus Bhutto, 
who was the member in Ayoub's Cabinet stated, "If India developed an 
atomic bomb we too will develop one even if we have to eat grass or leaves 
or to remain hungry' because there is no conventional alternative to the 
atomic bomb".''^ 
Pakistan needs US support for its Security in view of the changed 
geo-political situation in the region and also its requirements of a massive 
arms supply for expansion and modernization of its armed forces. 
It is also claimed that the United States helped Pakistan to launch its 
nuclear progranmie way back in 1955. According to Times Magazine, about 
40 Pakistani Scientists who had been trained at atomic facilities in the 
United States became the leading figures in the field of nuclear physics in 
Pakistan. America also supplied Pakistan with its first nuclear reactor which 
began operating in 1965.^ * 
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During the early conflict of 1971, American support to Pakistan was 
amply proved by Nixon's notorious tilt against India, his ganging up with 
China with a view to humilate India, and in the final stage his resorting to 
gun boat diplomacy by despatching the "Warship Enterprise" towards Bay 
of Bengal to intimidate India. In the United Nations, the USA and Maoist 
China did there utmost to block the entry of independent Bangladesh to this 
world body^'. It was Pakistan which arranged the Kissinger trip to Beijing 
which developed ultimately into US-China axis.'**' It is to be noted here that, 
indeed Zia-ul-Haq, then president of Pakistan got all his nuclear technology 
and components from Canada, USA, and in later stages from China with the 
full knowledge and support of America. 
Pakistani attempts to develop fission materials date back to 1961 
when it entered into agreement with a Belgian Company, Belgo Nuclearire, 
to set up a hot cell to handle highly toxic radio active materials like 
Plutonium at the Pakistani Institute of Science and Technology 
(PINSTECH). Between then and 1976, it set up a 5 MW research reactor at 
PINSTECH with the US assistance, a 137 MW nuclear power plant at 
Multan with Belgian/West German collaboration and a fiiel fabrication plant 
at Hyderabad. In 1976 Pakistan concluded an agreement with France for 
another nuclear power plant at Chashma and also a plutonium processing 
plant. 
Reports about a Sino-Pak nuclear deal appeared as early as June 
1976 following an important visit by Bhutto to China. However it was only 
when US began negotiating a civil nuclear agreement with China, that 
China's clandestine nuclear assistance to Pakistan became a controversial 
issue between the two. 
On 19 September 1982, the New York Times reported that the 
suspension of talks on the proposed US-China nuclear cooperation 
agreement was because of American suspicion of Chinese nuclear help to 
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Pakistan and that it was related to nuclear enrichment. Subsequently, the 
President of Washington's Nuclear Control Institute, Dr. Paul Leventhal 
Stated before Congress that, "China had transferred sensitive' nuclear 
weapon design information to Pakistan".'*^ 
Pakistan's participation in aggressive alignments caused serious 
imbalance in its economy. The growing military expenditure made Pakistan 
more and more dependent on America.'*'* Pakistan's overwhelming capacity 
in receiving nuclear programme construction materials from various quarters 
other than US had made Washington somehow tough towards Pakistan. 
In a trip to China, Z.A. Bhutto publicly announced that he made 
such an agreement that will decide in the great deal for the Pakistani people. 
The all weather friendship between the two countries strikingly manifested 
itself in the critical assistance that China provided to Pakistan in the design 
and fabrication of nuclear weapon and missile.'*^ 
The border war of 1962, between India and China and Indo-pak war 
of 1965 and the Kashmir question are some reasons that lead China to give 
more interest in the Pakistan's nuclear potential. The border agreement and 
Korakarm Highway buildup are the major prizes that pay Pakistan to China 
in return of nuclear technology. 
A Pakistani nuclear device was reportedly tested at the Chinese 
testing site at Lop Nor in Xingiang in 1987. By 1992 both Abdul Qadir 
Khan and then Foreign Secretary of Pakistan had confirmed that Pakistan 
was a nuclear capable state.'*^ It was also China which supplied Pakistan 
with ring magnets, drawings and designs for the manufacture of nuclear 
bombs. Chinese high temperature furnaces facilitated Pakistan manufacture 
of tritium moulds for the nose cones of the missiles that would carry 
warheads. The US has been the source of material such as Zirconium and 
Krypton electric Triggers for nuclear bombs.'*' 
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If one reads between the lines, it becomes clear that Sino-US 
intentions of permitting Pakistan to become a nuclear power are a part of the 
geo-political strategy of initiating a nuclear arms race in this region.'** There 
are excellent studies carrying documentary evidence of the nature of 
Chinese assistance in developing Pakistan's nuclear and missile capability/^ 
China's selective proliferation despite her stamp of approval to the 
indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995 and the CTBT in September 
1996 remain, while it continues to regard Pakistan an important diplomatic 
asset for its commercial interests involved in the sensitive export deals.^'' 
Sino-Pak collaboration and its impact on Indian Security 
The Indian nuclear test in 1974 made Pak authorities frantic to have 
nuclear weapon capability and the required R & D effort under the able 
scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan was intensified.^' 
The Chinese rationale to support Pakistani nuclear capability must 
consider the implications on India. A nuclear Pakistan compel India to 
become a full-fledged nuclear weapon state, a development China would 
never encourage.^ ^ So from a Sino-centric view, Sino-Pak nuclear 
cooperation had considerations other than India too. But fi^om the Pakistani 
angle the Islamic Bomb eliminated the nuclear element in Indo-Pak 
relations. 
In September 1985, after the Washington Post in February, 1983 
cited Chinese assistance to Pakistan, the Indian Chief of Army Staff General 
Vaidya referred to the threat arising from China-Pak nuclear collaboration.^^ 
It is not the Chinese threat or territorial dispute between India and 
China per se as the only concern of India but it is Sino-Pakistan 
collaboration in the nuclear and missile field that has caused serious anxiety 
among the policy makers in India. To that extent Pakistan is seen as an 
extension of Chinese threat.^ "* 
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The creation of Bangladesh and the PNE of India in 1974 made 
Beijing to enhance its commitment towards Pakistan and to accept latter's 
persistent request to assist it in building its independent nuclear posture 
which was finally agreed to in the Sino-Pak agreement of September 1974.^ ^ 
China has continued to be a major influence in determining the 
nature and profile of South Asian security environment which has seen its 
own ups and downs, thus, accordingly affecting China's leverage vis-a-vis 
South Asian Countries. 
As a result of India's PNE strategic development on the sub-
continent, China expressed a desire to provide Pakistan protection against 
"nuclear threats and nuclear black mail".^ ^ Also it appears that Pakistan 
formulated a response to the Indian nuclear explosion through the proposal 
for a "nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia." 
The Chinese Vice-Premier supported Pakistan's proposal for zonal 
non-proliferation, but India did not favour the suggestion due to its 
disagreement with her disarmament philosophy. Therefore, Chinese 
insensitivity towards India needs to be viewed in the broader framework of 
China-Pakistan nuclear relations. 
The then prime minister, Z.A. Bhutto visited Beijing in May 1976 
with his Scientific Advisor Dr. Abdus Salam. The Two governments 
concluded two agreement relating to scientific and military cooperation 
between them. When General Zia-ul-Haque took over from Bhutto, the 
proposed nuclear project was put on the backbumer. But General Zia too 
continued with the same stand. 
Subsequently a crucial consideration that enabled the resurgence in 
Sino-Pakistan nuclear relations was the convergence of US, Chinese and 
Pakistani interests due to Soviet presence in Afghanistan since April 1978.^ ^ 
The United States government and many western analysts believe 
that China assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives prior to its 
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accession to the NPT in 1992. In 1983, US intelligence agencies reported 
that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan 
alongwith enough weapons - grade uranium for two nuclear weapons China 
also reportedly helped Pakistan operate Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Plant/* 
On December 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build the Chashma 300 
MV nuclear power reactor for Pakistan.^ ^ 
China insisted that "the cooperation between China and Pakistan in 
the sphere of nuclear energy is entirely for peaceful purposes. In 1993 China 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to 
apply IAEA safeguards to a Chinese nuclear power station sold to Pakistan 
(INFCIRC/418). In 1994, China reportedly turned down a Pakistani request 
to "correct" Pakistan's nuclear weapons and to use the Chinese Lop Nor 
testing range. Despite these developments, China was still providing 
equipments and technology to Pakistan including its assistance in the 
construction of a 40 MW reactor and plutonium for its weapons program. A 
major proliferation controversy regarding Chinese nuclear trade with 
Pakistan includes the late 1995 export of about 5,000 specially designed ring 
magnets from the China Nuclear Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to an 
unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory, which was allegedly involved in 
nuclear weapons work. China initially denied that the sale had taken place. 
However, in talks with US officials, China eventually privately admitted that 
the sale had taken place.^ ** 
A 1997 report by the Director of Central Intelligence Agency stated 
that China "was the primary source of nuclear related equipment and 
technology to Pakistan" during the second half of 1996, since then, the 
United States has argued China to end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan 
entirely. 
The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in its 
1997 and 1998 armual reports on arms control compliance, stated that, based 
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on Beijing's long standing nuclear ties with Islamabad, it was unclear 
whether Beijing had broken off its contacts with elements associated with 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China and Pakistan have continued to 
argue that their nuclear cooperation is entirely legitimate and for peaceful 
purposes. Nevertheless, US concerns about Sino-Pakistani nuclear 
cooperation have persisted through out 1998 and into the new millennium. 
New insights into the level of Chinese assistance to Pakistan came 
about in early 2004 as a result of on-site investigations into Libya's nuclear 
weapons program, following Muaammar al Qadhafis dramatic reversal on 
WMD programs in late 2003. 
Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan was a 
contentious issue in Sino-US relations over the years. There were significant 
differences between Washington and Beijing regarding nuclear proliferation 
and peaceful use of nuclear energy. US-post cold war foreign policy has 
focused on proliferation of WMD as a major threat to US interests. China 
criticized the policies of industrialized countries that restrict and deny the 
legitimate demands of developing countries for peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and technology transfers for economic development under the pretext 
of preventing nuclear proliferation. 
Following the India and Pakistan nuclear tests in 1998, new signs 
emerged that China had permanently curtailed its military nuclear 
cooperation with Pakistan. In remarks to a seminar in New Delhi on Sino-
Indian relations, China's ambassador to India Zhou Gang reiterated that 
China had not assisted Pakistan's nuclear program, stating "non-existent is 
the issue of China's nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan" and that 
"all cooperation between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy is 
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards? Zhou acknowledged 
that China was aware of India's concerns regarding China's nuclear 
assistance to Pakistan and that Beijing had taken a positive, flexible and 
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pragmatic approach and made proper adjustment of certain policies 
concerned.^' 
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, and the subsequent war in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan has been viewed by the United States as a strategic 
ally in the region. Most of China's current assistance to Pakistan appears to 
only cover civilian facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Since 2001 and 
the change in U S - Pakistan relations, reactions in Washington of China's 
assistance to Islamabad have been muted - although the discovery of 
Chinese nuclear weapons designs in Libya in 2004 cast an embarrassing 
shadow on the administration's selective non-proliferation efforts. 
Nuclear Pakistan and Muslim World 
Z.A. Bhutto took over the reins of Pakistan in the last days of 1971 
in the midst of turbulence following separation of its eastern wing. In his 
first address to the nation he argued for Pakistan to build a new identity 
based on closer association with Islamic Countries in the West Asia. As a 
Shrewd Statesman he believed that Pakistan with its abundant skilled 
manpower and industrial infrastructure could play a leading role in the 
affairs of Muslim world. Bhutto was quoted as saying: 
"There was a Christian bomb, A Jewish bomb, and now a Hindu 
bomb, why not an Islamic bomb"?^^ 
Bhutto travelled extensively to several Arab countries to mobilize 
the resources for his ambitious plan and found an enthusiastic partner in 
Libya. The Libyan leader used both his wealth and influence in helping 
Pakistan's nuclear procurement operations in Europe during 1975-77. 
According to Khalid Hassan, a close associate of Bhutto, special courier 
services were established to transport Libyan hard cash to Pakistan. The 
Economist of London reported Libyan pressure on some of the European 
industries to comply with Pakistani orders for nuclear equipment.^ ^ Between 
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1972 and 1974 Pakistan had persuaded Libya, Saudi Arabia and to some 
extent Iraq to fund its nuclear weapon programme.^ '* 
To quote Bhuto again: "We know that Israel and South Africa have 
full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have 
this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic 
civilization was with out it, but that position was about to change*'(with the 
advent of Pak nuclear programme).^' 
After the 1973 oil crisis, the Arab countries had suddenly turned 
rich and influential. Libya's patronage however, ended with General Zia's 
take over in Islamabad in July 1977. Instead, Saudi-Arabia became 
Pakistan's new financial patron. In January 1981, the Sunday Times 
reported about a secret agreement for Saudi gift of $ 800 million to Pakistan 
"to help it (Pakistan) make a hydrogen bomb". The report added that Libya, 
which had fallen out after Bhuto's ouster, had insisted that Libyan scientists 
be given access to Pak nuclear research laboratories. General Zia promptly 
rejected the demand.^ ^ 
UAE and Nigeria were also closely involved in different ways. 
While UAE provided funds for Pak venture, Nigeria supplied uranium to 
Pakistan. The New York Magazine, quoting US intelligence reported in May 
1981 that Pakistan and Turkey had agreed to conduct a nuclear Test in the 
latter's soil to avoid detection. 
In July that year reports appeared saying that Turkey was acting as a 
conduit between western firms and Pakistan for electronic gears. 
Malaysia also was sympathetic to Pak plans and also extended some 
indirect help in routing nuclear items to Pakistan. There is an extensive 
nuclear cooperation between the two countries.*^ 
Determinants of India's Nuclear Policy 
India's nuclear programme has to be understood in the light of 
India's defeat at the hands of Chinese in 1962, and particularly the Chinese 
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nuclear test on October 16, 1964. In a similar view Pakistan's nuclear 
programme was a reaction to India's peaceful explosion of 1974 and desire 
to neutralise India's conventional weapon superiority which was clearly 
demonstrated in 1971 war.^' 
India's peaceful nuclear programme began soon after her 
independence. At that time the focus was to use available nuclear energy for 
the development of the nation. But the Sino-Indian border war and the 
Chinese nuclear explosion compelled Indian policy makers to reconsider 
their way of utilizing nuclear energy. India conducted the first nuclear test in 
1974 at Pokhran on may 18. Exactly 24 years after on May 11, 1998, India 
again conducted the second nuclear test.'" India made it clear that it would 
use its nuclear energy only in self defence. 
In fact, the Indian nuclear programme began even before India 
achieved its independence largely through the efforts of Homi-J. Bhabha.'^ ' 
The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (lAEC) was created shortly after 
independence, about the same time that India opted for a strategy of self 
reliance in producing military equipment with Bhabha as its first Chairman. 
India embarked upon an extensive progranune of civilian research. 
The Government of India after conducting 1998 tests made it clear 
that it would use its nuclear capabilities only in self defence. The 
government of India further pointed that the tests were not directed against 
any country. The Prime Minister of India on May, 15, 1998, declared that 
India is a nuclear state. Thus in view of the Government of India, India had 
to place the security scenario in a global perspective and not just an 
unseemly arms race with neighbouring Pakistan. 
The South Asian region has been and still remains - an area of 
actual and potential conflicts. Relations among states in the region suffer 
from mutual distrust and suspicion. Knowing the ground realities and low 
per capita income and economic backwardness of the region the extra-
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regional powers possess great threat to the security and stability of the 
region. India alone has common frontiers with all other South Asian 
countries,^ "* and lies in the middle of the US, China and Russian foreign 
policies. 
The determinants of India's nuclear policy can be viewed in the 
broad context under certain subheadings : 
Impact of China s^ military modernization and nuclear capability 
China exploded a nuclear device at the Lop Nor test site in Sinkiang 
on October 16, 1964.^ ^ The causes of conflict between India and China were 
many. They ranged from easily discernible disputes over territory and 
threats to security, through more complex questions of national ideology, to 
abstract considerations on status in the international hierarchy of power. 
Domestic policies in India were affected by the clash, especially 
policies concerning minorities, communities, dissidents on the far left and 
tribal peoples in north-east. 
Indian and Chinese interests first clashed when Chinese forces 
occupied Tibet during the 1950s with the failure of Indian and Chinese 
officials to resolve the Indo-Tibet border problems, through lengthy 
negotiations in I960.'' Forceful assertions of claims by both sides followed 
by the border war of 1962. 
The emergence of a border dispute between the two countries 
involving about 125,000 sq.km. of territory in about 400 km of border, 
eroded peaceful co-existence, China occupied approximately 33,000 sq.km. 
of territory in the area inside Indian territory. 
There is little doubt that Chinese nuclear capabilities are significant. 
Beijing already possesses a rudimentary strategic triad consisting of long 
range bombers, one nuclear ballistic missile submarine and several classes 
of nuclear armed ballistic missiles ranging from short range to 
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intercontinental systems.^^ The bombers and the sea based nuclear force, 
however, represent capabilities that should be of minimal concern to India. 
As early as 1988 a senior Indian military officer analysed in some 
detail how the Chinese missile deployments supposedly occurring in Tibet 
could under cut larger Indian defence strategies in the region. The following 
year, the then Indian defence minister K.C. Pant affirmed that China had 
infact deployed missiles in Tibet oriented primarily against India.*" 
The Chinese have a full spectrum of rockets and missiles as given in 
the Table. 
Table : Nuclear weapons of China 
Designation 
Dong Feng-2 
(CSS-1) 
DongFeng-
3(CSS-2) 
Dong Feng-4 
(CSS-3) 
Dong Feng-
5(CSS-4) 
Missiles 
1000 
150 
30 
20 Laun-
chers 10) 
Propulsion 
Liquid 
Liquid 
Liquid 
Liquid 
Range 
(km) 
1,2000 
2000-
3000 
5000-
7000 
11,000 
Pay load 
Single war H 
l-3Re-entry 
vehicle 
Single war H 
Single War H 
Year 
1964 
1969 
-
1979 
Source : Ruchita Beri, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Asian Strategic Review, 
Ed. Jasjit Singh, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New 
Delhi, pp. 192-93. 
Pakistan's Nuclear Potential 
From near the tomb of Ghauri in Malhot, in Pakistan's Jhelum district, 
rose missile named after him on April 6, 1998 symbolising the triumphant 
spirit of the warload who had defeated Prithviraj Chauhan in the last decade 
of the twelfth century. The President of Pakistan, Mohammad Rafiq I'arar 
proclaimed it to be a prelude to Ghaznavi, Babri and Abdali missiles, all 
named after warriors of the past who had intruded into India from the north-
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west to wreak havoc on unsuspecting Indian rulers. Ghaznavi was an 
invader who destroyed the Somnath Temple. Babar was the founder of the 
Mughal dynasty in India, which ruled large parts of the country for nearly 
three centuries, while Abdali had defeated the Marathas in the third battle of 
Panipatinl761.** 
According to Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema of Qaid-e-Azam 
University, Islamabad, Pakistan's nuclear history began with Gen. Ayub 
Khan's take- over of the government in 1958. Z.A. Bhutto and his 
supporters were in favour of developing nuclear capability with its potential 
for an eventual nuclear weapons option. 
It appears that Pakistan's introduction to nuclear technology had 
begun even earlier because, when in Dec. 1953 president Eisenhower made 
the "Atoms for Peace" proposal encouraging the use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, the proposal was received in Pakistan with enthusiasm.*^ 
US influence on nuclear developments in Pakistan was evident. 
Between 1954 and 1956 the US sponsored Atoms for Peace Exhibition 
toured Pakistani cities commending the uses of atomic energy and provided 
Pakistan about 70,000 items of information on the subject; thereby boosting 
the atomic energy constituency in Pakistan.*** Between 1955 and 1965, 
several hundred Pakistanis were reported to have been trained in foreign 
research institutions including Argonne, Oak Ridge and Brookhaven 
laboratories in USA and also Maxwell in U.K. Leonard Spector, a well 
known expert on South Asian affairs, has reported that amongst these were 
thirty seven nuclear scientists, the number went up to 120 by 1974.*^ 
Pakistan's policy on international issues related to arms control and 
disarmament during 1960s and 70s was still under formulation. Pakistan 
signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, but did not ratify it. The reasons 
offered pointed to the flaws in the treaty saying that it prohibited nuclear 
weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water only. It did not 
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prevent the nuclear powers as parties to the treaty from further developing 
and refining their nuclear arsenals. These were valid reasons which enabled 
Pakistan to retain its option. India, which had been in the forefront during 
the negotiations, had signed and also ratified the treaty.*^ 
According to an American news agency, some LiS intelligence 
officials assessed that, Pak nuclear arsenal was vastly superior to India's. 
They had estimated that Pakistan had more than a hundred warheads while 
India's number was around 25. Pakistan had also more missiles to deliver 
nuclear payloads than India*', they said. 
Naturally Indian authorities and scientists dismissed the news as 
fabricated by Pak supporters in USA. The US officials could have invented 
this to coerce India into signing the CTBT, they argued. 
Actually, the Pak nuclear weapon programme is handled by two 
parallel outfits. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the 
Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL). Cold tests of nuclear devices 
(working without an explosion) by PAEC under the leadership of Dr. 
Mubarakmand and by KRL led by Dr. A.Q. Khan were successfiilly 
conducted as far back as 1983 and 1984 respectively.** The Pak armed 
forces have been fully involved with the countries nuclear programme 
where as in India the scientists monopolise the programme while the prime 
minister and his office take all the decisions. 
Many Indian strategists and scientists have long held Pakistan's 
nuclear programme in a low esteem and thus were surprised by its claim to 
have tested six nuclear devices between 28 and 30 May 1998.*' Records 
assiduously maintained and collected by Centre for Non-proliferation 
studies in the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, 
indicate that Pakistan went into the high gear to become a nuclear weapons 
state from 1977 onwards after having collected the basic material necessary 
to launch its tests of 28 and 30 May 1998.'° 
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Pakistan poses a considerable threat in the short haul. This is due to 
the expectations entertained in the country of the moral impact of her 
acquistion of nuclear weapons and the resultant exuberance in fostering and 
supporting terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir, Punjab, and other parts of 
India. An estimated account of nuclear warheads and missiles by Pakistan is 
shown in the following table. 
Table : Nuclear Weapons - Pakistan'* 
Designation 
Haft I 
Haft II 
Haft III 
M-II (Import China) 
Propulsion 
Solid 
Solid 
-
Solid 
Range (km) 
80 
280-300 
1000 
300 
Payload (kg) 
500 
500 
-
500 
Year 
1987 
1988 
R&D 
1991 
Pak nuclear weapon programme has been a do or die venture of 
beg, borrow or steel. The China and North Korea helped Pakistan with 
equipments and knowhow. Pakistan surrendered territory in Pak-occupied 
Kashmir to China to build the Karakoram highway between the two 
countries which facilitated transport of arms and equipments by road. 
Though China helped Pakistan in its nuclear weapon endeavors, the 
assistance was covert and seemingly within the limits of NPT. 
Of course, Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme is India centric. 
Pakistan has not only declared that its nuclear weapon programme is a 
reaction to India, but also has expressed its readiness to dismantle its 
weapon capabilities if India is also willing to do so. 
The 'insecurity syndrome' in Pakistan's policy has been prominent 
from the very beginning as Ayoub Khan said : 
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"We have our security problem with India since partition. India's 
foreign policy and its policy towards Pakistan has been offensive and non-
cooperative". 
Bhutto's dream of attaining parity with India in nuclear field has 
fructified. His statement of eating grass for a thousand years but getting a 
Islamic Bomb became a reality in May 1998, when in response to India's 
five detonations of nuclear devices, Pakistan answered by exploding six. 
General Pervez Musharraf, on January 4, 2000 stated that Pakistan would 
not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if its security was threatened. In his 
words, "If the security of Pakistan is threatened, surely we would not allow 
Pakistan to die. That will not be allowed". "Surely Pakistan's security will 
never be compromised."'^ 
After December '13, 2001 attack by terrorists on Indian Parliament 
things reached a flashpoint. India deployed its forces along the borders with 
Pakistan. Pakistan too responded immediately. Reports from Pakistan 
indicated that by early January missiles directed against India were put in 
place. M-11 and M-9 missiles with strike range varying from 600-750 km, 
Ghauri I and Ghauri II with a range of 1150-1500 Km and Shaheen II with a 
range of 2500 km were ready for action. India's missile system too was 
placed in strategic positions. The Indian Defence Minister George 
Fernandez said, "At the movement we are concentrating on Agni II missile 
with a range of 2500 km. We do not have any plans now for a longer range 
missilesT '^* 
History proves that Indo-Pak decision making is heavily influenced 
by the past experience of two nations dating back mainly to pre-
independence period. The ideological differences between the majority 
communities of Pakistan and India have been exploited by fundamentalist 
elements in both the countries to create malice and hatred which has etched 
stereotyped images to be exploited at will by the political leaders. 
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Nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea 
The North Korean-Pakistan nuclear link has all but played out since 
it first surfaced after Pakistan's nuclear weapon tests at Chagai, near the 
Afghan border in. May 1998, many Pakistani sources claimed that one of 
the nuclear devices tested was of N. Korean origin and that N. Korean 
nuclear scientists were present during the testing. As this information was 
not corroborated by independent sources. It is to be placed under way for 
confirmation. 
In an article on Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
disseminated on August 1, 2001 it was reported: Joint Intelligence 
Miscellaneous: Responsible for covert actions in other parts of the world 
and for the clandestine procurement of nuclear and missile technologies. 
Major General (retired) Sultan Habib, an operative of this division who had 
distinguished himself in the clandestine procurement and theft of nuclear 
material while posted as the defence attache in the Pakistan embassy in 
Moscow from 1991-1993, with concurrent accreditation to the central Asian 
Republics (CARs), Poland and Czechoslovakia has recently been posted to 
N. Korea as ambassador to oversee the clandestine nuclear and missile 
cooperation between N. Korea and Pakistan. After completing his tenure in 
Moscow, he had coordinated the clandestine shipping of missiles from N. 
Korea, the training of Pakistani experts in the missile production and 
testing facilities of N. Korea and the training of N. Korean scientists in the 
nuclear establishments of Pakistan through Captain (retired) Shafqat 
Cheema, third Secretary and acting head of Mission in the Pakistan embassy 
in N. Korea from 1992-1996.'^ 
Before Major General Sultan Habib's transfer to ISI headquarters 
from Moscow, the N. Korean missile and nuclear cooperation project was 
handled by Major General Shujjat from the Baluch Regiment Division of 
the ISI for five years. On Capitan Cheema's return to headquarters in 1996, 
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the ISI discovered that in addition to acting as the liaison officer of the ISI 
with nuclear and missile establishments in N. Korea, he was also earning 
money from the Iranian and Iraqi intelligence by helping them in their 
clandestine nuclear and missile technology and material procurement not 
only from N. Korea but also from Russia and Central Asian Republics. On 
coming to know of the ISI inquiry into his clandestine assistance to Iran and 
Iraq he fled to Xingjang and sought political asylum there but China 
arrested him and handed him over to the ISI. What happened to him 
subsequently is not known.'^ 
Pakistan continued to buy missiles from N. Korea using nuclear 
technology as payment until as late as autumn 2002, resulting in sanctions 
against a nuclear laboratory, but not the Pakistani government. According to 
CIA reports from 2002, Pakistan has continued to buy short and 
intermediate - range ballistic missiles from N. Korea that are capable of 
reaching every major city in India. In exchange, Pakistan is providing N, 
Korea with technology and machinery to make highly enriched uranium 
usable in nuclear weapons. In March 2003, Washington imposed new 
sanctions on N. Korea for the clandestine missile supply relationship, but 
none on Pakistan. 
The National Intelligence Estimate released to high level U.S. 
government officials in late 2002 revealed that Pakistan has been sharing 
sophisticated technology, warhead-design information and weapons testing 
data with Pyongyang beginning in 1997, under the then Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif. A relationship between the two countries has been in place 
since 1970s when then Pakistani leader Zia-ul-Haq began buying missiles 
from Pyongyang. This relationship continued until the mid 1990s, when the 
Pakistani economy began to falter. Instead of discontinuing the purchase. 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto began to barter for the missiles, trading high 
speed centrifuge machines, blueprints for the production of nuclear weapons 
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and other materials for the manufacture of nuclear weaponry to the N. 
Korean government. 
General Pervez Musharraf denies that any such trade has occurred 
since the overthrow of Bhutto government in 1998. Speaking to reporters in 
Paris, Musharraf said, "There is no relationship with N. Korea either on 
conventional or nonconventional level. We purchased surface to air 
missiles from N. Korea sometime back and now we are producing the same 
type of missiles at home. There is no conventional or unconventional 
agreement with Pyongyang." However in July 2002, U.S. intelligence 
tracked C-130 Cargo plane, that Washington had provided to Pakistan to 
help fight the al-Qaida terror organisation as it flew to N. Korea, where it 
picked up missile parts and returned to Pakistan. Trade with Pakistan may 
explain how a country as poor and isolated as N. Korea could produce 
nuclear weapons in such a short time span. 
Both countries have sought to develop long-range ballistic missiles to 
carry their warheads. Both have also ties with China - seen by many experts 
as a key exporter of nuclear & missile know-how. Suspicions are one thing 
but now the Americans seem to have concluded that they have hard 
evidence showing Pakistan's support for North Korea's nuclear weapons 
programme. 
Nuclear Strategy for India 
India's Nuclear Policy : India started research in nuclear physic as early as 
1944 and was on an upward trend in the 1950s. Soon after independence 
China at that time was neither a nuclear power nor seen as a threat to India. 
From neighbouring powers, the only problem was Pakistan's sponsoring a 
tribal invasion' of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947; and subsequently 
introducing their regular forces openly, and this did not dictate the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons for national security. 
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It can be said now that if a decision to become a nuclear weapon 
power had been taken in 1962 at the time of war with China, India could 
have become a legal nuclear weapon power before the arbitrary deadline 
imposed by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty., 
Not withstanding the tactical military defeat of India, the policy of 
using nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes continued unquestiond, 
till 1964 when China carried its first nuclear test. Despite it, in the mid 
1960s, during the early years of Indira Gandhi's prime ministership, India 
tried hard at the meetings of the 18 Nations Disarmament Committee in 
Geneva to get an NPT that would safeguard its security from the nuclearised 
China. It wanted effective and credible measures included in the treaty that 
would insure non-nuclear powers against the threats or use of nuclear 
weapons (by nuclear powers). Finally, when the NPT took shape, India did 
not sign it for two reasons; first an imbalance of obligations between 
nuclear and non-nuclear powers, making the treaty unequal and 
discriminatory; and second, inadequate security guarantees to the non-
nuclear powers. 
China launched its first satellite in 1970 "The demand for India to go 
nuclear in its defence... found wide and persistent expression on more than 
one occasion". A sample survey carried out by the Indian Institute of Public 
Opinion found that two thirds of the respondents across the board, wanted 
India to go in for nuclear weapons.'* In mid 1970s, the late Dr. Vikram 
Sarabhai who was then the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) announced a 10 year profile for a balanced but modest nuclear and 
space programme. This included one or more underground 'peaceful nuclear 
explosions'. 
The government adopted this profile in 1971. The political 
implications were taken note of and interpreted abroad. A British news 
paper reported that India had " decided to start work on the development 
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of atomic explosives and could set off her first atomic bomb in less than two 
years."'' In June 1971 the Indian PM said in Mauritius, "we have discussed 
this question deeply and rejected the idea of making the bomb".'"** 
After the explosion at Pokhran in 1974, the Indian government 
continued to assert that it would use nuclear technology only for peaceful 
purposes. Pakistan the immediate neighbour doesn't remain deaf. A 
memorandum of the US State Department of 1983 shows quite clearly, that 
as of 1983, there was unambiguous evidence that Pakistan was actively 
pursuing a nuclear weapon programme.'"' 
During the 1980s and into the 1990s the Indian approach was to hope 
for the USA to some how stop the Pakistani nuclear programme. At the 
same time there was this strange reluctance to face up to both the evidences 
of the rapid progress made by the Pakistani progranune as well as 
America's turning a blind eye to it. The culmination was of course the non-
articulation of a new policy by India, even after the US President refiised to 
certify Pakistani nuclear virginity. 
The Nuclear Threats to India : The nuclear threat to India has to be 
assessed to analyse the threats it faces.. We have to classify the type of 
nuclear power that could pose the threat and the probability of such a threat 
being posed in the time period that is under consideration. To facilitate such 
an analysis, classification of nuclear powers is most essential. 
Table : Classification of Nuclear Powers^ "^  
Large Nuclear 
Powers (LNP) 
USA 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Medium Nuclear Power 
(MNP) 
China 
France 
Britain 
Kazakhstan* 
Small Nuclear Power 
(SNP) 
Israel 
India 
Pakistan 
Belarus* 
South Africa* 
* Likely to be included, excluding from the present analysis 
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Threat from the large Nuclear Powers : A few years age, analysis of the 
nuclear threat from the super powers to regional, medium and small powers 
was comparatively a simple matter. Today, with the disappearance of the 
USSR, it has become quite complex. What is clear is, that for the present, 
there is only one pre-eminent military power in the world, the USA. It is a 
large nuclear power with world-wide strategic nuclear reach, which also has 
a global reach with conventional military power. However, there is no major 
nuclear threat from the USA to India as their clash of interests in the region 
is far from possible. If Russia becomes a powerful regional power, a clash 
of interests between it and India appears unlikely as their spheres of 
interests will not clash anywhere. On the other hand, there are chances of 
Russia soliciting India's support if it has serious policy differences with 
either the USA or China in future. 
The Threat from Medium Nuclear Powers (MNP) : China has made a 
'No First Use' declaration as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. The 
historical record from 1964 to date has also not shown a Chinese penchant 
for nuclear blackmail or coercive diplomacy. However, in extrapolating to 
the future, one must exercise caution. 
With a border problem between India and China there could be a 
major conventional border war only due to miscalculation or some 
unforeseen reason. In such a case if the Chinese were to face a very adverse 
tactical situation, such as an Indian counter-offensive that has progressed 
beyond a national limit into Chinese territory there could be high probability 
of a nuclear threat to India. That too is only if the Chinese decide to go back 
on their 'No First Use' pledge. 
The Threat from Small Nuclear Power : Pakistan poses a considerable 
threat to Indian security. Though India was the first to conduct a nuclear 
test, the country has not inducted weapons into its armed forces. A draft 
nuclear doctrine has been prepared by the National Security Advisory Board 
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(NSAB), but has not been approved by the cabinet as yet. In Pakistan, 
bombs have been designed to fit in F-16 fighter air crafts and since the 
military is in power, there is no need for elaborate discussions and political 
approval to take possession, deployment and even launching of the nuclear 
weapons. 
All this shows that though the Pak weapon capability is 
comparatively smaller than India's, the danger from it is formidable. If India 
is a nuclear elephant, Pakistan is a nuclear tiger. 
With its democracy crushed by military dictatorship, its economy has 
become bankrupt and regional aspirations is pulling the country apart, 
Pakistan is a failed state. But all this actually makes Pakistan more 
dangerous, it is difficult to visualize as to what it would do with its nuclear 
weapons in its frustration. The Pak nuclear threat is very much there and can 
not be wished away by cold war comparisons of the balance of terror 
promoting peace. 
India and the Super Powers : The Structure of the Nuclear Facilities 
Indian attitudes and policies concerning science in general and 
nuclear science in particular originated in the 1930's in the context of a 
changing state form, i.e., that is there was an expectation that British 
colonial rule in India was coming to an end and independent India was 
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emerging. 
India's scientific establishment has emerged as one of the largest 
pools of scientists in the world but, strictly speaking, it is not a scientific 
community with a shared set of common interests and a common approach 
to scientific questions. 
Nehru and important scientists defined two relationships: (1) between 
science, technology and economic development; and (2) between peacefiil 
development of Indian atomic energy and nuclear weapon capability, Nehru 
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was the sole formal decision maker in Indian foreign and scientific affairs 
upto 1962 because he directed the Foreign Office and held the atomic 
energy and planning portfolios simultaneously. He emphasized the 
importance of secrecy in atomic affairs, and thus immunized himself and his 
government from public scrutiny.'"'* 
Despite the secrecy, the autonomy of the dominant scientist - state 
coalition of the Nehru era was fractured as a result of increasing political 
pressures in Indian politics and the rise of bureaucratic politics since 1960s. 
Two new elements added these confrontations, first, following the India-
China war of 1962 and China's nuclear test in 1964. Second, by mid-1960s, 
the US government was actively involved in internal bureaucratic battles in 
India pushing aggressively for Indian denuclearisation.'°^ 
Between the early 1960s and mid 1990s, Indian governmental nuclear 
decision making and its posture in international conference diplomacy 
oscillated between the first and the second policy lines. Both lines coexisted 
inside the Indian government and in public debate. 
India's nuclear history has three interwoven strands that originated in 
the Nehru-Bhabha years. The first strand is diplomatic, the second strand is 
labelled 'scientific/technological activity; both the strands took shape in 
1947, and the third strand that arose because of the gap between scientistific 
state ideologies, is of the crucial importance and is labelled as 'Indian 
nuclear decision making about the role of nuclear armament. Unlike the first 
and the second strands, the third is reactive and heavily politicised with 
cross currents. The first and the second have developed in a non-crisis 
mode. 'Crisis' implies that 'policy makers feel compelled to make policy 
choices under pressure and with deadlines'. The first strand is a necessary 
condition because it creates the legal and political foundations for Indian 
bomb activity. Indian attitudes and policies on other aspects of defence and 
foreign affairs crystallized by the waves of the time (for example; Kashmir 
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policy, 'relations' with Pakistan, USA and USSR; defence requirements) 
later. 
It was after the impulsion of 1974 that India developed a coherent 
nuclear doctrine to suit the fast changing circumstances,*"^ The 1974 test 
reflected Indira Gandhi's familiarity with consequences due to the impact of 
sanctions. The existence of western sanctions and the threat of sanctioning 
meant that Indian Prime Ministers - Indira Gandhi, Rajive Gandhi, 
Narimsimha Rao, V.P. Singh, Deve Gondwa, I.K. Gujral did not want 
further trouble from the West.**^ ^ The 80s saw no major shift in India's 
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position on the nuclear policy. India had stead-fastly resisted first US-
sponsored and then Soviet sponsored proposals for the international control 
of nuclear energy, which was in practice, a control of the civil uses of 
nuclear energy.''^ ^ 
India and the Big Five : The nuclear blast in the deserts of Rajasthan on 
18'*' May 1974 is a proud achievement of India's nuclear scientists. Between 
1974 and 1998 the internal dynamics defined the pattern and process of 
Indian nuclear decision making with regard to the military aspect of the 
nuclear question. This was an uncertain period and Indian decision-making 
oscillated because of the unstable economic and political conditions.*'" 
Between 1974 and pre-May 1998, Indian nuclear and missile activity and 
decision making was shaped by a complex internal and international 
environment. Nuclear weapons still retain their magic charm as the big 
powers still rely on them. It is still the ultimate weapon the best man can 
have and without these weapons the 'supreme national interest' is said to be 
at stake.*" 
Indian nuclear safeguards differences with the super-powers concern 
Indo-US relations more than Indo-Soviet relations, because Washington's 
determination to stop the transfer of nuclear energy from civil to military 
purposes has been much greater than Moscow's stand on this matter."^ 
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Between 1964 and 1968, the United States emphasized the immediate need 
to stop an increase of the number of nuclear weapon states and requested 
IAEA safeguards for the civil nuclear programmes of nuclear weapons 
threshold countries. India, on the other hand, emphasized that there must be 
a reciprocal commitment towards nuclear disarmament by the great powers, 
that the security of non-nuclear disarmament and IAEA safeguards were 
approvable if these concerned every reactor in all states. 
Ever since the explosion of the first nuclear device by the United 
States, it has been the policy of the nuclear powers to preserve their nuclear 
monopoly. America did not like Britain going nuclear. They did everything 
in their power to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear 
capability. They failed. In its turn Russia also tried to thwart the plans of the 
Chinese to develop and acquire nuclear weapons. The Russians could not 
succeed in this game either. France also acquired nuclear capability in 
defiance of the wishes of the United States. India is not a permanent 
member of the Security Council, nor does it wield the power of veto. 
Acquisition by India of nuclear capability has therefore upset the UN 
Applecart, and the balance of power has changed, if not in the world, at 
least in South Asia. 
India and USA : Americans have recognised China as a global force 
throughout the postwar period because of its historical association with the 
United States, its proximity to the Soviet Union and its colossal size. In 
contrast, the United States has found it difficult to accommodate the 
changing global circumstances of India, the largest state in the region, after 
China, and most broadly industrialized of the third world countries, while 
India has become a middle power with respect to many issues of importance 
to United States."^ 
India's science and technology complex is immense. India is third 
among nations in the number of scientists and publications, though it may 
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rank lower in quality. The decision to join the nuclear club in May 1974 
reflects only the tip of nuclear science capacity, let alone total science 
capability. 
The United States has four major interests with respect to India. Each 
involves consideration of India as a major force interacting with other 
powers. First are ideological issues, second are interrelated global issues, 
including population growth, natural resources access, and environmental 
protection. Third is a set of commercial issues, including trade and capital 
flows. Fourth are issues directly related to preservation of power, including 
control of access to nuclear weaponry.'''* 
Policy differences and public pronouncements during the Nehru era 
made it difficult to maintain mutually beneficial bilateral relations, which 
fluctuated considerably."^ The 1951 Indian critical food shortage and 
assistance thereafter by both the superpowers (USSR & USA) got equal 
responses and publicity. Concerns over the security of Asia in the wake of 
the Korean war brought on America's heavy involvement in South Asian 
affairs. From the signing of the US-Pakistani military aid agreement in 1954 
until the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, the United States supplied its ally with 
arms worth between $ 700 and $ 800 million."^ It sold India a modest 
amount of equipment before 1962, and gave India arms worth about $ 85 
million, between 1962 conflict with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan. 
The extent of Chinese nuclear threat to India, what India can and 
should do about it, and what policy the United States should pursue with 
respect to these matters forms one of the most complex military issues 
involving South Asia. In any case, India's capabilities and security problems 
make it a prime candidate to join the nuclear club and thus is a matter of 
concern to the United States."^ 
The United States has always opposed an Indian nuclear weapons 
programme as a part of its general policy towards nuclear proliferation. 
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"Monopoly of Big Five Broken" and "Indian Genius Triumph" were typical 
of the headlines in Indian newspapers after 1974"* nuclear test at Pokhran. 
Although the super power's official posture was relatively calm, 
because they realized that there was not much they could immediately do to 
stop the progress of India's nuclear conduct, actually they were not happy 
about it. 
During the period between 1974 to pre-May 1998, Indian nuclear and 
missile activity and decision making was shaped by a complex international 
environment. The US and Canada have maintained a sanction policy against 
India because of Pokhran-I (1974) and Pokhran 11(1998). The US did the 
same with People's Republic of China (PRC) as a part of its policy to 
contain and isolate the communist regime. The sanctions policy, however, 
was relaxed when the PRC emerged as a strategic partner of the west from 
the 1970s onwards. 
Arms control and disarmament arrangements and proposals are 
usually double games and with one set of rules for the US and its strategic 
partner(s); and another set of rules for others.'*' 
In the first week of September 1974 the United States halted the 
uranium assistance to India in the wake of its nuclear test. In January 
1975, during an official visit to Tokyo, Mrs. Gandhi said that India would 
continue its peaceful nuclear tests, despite criticism from foreign sources.'^' 
In fact no further nuclear tests were conducted upto May 1998. 
Moreover, the conditions were linked to the shipment of enriched 
uranium fi-om the United States to India in mid 1977 made it improbable 
that the latter would undertake a second nuclear explosion soon. The 
President of United States had declared that Washington would not provide 
nuclear cooperation to any state that explodes a nuclear device, enriched 
uranium is required to refuel India's power station at Tarapur. The closure 
of which would have a disastrous impact upon this region.'^^ 
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In early 1978, new legislation in the United States provided for 
cutting off nuclear fuel supplies within eighteen months to all states like 
India that refused to sign the NPT or to open all its nuclear facilities to 
inspection. Prime Minister Desai reacted to this threat by instructing Indian 
scientists to proceed with their experiments to produce a substitute for the 
enriched uranium from the United States.'^ ^ Despite negotiations India 
consistently declined to meet either of those terms. 
The relationship between India's nuclear weapons option and her 
non-alignment policy vis-a-vis the super-powers has been mutually 
reinforcing in nature. On the one hand, the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 
symbolically stressed her non-alignment, as it represented an act of defiance 
vis-a-vis the super powers in the context of the NPT, on the other hand, it 
was the policy of non-alignment which had assisted India in securing the 
option by minimizing the counter measures of the super powers. K 
Subrahmaniam has described India's stance in the 1970s as one of 'nuclear 
non-alignment - neither with nuclear powers, nor with those who have 
renounced the acquisition of nuclear capability. 
The actual decision by premier Mrs. Gandhi was to secure a 
capability for different policy options. Mrs. Gandhi repeatedly announced 
that India supports the peaceful nuclear explosions, India fulfilled that aim 
without causing any basic damage to her relations with either of the super-
powers. In the perceptions of Washington and Moscow, India does not, and 
will not during the forseable future, represent a real or potential military or 
political threat to national interests of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, respectively. India made it clear that it would use its nuclear 
capabilities only in self defence. 
The current Indian defence posture has to cover all contingencies 
presented by Pakistan and China. Therefore, Indian security remains, to a 
large degree, dependent upon a skilful diplomatic effort directed towards the 
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Soviet Union and United States, and sensible but cool policy towards China. 
Pakistan remains a problem, not because of its intrinsic strength but because 
foreign powers acting through Pakistan have a heightened effect on India's 
vulnerability. 
In the view of the United States, India's N-test of May 1998" could 
ignite an arms race with no visible finish line between India and Pakistan, 
who have fought three wars in the last 51 years and who remain bitterly 
divided over Kashmir and related issues. The US through its spokesperson 
called upon both India and Pakistan to sign CTBT. The immediate response 
of the US was to impose sanctions on India under a 1994 US non-
proliferation law that mandates strict penalties for countries not recognised 
as a nuclear power that receive or detonate a nuclear device. The swift 
imposition of sanctions underscores the seriousness with which the US 
views the proliferation threat posed by the tests, and sets the stage for a long 
term rift between US and India.'^ ^ Japan, India's biggest aid donor, also 
announced on May 13, 1998, tough economic sanctions against India for 
carrying out nuclear tests by freezing 3.5 billion yen ($ 26 million) annual 
grant aid. Sweden cut short a three year aid agreement with India worth 900 
million kronor ($118 million) which began at the start of 1997. The EU 
condemned the series of underground tests of nuclear weapons carried out 
by India and strongly called upon her to cease fiirther testing. In the view 
of Government of India the EU's reaction did not take any note of India's 
security environment nor did it contain any reference to India's past 
experience with China or Pakistan or to China's nuclear arms or missiles. 
History is repeating itself in Indo-US relations after a gap of 27 
years. In 1971, US president Richard Nixon had appointed a special action 
group under his National Security Adviser Henry S. Kissinger, to formulate 
policies against India that were meant to punish it for helping prevent 
genocide in Bangladesh'. The year 1998 again saw a similar US response.'^ ^ 
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India's defence industry is seeking to acquire autonomous design and 
development capacities, expand defence industrial base, select thrust areas 
such as main battle tank, missile system, light combat aircraft, collaborative 
interdependence in defence technology and equipment design, development 
and production, and enter the arms bazaar as an exporter in a planned 
manner. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has 
formulated Plan 2005 for achieving self-reliance by the year 2005 (likely to 
be extended fiirther). The thrust is on meeting 70 percent of the military 
hardware requirements indigenously as against 30 percent at present. The 
production of vital spares is high on the Plan 2005 agenda.'^ ^ 
Despite being one of the largest democracies in the world, Indian 
defence forces are among the least modernized. Less than 15 percent of 
India's armaments are contemporary in nature, as against a world average of 
30 percent.'^° Nuclearisation and the Kargil conflict brought in the forefront 
the demand and need for acquiring critical technologies and modem 
equipment and armaments for defence forces. There is a need for making up 
the deficiencies which inhibit modernization. 
India does not require nuclear weapons for prestige or status, 
although nuclear weapons have been seen as the currency of power since 
Hiroshima. Indian prestige will be governed by her ability to solve her 
problems successfully. The issue of national security in relation to nuclear 
weapons threat is one of those myriad problems. For a country pursuing an 
independent foreign and security policy, potential challenges posed by 
existential and specific nuclear weapons threat can be adequately addressed 
only; (i) through global abolition of nuclear weapons or (ii) by reliance on 
nuclear deterrence to wardoff such challenges. The latter could be 
autonomous or provided by military alliances (as is the case of large number 
of countries.*^' 
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With the collapse of the USSR, USA has assumed the role of the 
guardian of the world as the sole super power left in the world. It possesses 
tremendous clout by way of its virtual control over a number of world 
bodies which are central to the survival, and development of weaker 
nations. Even the developed nations are susceptible to pressure by USA in 
order to protect their own interests. In such an environment, relations with 
USA require a careful and pragmatic review. 
When USSR was a potent entity, India had the advantage of its 
support and she could afford to strike a path of her own, even if it ran 
counter to US interests. Despite being the world's two largest democracies, 
i.e. India and USA, the relations between the two have been blowing hot 
and cold. The anomaly was only aggravated by USA by overt and covert 
support to Pakistan.'^^ 
US, however, knows that India is a major and promising market for 
firms that originate from US. India is an important market for US power 
projects, like Enron. Besides power and energy projects, punitive measures 
against India could put at risk the infrastructure initiatives such as, building 
of roads, ports and bridges that involve US firms. The Government of India 
also knows that the economic development of India is dependent on import 
of technology and capital goods from the US. India depends upon engines 
from the US for the main battle tank (MBT) and equipment for the advanced 
light helicopter (A2H), besides other sophisticated items. *^^ 
In the light of recent events, it is apparent that USA wishes to engage 
India as the premier ally in the region. Its support at a crucial juncture 
during Kargil war, a successful visit by the US President to India and his 
virtual admonition to Pakistan's rulers, lifting of sanctions imposed post 
nuclear blasts, indication of support for India's permanent membership in 
the UN Security Council etc are strong indications of long term US interests 
in India.'^ "^  
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Nuclear India and Russia : The rise of the Soviet power is perhaps the 
most outstanding development of our times. In short, in a space of 30 years 
(1918-1948), the USSR became the most formidable challenger to the USA' 
in the next 12 years (1948-1960), it left the USA far behind in respect of 
space research and nuclear weaponry; and in the next 25 years (1960-1985) 
Moscow has become a factor, active or latent, in every international 
situation whether it is in Nicaragua or Cuba, South Africa or Ethiopia, 
Gibraltar or Cyprus, Iraq or Afghanistan, Japan or China, India or Pakistan, 
Australia or New Zealand, Kampuchea or New Caledonia.'^^ 
The impact of the Soviet might is felt especially by the USA whose 
interests also reach out into every ocean and continent. 
Thus, upto the end of the cold war and the disintegration of erstwhile 
Soviet Union, the whole world lives in a situation where irrespective of 
whether we love the one or the other, hate one or the other or both, no peace 
can endure, no world can survive, no international order can function, if 
these two superpowers drift into a state of active or incipient hostility 
towards each other. 
The struggle of the great powers for influence in the former colonial 
territories is one of the striking phenomena of international politics since 
world war II. To be sure, India, Pakistan, the USA, the Soviet Union, 
Communist China, and their various national interests come into striking 
juncture in South Asia. In sheer numbers, they are the five most populous 
countries in the world, with China the largest, having roughly six times as 
many people as Pakistan. The tender relations between India and China after 
1962 war and the unyielding hostility between India and Pakistan made 
South Asian security somehow threatening. India tries to use both US and 
Soviet support to deal with China and with Pakistan.'^^ 
The Kingpin of India's foreign policy has broadly been dictated by a 
principle of equidistance from the superpower rivalry until the dissolution 
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of the Soviet Union. In any assessment of India's role to ensure global 
peace, non-aligned movement played an important part.'^' Consistent with 
our traditional values, Nehru ceaselessly promoted the universal cause of 
disarmament, racial equality, international cooperation for economic 
development and the peaceful resolution of disputes and gave India a 
conceptual framework.'^ * 
In the contemporary situation of world politics, relations between 
states have three dimensions - one direct and two indirect namely; (a) 
correlative (or bilateral) (b) regional (or multilateral), and (c) global (or 
international).'^' Quantitatively speaking, therefore, interstate relations are 
the sum total of the relations of the three dimensions: bilateral, regional and 
global, the sum total being the cumulative aggregate of the three 
dimensions. While it is true that the quantitative measures do not always 
reveal the quality of relationship, they are, nevertheless, a necessary 
theoretical corrective and a dependable basis for verification.''*" 
Closely examining the nature, expanse and the level of Indo-Soviet 
relationship with the framework of the theoretical perspective, it is quite 
evident that both in the pursuit of a new national identity and legitimization 
of the political system as well as in all three dimensions of interstate 
relationship - bilateral regional and global, Soviet Union not only stands but 
as the state that has acquired a place of primacy in friendship, but also, (and 
this is most significant) it is the only state in such an exalted category of 
closeness of relations with India based on the convergence of mutual trust, 
conmion interests and closely shared objectives of international 
development.''*' 
Third country relationships have influenced India -USSR relations 
significantly. The most important determinants of the shape of Indo-Soviet 
relations have been the India's relations with Pakistan, China and the United 
States of America. Indo-Soviet relations grew at a more relaxed pace during 
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sixties, helped along by a deterioration of relations of both countries with 
China.''*^ South Asia has been the main target of opportunity for the Soviet 
Union for many years. In its quest for influence in Asia, Moscow has used 
all the tools of contemporary statecraft to gain and maintain its foothold in a 
region that became crucial to its interest.'*^ 
Over the entire period, the central concern of Soviet international 
relations has been the United States, while Pakistan has been the Chief 
focus of Indian foreign policy. Once Pakistan became the funnel for 
supplying arms for the Afghan Mujahideen, it acquired an intrinsic 
importance for Soviet Union. 
Pakistan was drawn into the western system of military alliances 
through bilateral treaties and multilateral pacts between 1956-9. The course of 
the alliance however proved rocky for the west, would not help Pakistan 
materially. Yet the Americans are felt to have let Pakistanis down in their rush 
to assist India against China in 1962, in their posture of equidistance between 
India and Pakistan in the 1965 war and finally in their inability to protect 
Pakistan from dismemberment at Indian hands in 1971. 
Disappointed with the US, Pakistan looked northwards, president 
Ayoub Khan's visit to the USSR in April 1965 suggested a new Soviet interest 
in Pakistan. The Soviet Union agreed to sell weapons to Pakistan in 1968.''*^ 
When Ayoub cancelled the lease on the US intelligence base in Peshawar and 
Pakistan, like India, abstained on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia of August 1968.''*^ 
With reference the supply of weapons to Pakistan by the USSR, the then 
defence minister of India Swaran Singh admitted in Parliament on 9 April 1969 
that India had failed to convince Moscow of the dangerous implications of 
supplying arms to Pakistan.''*^ Simultaneous good relations with India and 
Pakistan cannot survive a war between them neither can put a halt to the 
sinister designs put forth by the western powers especially, USA. 
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The twin developments of the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American 
rapprochement internationally coupled with the India-China conflict 
regionally, meant that in the 1970s Moscow and New Delhi came to have 
geostrategic community of interests. The proposed visit to Peking by President 
Richard Nixon, announced in July 1971, when the subcontinent was in the 
midst of the Pakistani civil war tension, shook both India and the USSR. 
The strength of Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation and its 
qualitative development to a higher plane resulted in the 20 year Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971, between India 
and Soviet Union Here again the Soviet policy was just the opposite of the 
power game and balance of power approach of Washington - Beijing axis 
which utilized Pakistan as a countervailing factor against India and threatened 
the peace of this subcontinent in 1971. The emerging Beijing-Washington axis 
towards which Islamabad also contributed its mite egged on the Pakistani 
rulers to continue their bloody reprisal against the freedom loving people of 
Bangladesh and to take a rigid posture of hostility towards India.''*' 
In the preamble of the 1971 Treaty the confracting parties reaffirmed 
their faith in the, "principles of peacefiil co-existence and co-operation between 
states with different political and social systems" and their determination to 
abide by the purposes and principles of United Nations Charter. '"^ ^ There were 
certain quarters that feel that this treaty is the sole reaction of President 
Nixon's Beijing visit arranged through Islamabad's good offices. If it would be 
seen in a broad vision, then it clear, it is was the logical outcome of a long and 
successful developing cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. 
With the growing tensions in the Indo-Pak border in 1971 and mounting 
tension between the two countries the Soviet Union besides its concentration 
on the question of ensuring the return of the East Pakistan refugees as the core 
of the questions in the Indo-Pak relations also pleaded for avoidance of all 
border clashes between the two countries. 
190 
Today, reality of the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the 
abandoning of the socialist experiment, these can not obliterate the foundations 
on which Indio-Soviet and Indo-Russian relations developed in India's pre-
independence period, something which influenced the future course of those 
relations following India's independence in 1947, and even after the USSR 
ceased to exist 45 years later. 
The two major landmarks in the annals of Indo-Soviet friendship that 
lent particular impetus to the ties and endowed them with a new and special 
dimension (reflective of the type of model relationship, socialist states were 
capable of developing with third world nations which had freed themselves of 
colonial bondage) were the visits of Jawaharlal Nehru as the first Indian 
premier to the USSR in June 1955 and of Nikolai Bulgenin and Nikita 
Khrushchev as the Soviet premier and First Secretary of the Communist Party 
of Soviet Union to India in November - December of the same year. The 
bilateral trade grew from a mere 17 lakhs in 1953 to Rs. 5200 crores in 1988.''*' 
Besides the Soviet contribution towards India's heavy industry, Bhilai 
Steel Plant in Madhya Pradesh and Bokaro and Vishakhapatnum Steel Plants, 
the Soviets supplied a whole range of military hardware thereby enhancing 
India's defence capabilities. The Soviet defence supplies included, inter alia, 
nuclear powered and other submarines, a variety of missiles and rockets, a 
wide range of aircraft of the MiG series, the MiG in particular which, the 
Western experts conceded in amazement, can match or even excel the most 
sophisticated western fighters. A large number of Indian defence personnel 
were trained in the Soviet Union, and licensed production of Soviet aircraft and 
other equipment reinforced India's indigenous defence prospects. 
Furthermore, Soviet Union contributed to India's space efforts and 
nuclear developments. Soviet Union supplied heavy water for the reactors of 
the Rana Pratap Sagar Nuclear Power Station in Rajasthan when Canadian 
assistance on this score was withdrawn as a token of protest against India's 
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peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974, and having agreed to set up two 
nuclear reactors of 1000 MW each on a turnkey basis in Tamil Nadu extending 
the necessary financial assistance for their construction.'^ *' 
The Soviet Union did not mind the effort of third world countries to 
acquire nuclear capability.'^' During the Reagan administration the US stuck to 
its policy of stopping nuclear cooperation with India. Rather, the USSR 
extended its help to third world countries to meet their requirements in the 
defence field. 
It is noteworthy to mention that with Soviet Union assistance India has 
become a substantial military power. India turned to the Soviet Union for 
defence supplies only after its requests for assistance in developing a largely 
1 ^0 
indigenous military capability were turned down by the West. 
The 1962 war with China is a significant turning point in the history of 
Indo-Soviet military relationship. During and immediately after China-India 
hostilities, the Soviet Union provided no emergency military assistance. A little 
later, however, India rejected offers of an Anglo-American guarantee of air 
defence system. This the western powers were not willing to supply.'" 
In December 1964, India's defence minister requested the loan of three 
fully operational daring - class destroyers from Britain, but was offered the 
loan of three very old weapon - class destroyers instead, an offer he could, and 
did refuse. The US proving equally unresponsive to requests of F 104 
starfighters and C-130 transport aircrafts.'^ " In 1965 India accepted the offer of 
Petya class frigates from the USSR. India's search for submarines in 1964 
produced a British offer of an obsolete world war II model, which India 
rejected. An agreement for the purchase of four Soviet submarines was signed 
in 1965, and all were delivered by 1970.'^ ^ 
For all the range and volume of Soviet military sales to India, the 
Moscow - New Delhi military relationship is a limited association rather than 
an alliance or a protector client bond. The very size, professionalism and 
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modernization of the Indian defence services makes it impossible to envisage 
India as a mere client of any external power. 
The number and duration of Soviet military instructors in India is 
strictly controlled. Soviet officers do not attend Indian staff colleges, there are 
no Soviet military advisers in India; there are no Soviet military or naval base 
in India, although Indian facilities are available for Soviet use upon specific 
requests; and there does not appear to be any regular exchange of military 
intelligence. 
India's strategic doctrines are mostly indigenous, focusing upon 
perceptions of threats to Indian political - security interests rather than global 
quarrels. If imported, then they are more likely to be borrowed fi-om American 
and British writings.'^ ^ Nonetheless, India's defence doctrine has inevitably 
been shaped by Soviet strategic planning. 
In 1976, Moscow concluded an agreement with New Delhi for the 
supply of two hundred tons of heavy water, conditional on the latter 
concluding a safeguards agreement with IAEA, a concession that was made m 
September, 1977. Some sources allege that the agreement clearly prohibits 
New Delhi fi-om carrying out peacefiil nuclear explosion. Details of the 
agreement have not been revealed officially in India.'^ ^ 
With the emerging reality of Indian ocean as a multipolar zone, India 
could not afford not to look to safeguarding its interests. India's relations with 
the Soviet Union added a sharpness to anxieties among littoral states about its 
naval expansion. Yet the much stronger western presence in Indian ocean was 
ignored. It could also turn out to be the case that success in India's pursuit to 
become a regional power could lead it into a degree of competition with the 
Soviet Union.'^ * 
The Pakistan - China - US axis would on the face of it, suggest a 
geostrategic convergence of interests between India and Soviet Union even on 
the high seas. 
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The Indian ocean is important to Soviet strategists by virtue of being the 
only maritime route connecting the European and pre-Eastem regions of the 
USSR that is open all year. 
Indian and Soviet interests in the Indian ocean are thus complementary 
vis-a-vis both the United States and China. Repeated and forcefully expressed 
Indian opposition to the development of the US naval base at Diego Garcia 
must be understood in the context of potential US-Pakistani collusion in the 
event of another Indo-Pak war. 
Indian defence officials and analysts have consistently explained India's 
defence build ups with reference to threats posed by military modernisation of 
Pakistan and China, arms acquisition by Pakistan in the wake of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the construction of Chinese military bases in Tibet 
which derogates India's security on the rather large Indo-Tibetan border, and 
possible Chinese assistance to the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme.'^' 
India's "peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) at Pokhran in the Rajasthan 
desert on 18 May 1974" jolted the suppliers into a show of action. Punitive 
economic and nuclear energy measures instituted by the US and Canada after 
1974 test complicated and delayed India's search for nuclear self sufficiency. 
By the 1980s India had developed an indigenous capability to produce its own 
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uranium fuel. 
The pace of nuclear developments in the subcontinent quickened in 
1987. International apprehensions about India's nuclear ambitions stem from 
different factors particular among which is India had taken a militantly anti-
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) posture from the beginning. 
CVDIA-USSR Nuclear Energy Cooperation 
Moscow has generally been supportive of India's plans for the peaceful 
application of nuclear energy but unhappy with Indian opposition to the NPT. 
An agreement for nuclear research cooperation on a regular basis was signed 
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by India and Soviet Union as early as 6 October 1961, with an additional 
Protocol in 1968. They provided the framework for exchange of scientific -
technical information and visits by groups of scientists. The Soviet Union 
transferred to India design plans and specifications, and production forms and 
records of the BN-50 (fast neutron) experimental and research reactor. A new 
agreement for scientific-technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy was signed in January 1979, that is five years after the explosion of a 
nuclear device by India.'^' 
The USSR stepped into the breach created by the suspension of 
Canadian and US assistance to India's civilian nuclear industry, supplying 
heavy water in 1978 under partial safeguards. Dr. Raja Ramanna, Chairman 
of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) led a five member delegation to 
Moscow in December 1983 for discussion on an offer to set up a giant nuclear 
power plant in India. 
Moscow managed to convince Rajiv Gandhi during his May 1985 visit 
of the merits of building a 440 MW nuclear power plant in India, the furst such 
Soviet plant in a non-socialist country.'^ ^ After Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to 
India in 1986 the two countries were reported to be finalising a memorandum 
of understanding to cover the transfer of nuclear power technology.'^ '* 
In May 1988, India signed a Rs. 48 billion deal with Moscow for two 
1000 MW pressurized water reactors to be installed on a turnkey bases by 
1997-98, making this the largest single foreign purchase ever for India.'^ ^ 
Gandhi and Gorbachev signed an agreement during the latter's visit to 
India in November 1988 for the construction of two giant nuclear power plants 
of 1000 MW each in Koodankulam (in Tamil Nadu). The Soviet Union agreed 
to supply enriched uranium for the entire operational life of the reactors.'^ ^ 
After the end of cold war the long-term strategic interests of Russia and India 
coincide, both countries are interested in the multipolar structure of the world 
whose components would balance each other's influence. 
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At the end of the twentieth century Russia's firm resolve to stand by 
India through thick and thin - its unambiguous support to India's endeavour to 
secure the permanent membership of UN Security Council is a case in point -
has given a fk-esh thrust toward renewed efforts to democratize the international 
order. 
The end of the Soviet era posed special difficulties for India, 
particularly in the military realm given its huge dependency on Soviet arms 
transfers for spare parts and equipment during this crunch, the India's defence 
ministry was even forced to turn to Ukraine and East European states as a stop 
gap measure. As Indo-Soviet ties unraveled at a dizzying speed, India faced 
multiple crises in the security and economic sphere, with not only its strategic 
framework in shambles, but also in the financial sector, where the country was 
left with just enough foreign exchange to cover a fortnight's worth of 
imports.'^ ^ 
The early years (1991-96) in which Russia's policy towards India 
amounted at best to 'benign neglect' have left a deep mark on Indian 
policymakers, in particular providing a rude awakening for those who 
imagined that Indo-Russian relations were strong enough to whether any 
circumstances that might emerge. 
The partial recovery of their ties since then is explained in large part by 
the techno-commercial arms trade which has proved to be the only real 
enduring aspect of their earlier 'special' bilateral relationship.'^ ^ The 
importance of India for the Russians may be gauged by the fact that the Indians 
buy more hardware from the Russian defense industry than do Russia's own 
military forces. 
The extensive trip to India by President Vladimir Putin in October 2000 
served to reinforce this trend in important ways. For example, this slow but 
discernible shift has been mirrored in Russia's more open acceptance of India's 
declared nuclear status. In response to India's nuclear tests in 1998, Russia had 
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joined the chorus of condemnation by the west, though in more muted tones.'''^  
During Putin's visit the bilateral defense relationship was taken much further 
than before. 
It is precisely in the context of sanctions and other international regimes 
that Russia's role in the nuclear field becomes critical for India. India has been 
looking towards other suppliers such as France but without immediate results. 
As a leading Indian strategic analyst commented, "The reality is that Russia 
today is the only great power which is ready lo cooperate with India m the 
atomic energy sector!!'^ ' 
A critical testimony to the desire of the Russians to deepen future 
relations is the Memorandum of Understanding on peaceful nuclear energy 
uses signed along with the Declaration on Strategic Partnership during Putin's 
visit to India. While the latter has been made public the former remains 
unpublished. 
The position of Russia's Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy) was that 
the new decree significantly expanded Russia's nuclear export capability and 
that it was linked to Russia's intent to assist the Indian program. Indeed Putin 
said as much when he noted in New Delhi that two more reactors in addition to 
Koodankulam were distinct possibilities. This was consistent with Adamov's 
(the former Atomic Energy Chief during a visit to India in December 2000) 
promise in The Hindu interview that 'we will do our best to participate in 
India's ambitious program to generate 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 
2020'.''^ 
Yevgeny Adamov, viewed sanctions by the west on India 
'unconstructive' in forcing India to forfeit its nuclear option, and pointed out 
that 'we are against a policy of sanctions and did not impose them even when 
India conducted its nuclear tests. On the contrary, with three months of 
Pokhran-II, an agreement was signed to sell India $ 15 billion worth of Russian 
arms over 10 years. 
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Socio-Economic Dimensions of India's Nuclear Policy 
The understanding of the economic role of the atomic energy and the 
awareness of developments abroad in this field were helpful in defining the 
objectives of India's nuclear policy. India could hopefully aspire to employ this 
new source of power along with the conventional sources to solve its problems 
of backwardness and poverty. Science and technology, it was felt, would 
enable the country to get a larger output of commodities and services from its 
resources of men and material.'^ '* The harnessing of vast natural resources and 
man power with the help of modem technology could not only restore the 
economic health of the country that had deteriorated as a result of colonial rule 
and the partition. It could also be instrumental in catching up with the 
advanced countries. In international forums India had all along advocated the 
elimination and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and emphasized 
the need for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
As early as 1948, speaking in the General Assembly, the Indian 
representative, Mrs. VijayaLakshmi Pandit, gave vent to these aspirations 
when she said that, "atomic energy could be expected to play an important role 
in the future economy of an underdeveloped and under powered country".''^ A 
review of the post partition economy of India pointed to the necessity of 
urgently using modem scientific & technological tools to reconstmct the 
shattered Indian economy. 
The country's industrial growth was in a depressing state. The 
unfavourable aspect of the industrial situation was the lack of emphasis on 
basic goods industries. It was therefore a gigantic problem to provide a vast 
population with the necessities of life such as food, clothing and housing. The 
position of power which could solve these problems, was very unsatisfactory. 
Cheap electric power, considered as the key to rapid industrialization and vital 
for irrigation and agricultural operations, was in short supply. Besides, there 
was the unbalanced development of power in various regions. About three 
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percent of the country's population in six large cities got the benefit of 56% of 
the total public utility installation.'^ * Rural areas were particularly neglected so 
the highest priority was given to the generation of electric power to give a 
boost to the economy in urban as well as rural areas. 
It was in the context of power generation that the taming of the atom 
was given the priority. Dr. Homi. J. Bhaabha, realising the inadequacy of 
hydroelectric power and conventional fuels, stressed the need for developing 
the atom for this purpose. He was also alive to the potentiality of nuclear 
energy in other fields which were of at least equal importance in meeting the 
requirements of society. He visualised a network of atomic power industry that 
would produce that vast amounts of radio active materials useful in industry 
and food preservation. He also fore saw the possibility of the use of irradiation 
for artificial mutation of plants and crops and its allied applications in 
propulsion, biology and medicine.''' 
Meanwhile, groups of Indian scientists and technicians were also sent to 
the USA, UK and France for further training in nuclear sciences. The prime 
minister referred briefly to these visits during the question time in the Lok 
Sabha on 9 February 1950; "we have been in touch with numerous scientists 
and atomic energy commissions in other countries. Some of our men have been 
sent for trainmg there. I do not think it is desirable, normally speaking, for us 
to bring people for this kind of work from outside - but we are in touch".''* 
Foreign collaboration was sought and received in building nuclear industrial 
technology. 
The Atomic Energy Research Committee, founded in 1947, probably 
with Nehru's encouragement, signaled the early determination of the Indian 
govenmient to promote advanced research in nuclear energy. The 
determination was strengthened further with the establishment of the Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1948. The objectives of the Atomic Energy Act 
approvsd by the Indian Parliament in 1948, were two-foid. These were, to 
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allow for research and development in secrecy when necessary, along 
methodical lines, and to extend state ownership over atomic minerals, namely 
uranium and thorium.'^' 
India's reaction to the various versions of the Baruch Plan for the 
international ownership of atomic raw materials was inspired by the same 
desire. Referring to the economic role of the atomic energy, Mrs. 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit said that, the under developed countries, could not 
forego any opportunity to develop atomic energy for industrial purposes. They 
could not allow any international organisation, dominated by the industrially 
advanced coimties, to control their activities in regard to the development of 
atomic energy.'*° Thus, India opposed any form of international control of 
atomic energy which might in any way inhibit her mdependence to develop the 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes. India apprehended that an attempt was 
underway, through international control of atomic energy, to thwart the 
economic growth of the under-developed countries. 
The government of India was aware of the important potential 
contribution which nuclear energy could make towards the country's economic 
progress. It, therefore, recognised the urgency to initiate the nuclear energy 
programme immediately. The complete understanding between prime minister 
Nehru and Homi J. Bhabha proved to be of immense value in the evolution and 
promotion of India's nuclear effort. The fact that the country was endowed by 
nature with atomic raw materials was helpful in launching the nuclear 
programme. 
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Chapter -IV 
CTBT AND INDIA'S PURSUIT OF DISARMAMENT 
AND PEACE 
Ending the arms race and effective disarmament measures 
culminating in a general and complete disarmament is without doubt the 
largest and the most pressing problem of today's world's politics. 
In this day and age of nuclear weapons and missiles the very 
survival of the human race largely hinges on whether mankind succeeds in 
achieving genuine disarmament, on whether the costly and dangerous arms 
race is checked and whether the horror weapons of mass destruction are 
eliminated from the face of the earth. 
The very logic of events has placed the problem of disarmament at 
the centre of the world politics. It is the most burning and crucial problem of 
our times. Questions of disarmament are being discussed by government 
officials at many international conferences as well as on a bilateral basis. 
The disarmament movement has now involved wide segments of the 
general public as well as representatives of many international and national 
organizations. The intense and universal interest being shown in effective 
arms limitation and eventual disarmament is quite understandable in a world 
that has seen so many bloody conflicts and wars including two frighteningly 
destructive world wars, the need for genuine disarmament is being 
increasingly recognized as crucial to efforts aimed at averting the tragedy of 
a world thermo-nuclear holocaust and maintaining peace on earth. 
Questions of ending arms race and achieving completely 
disarmament are reflected in the numerous resolutions and declarations 
adopted by the UN as well as in political statements made by most of the 
world's leaders and in the programmes of political parties. Nonetheless, to 
this day, there has not been a major breakthrough in curbing the arms race, 
let alone finding a radical solution to the disarmament problem. The 
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question is why, who and what prevents disarmament? Is disarmament at all 
possible? 
Wars have a history of their own and so is the struggle against them, 
and disarmament too has a history of its own. War, killings and destruction 
are essentially alien to human nature, alien to reason and human dignity as 
men have always sought peace. The first ideas to reduce armaments and 
even to achieve disarmament originated in ancient Greece, Rome and, in 
India. The originators of this noble idea associated disarmament with the 
ideal of'eternal peace'.' 
Evaluation of Machinery and Approaches towards Disarmament under 
the United Nations 
The founding members of the United Nations, meeting in San 
Frencisco on 26'** June 1945 to sign the Charter, solenmly committed 
themselves to the purposes and principles of the organization, the primary 
purpose being "to maintain international peace and security" (Article 1). In 
order to promote this purpose, "with the least diversion for armaments of the 
world's human and economic resources" (Article 26 of UN Charter), they 
conferred specific responsibilities in connection with disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments on the Security Council and the General Assembly. 
The Security Council was made responsible for formulating with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47), "plans to be 
submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a 
system for the regulation of armaments" (Article 24). The General Assembly 
was empowered to consider "the principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments", and to make "recommendations with regard to 
such principles to the members or to the Security Council or to both" 
(Article 11).^  
Only days after the signing of the Charter, the first atomic weapons 
were exploded. This confronted the United Nations with unprecedented 
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military and political problems. The Charter has envisaged disarmament and 
the regulation of armaments as elements in the progressive establishment of 
an international security system. However, the possibility that new weapons 
of mass destruction might again be used gave disarmament greater 
immediacy and an enhanced place in the sphere of international politics and 
security. 
The United Nations reacted promptly to this new turn of events. The 
General Assembly's firsi resolution (resolution 1(1)), adopted on 24 January 
1946, established an Atomic Energy Commission with the urgent task of 
making specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of 
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction. Later 
that year, in resolution 41(1), adopted on 14 December, 1946, the General 
Assembly recognized the central role of disarmament in relation to peace 
and security.^ 
Since that time, the question of disarmament has been discussed in 
the Security Council, at every session of the General Assembly and in 
numerous subsidiary bodies. In the search for disarmament, the United 
Nations has been confronted with complex and difficult tasks. 
Discussions through diplomatic channels, including meetings of 
heads of government (such as "Geneva Summit" meeting of July 1955) and 
of ministers of foreign affairs (starting with the Moscow meeting in 
December 1945), play an important role in disarmament negotiations. 
However, as the Charter envisaged a multi-lateral system for the regulation 
of armaments and ultimately disarmaments, the traditional methods of 
diplomacy have been superseded, to a large extent, by new negotiating 
machinery."* 
In due course the main initiative on disarmament has moved from the 
Security Council, or bodies under it, the General Assembly and subsidiary 
organs of the Assembly. The growing influence of the non-aligned countries 
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has also given them a new role in disarmament, a role that the Secretary 
General has described as "an important element exercising a moderating and 
catalytic influence in helping to bridge the gap between extreme positions of 
either side!* 
The setting up of the Atomic Energy Conmiission was, as stated 
above, the first act of the General Assembly in this direction. The Commission 
for Conventional Armaments was established by the Security Council at the 
beginning of 1947. In 1952, these two commissions were merged by the 
General Assembly into the Disarmament Commission.^  
The Disarmament Commission played a less prominent role in 
disarmament negotiations, not withstanding the decision of the Assembly in 
1947 (by which time the membership of the United Nations had risen from 51 
to 82) to increase the 'Commissions' size by the addition of fourteen members 
and, in 1958, to enlarge it again to include all the members of the United 
Nations. Since then, it has held only two sessions, in 1960 and 1965. 
The issue of arms control is too extensive and the underlying 
hostility too great to allow an immediate and comprehensive solution. 
Compromise must be achieved through a series of partial measures, each of 
which balance force reductions and modernization restrictions. Recent arms 
control negotiations have not focused on a balanced but limited combination 
of force reductions and weapon modernization restrictions and that has 
virtually precluded success. 
Arms control in post cold-war era must be pursued as an adjunct to, 
not a substitute for ways of dealing with sources of conflict and methods of 
managing disputes while some of the potential causes of war are likely to lie 
within the military arena, there is little reason to believe they will be the 
most potent ones. 
The changing nature of world politics suggests a new role and a new 
importance for arms control. East-west tensions have eased, and an 
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international diffusion of power is occurring, the fast focus on US-Soviet 
arms control will not be sufficient in the future, although lacking in the 
gains of previous and on going arms negotiations with the USSR is critical, 
it will also be necessary to construct enduring multi-lateral regimes to deal 
with emerging problems of proliferation of weapons, preventing the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
will become increasingly important. Arms control should attempt to slow the 
spread of dangerous technologies in order to gain and to better manage their 
destabilizing effects.* 
Arrangements for ensuring that arms control agreements survive 
and are able adapt to changing conditions after they enter into force have not 
received the degree of attention, the subject deserves. Arms control treaties 
need verification and compliance arrangements that protect the security of the 
state concerned, provide a low key channel for raising compliance question and 
instill confidence in public that their interests are being protected.' 
The development of large quantities of nuclear weapons in the Asia-
Pacific and Indian Ocean regions presents tremendous dangers to the countries 
of the region. It is essential to define appropriate forms for US participation in 
the system of confidence building measures in East Asia on the condition that 
the US demonstrate a desire to avoid explosive situations. The normalization of 
relations between the countries of these regions* not require the cooperation of 
all the countries affected.'° 
It is obvious that no dramatic result will be achieved in the near future. 
It might be possible to obtain some guidelines for international arms transfers 
and further restrictions on the use of certain weapons in war. The regional 
approach is particularly suited for conventional disarmament." 
The Middle East along with South Asia has been the largest 
conventional arms market in the third world. Despite the presence of evidence 
that supports the facts of arms trade being a retardant to economic and social 
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development and the principal causative factor for interstate tensions, the 
dividing line about whom to blame for this problem has never been bridged. 
There is now a need to create an arms control regime incorporating suppliers 
and users, that is equitable at the base, and most importantly offers a feeling of 
enhanced security through unanimously arrived decisions.'^ 
The developing countries should adopt a strategy of non-
confrontationist resistance to the industrial and heavily armed powers to bring 
about disarmament.'^  
For years the multilateral arms control processes (eg. The UN, the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) have provided an extravagant, self-perpetuating, 
irresponsible gab feast for the benefit of the professional arms-controllers. 
However, the process has promoted ideas harmful to western security, that 
wars arise principally fi'om miscalculation and misperceptions; that arms, not 
aggressive regimes cause wars, that nuclear weapons not totalitarianism, is the 
chief threat in the world today that 'the superpowers' are morally equivalent, 
that force can be eliminated from international relations.''* 
Disarmament has been one of the most important concerns of the non-
aligned movement since the time of its inception. This concern was nurtured by 
the historical experiences of the non-aligned countries whose endeavor has 
been to guard their independence and remain outside the spheres of influence 
of the great powers. During the successive summit meetings over the years they 
have shown progressive sophistication in dealing with specific disarmament 
issues. Despite various inherent limitations they have constructively 
contributed to the disarmament debate through mediation between the two 
superpowers, shaping the concensus in multilateral fora including the General 
Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament and making people conscious 
of the threat of nuclear holocaust in an over-armed world. The non-aligned 
movement has thus become history's biggest peace movement.'^  
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The US attempts at influencing Pakistan, especially its nuclear 
weapons decisions during 1979-91, explains the conditions under which a 
supplier can develop structural and decisional influences over a recipient. It 
concludes that the success rate of influence attempts has been mixed as 
Pakistan often succeeds in reversely influencing the US to receive better 
weapon systems, largely due to the structural conflict that Washington was 
engaging with the USSR on Afghanistan.*^ 
On all accounts Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapon capability is now 
irreversible, not even the US can deter her. Hence, India must take appropriate 
counter measures including a matching nuclear response, to safeguard herself. 
Since neither country is willing or in a position to abandon its nuclear option, 
the only safe course left is to shun a strike at each other's nuclear facilities and 
live in mutual nuclear deterrence. This could extend to be deterrence of a 
conventional war as well, thus serving the cause of peace, even if somewhat 
diabolically. Accordingly, despite the ongoing mutual distrust, the Indo-Pak 
accord arrived at on 17 Dec. 1985 could be regarded as the second block 
overcome for building peace on the subcontinent, the Simla Agreement of 1972 
being the first.'' 
Against a back drop of strategic interests that appear to override US 
concerns about Pakistan's nuclear path, both India and Pakistan seem destined 
to engage in a nuclear arms race. The social and economic costs to both 
countries are obvious enough, but the greatest danger lies in a possible 
regional blowup also involving the superpower. There is not much hope of a 
bilateral or international non-proliferation solution, the only hope for nuclear 
restraint lies in a voluntary fi-eeze by both India and Pakistan on these weapon 
oriented programmes, wherever possible. At the same time, there is a great 
need to disengage the Indo-US relationship from its Pakistani shadow.'* 
Regional nuclear diplomacy in South Asia primarily originates from 
the interaction of the nuclear policies of India, Pakistan and the five nuclear 
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weapon states. India's policy towards every meaningful nuclear arms control 
and disarmament solution in the 1980s reflected an inextricable linkage to its 
claim for general and complete nuclear disarmament, however, because of the 
exclusiveness of general and complete disarmament as a attainable objective, 
India has been able to maintain a doctrine of nuclear ambiguity rejecting all of 
Pakistan, bilateral initiatives aimed at regional non proliferation, India's covert 
nuclearisation is generally under this doctrine of nuclear ambiguity.'" 
The two sided East - West pattern of representation was continued in 
the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which was 
established by a decision of the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the 
United Kingdom and the United States in 1959. The ten participating countries 
were: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR on one side 
and Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on the 
other. 
The next step on the conference machinery was the 1961 agreement 
between the Soviet Union and the United Slates, endorsed by the General 
Assembly that same year, to establish the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament, which added to the original ten countries of the 1960 
Conference, eight members of the United Nations not belonging to either of the 
two major military alliances in Europe. The eight new non-aligned members 
were: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United 
Arab Republic. The Committee has met in almost continuous sessions since 
1962, except when its work was being reviewed by the General Assembly. The 
Government of France decided not to participate in it. 
The twentieth session of the General Assembly may have opened a 
new chapter in the machinery for disarmament negotiations when, in 1965, it 
endorsed the idea of holding a World Disarmament Conference to which all 
countries would be invited. Many of the countries supporting this idea 
explicitly stated that it was their hope that would permit the participation of. 
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among others, the People's RepubHc of China. Though the members of the 
General Assembly ruled out any direct link between the United Nations and the 
World Disarmament Conference, so as to make universal participation 
possible. The resolution recognised the Continuing interest and responsibility 
of the United Nations in connection with the solution of the disarmament 
problem. 
The new item "general and complete disarmament" was included in 
the agenda of the Assembly's fourteenth session at the request of the Soviet 
Union^", on whose behalf premier Khurshchev, addressing the Assembly on 
18"^  September '^ proposed a new disarmament programme in three stages 
aimed at eliminating within four years and under international control all armed 
forces and armaments. A revised and detailed version of the programme was 
submitted to the Ten Nations Disarmament Committee which convened in 
Geneva in March 1960.^ ^ 
The General Assembly also had before it a three stage plan for 
comprehensive disarmament submitted on 17 September 1959 by Mr. Selwyn 
Lloyd, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.^ ^ The 
plan which was based on the principle of balanced stages towards the abolition 
of all nuclear weapons and the reduction of all other weapons to levels which 
would rule out the possibility of aggressive war, was the basis for the 
subsequent western plan submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee. 
France proposed that, in any disarmament programme, high priority be 
given to measure prohibiting first the development and then the manufacture 
and possession of all vehicles for the delivery of nuclear devices. Satellites, 
rockets, supersonic or long range aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers and 
launching pads.^ '* 
The United States representative declared that his government 
unreservedly supported the greatest possible amount of controlled disarmament 
and welcomed in particular Soviet willingness to seek progress through limited 
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steps, expressing a preference for work on the prevention of surprise attack and 
agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. 
The Conference of the Ten-Nations Committee on Disarmament ended 
on 27 June 1960 on the withdrawal of the five Eastern European delegations in 
the aftermath of the U-2 incident and the crisis atmosphere resulting from the 
abortive summit meeting scheduled for Paris in June. The Eastern European 
powers charged that the western powers were avoiding the question of general 
and complete disarmament while the western powers accused that the eastern 
powers were avoiding the question of preliminary measures and control. The 
consideration of the disarmament plans which followed the current draft 
treaties for general and complete disarmament, was left incomplete. 
Following the Irish proposal, 1958, which General Assembly adopted 
on 20 November 1959 by 68 votes to none, with 12 abstentions, France became 
world's fourth nuclear power conducting experimental explosions in February 
and March 1960.^ ^ The problem of proliferation, though not considered at the 
Geneva Conference of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee as requested 
by resolution 1380 (XIV) was again placed on the Assembly's agenda of the 
fifteenth session by Ireland.^ * The draft resolution was adopted by the 
Assembly on 20''* December 1960, by 68 votes to none, with 26 abstentions as 
resolution 1576(XV). '^ 
Although there was universal support for the Irish proposal, some 
states regretted that it did not prohibit the physical transfer of nuclear 
weapons and that consequently, did not foresee the contingency in which a 
nuclear power could transfer nuclear weapons while at the same time 
retaining control over their use. 
At the Assembly's sixteenth session, there was also a new proposal 
by Sweden. On 17 November 1961, Sweden submitted a draft resolution^'' 
co-sponsored by Austria, Combodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan and 
Tunisia, which requested the Secretary General to make an inquiry as to the 
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conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be 
willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or 
otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future 
nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of any other country. 
Both Soviet Union and USA opposed the draft resolution. The 
Soviet Union regarded the text of the resolution as weak and not sufficiently 
categorical and objected to the words "in the future" which appeared in the 
sentence "to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on their 
territories on behalf of any other country." 
The United States opposed the draft resolution on the ground that 
the proposal sought to shift the emphasis entirely to non-nuclear powers 
receiving nuclear weapons on their territory on behalf of any other country, 
and thus to prejudice existing defensive arrangements. The conditions which 
created the need for defensive arrangements would have to be removed 
before those arrangements could be terminated. The draft resolution seemed, 
the United States said to question the right of free nations to join together in 
collective self defence, including the right to self defence with nuclear 
weapons if need be. The United States had to continue and give its allies the 
military support which they requested and which they considered necessary 
for collective self-defence.^' 
On 4 December 1961, the Swedish draft resolution was adopted by 
the General Assembly by 58 votes to 10, with 23 abstentions."^^ 
On 2 January 1962, the Secretary General requested member 
governments to state their views with regard to the conditions under which 
countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into 
specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or other wise acquiring 
such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the fiiture, nuclear weapons in 
their territories on behalf of any other country. 
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The three western nuclear powers indicated that the best solution 
was general and complete disarmament under effective international control 
including nuclear weapons; the USSR supported the idea of nuclear-free 
zones, which, it felt, would contribute towards building confidence between 
states and reduce the threat of an outbreak of military conflicts.^^ 
Matters evolved rather differently, Decolonization proceeded 
quickly through the 1960s and 1970s, and the membership of the United 
Nations increased from 51 States in 1945 to 191 by 2003.^'' While in the 
same period real progress on disarmament and arms regulation was 
disappointingly arduous and slow. 
The draft treaties for general and complete disarmament introduced 
by the Soviet Union and the United States in the ENDC (Eighteen Nation's 
Disarmament Committee) in 1962 and endorsed by the General Assembly 
with eight members added from non-aligned states. This became the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1969, with a 
membership of twenty-six states and it was expanded yet again in 1975 to 
thirty one-states.^^ 
Faced with the continued build up of arms across the board, the 
General Assembly turned to limiting the introduction of arms into specified 
geographical areas. By the late 1960s, a number of collateral agreements had 
been signed, with the principal aim of curbing the expansion of the arms 
race into areas in which it had not yet extended. These include: 
• The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which provided for the demilitarisation 
of Antarctica. 
• The 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in 
outer space, and under water, known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(PTBT). 
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• The 1967 treaty on principles governing the activities of states in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, known as the Outer Space Treaty. 
• The 1967 Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin 
America, know as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
• The 1968 Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, often 
called simply the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
These treaties were dramatic in comparison to the years of failure 
and were visionary in the limitations they placed on the expansion of nuclear 
weapons deployment. Notwithstanding these achievements, none of these 
treaties produced actual reductions in levels of weapons, and global military 
expenditures continued to rise. 
Again, it was through the General Assembly that an effort was 
initiated to slow and reverse the arms race. In 1969 the General Assembly 
declared the 1970s as the first disarmament decade and called upon states to 
intensify their efforts to achieve effective measures relating to the cessation 
of the nuclear arms race. The General Assembly called for nuclear 
disarmament as well as the elimination of non-nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction. 
To support the attainment of objectives, the General Assembly in 
1979 declared the 1980s as the second disarmament decade, with the goals 
consistent with the ultimate objective of the disarmament process: general 
and complete disarmament under effective international control. For that 
purpose first special session of the General Assembly was held, devoted to 
disarmament, 1978. 
During the years immediately following the special session, the 
international climate worsened. The hostility between the United States and 
the Soviet Union sharpened, military expenditures increased, and nuclear 
arsenals continued to grow. 
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The second special session of General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament took place in New York from June 7 to July 10, 1982. More 
than 140 states took part in the debate, many expressing their deep concern 
at the lack of progress. Also present to give voice were more than 3,000 
representatives from 450 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the 
streets of New York witnessed the largest popular demonstration in U.S. 
history when an estimated three quarters of a million people took part in an 
anti-nuclear rally. 
Despite these expressions of public concern and various efforts to 
find diplomatic language that would attract concensus agreement, in the end 
the political gap between the west, the east, and the non-aligned proved too 
large to be bridged. With the end of the cold war in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the threat of major nuclear exchange receded and the two major 
nuclear powers. Russia and the United States, themselves took steps to 
reduce their nuclear stockpiles which represent some 98 percent of the 
world's nuclear weapons.^ ^ It was during the cold war both states made it 
clear that the negotiations to limit nuclear weapons would be strictly a 
bilateral matter and a number of agreements were accordingly made.^ ^ By 
the end of the 20* century it was estimated that the nuclear stockpiles had 
been reduced by approximately half, to less than 30,000 warheads. 
But, although the threat of nuclear war has lessened and stockpiles 
have been reduced, large numbers of warheads and delivery systems remain. 
The consequences of a nuclear exchange were to take place would still be 
catastrophic. China, France and United Kingdom are believed to have a 
combined total of about 1,000 nuclear warheads; with the nuclear tests 
carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998, there are now seven countries 
with nuclear weapons, and for many years there have been reliable 
assessments that Israel has an undeclared nuclear weapon capability. 
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South Africa announced in the early 1990s that it had ended its 
undisclosed nuclear programme by destroying its half dozen or so nuclear 
devices.^ * Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement in 1991 to end their 
rival nuclear weapon research programms and agreed to have the IAEA 
participate in overseeing the agreement. However, despite considerable 
efforts since 1963 to negotiate a treaty acceptable to all, the goal has so far 
proved elusive. 
The principal stumbling block in achieving full scale disarmament 
objective for many years was that of reliable verification, but eventually a 
worldwide system of on site inspection and seismic, infrasound, radio-
nuclide, and hydro acoustic stations and laboratories was devised. 
The issue of nuclear non-proliferation has received major attention 
over the years. The treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was 
adopted in 1968, came into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in 
1995. The treaty has 188 parties, including the original five nuclear weapon 
states, but Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan are not its signatories. 
One of the major achievements of the United Nations in the nuclear 
field is the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) '*" which was 
overwhelmingly adopted by General Assembly atter years of planning, hard 
work, and lobbying by many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that 
advocate arms control. It was an achievement not only for curbing nuclear 
weapons, but also for halting nuclear contamination of the environment, 
even by underground testing. 
As of the beginning of 2004, 170 states had signed the treaty and 
108 had ratified it. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom have ratified, 
but China and the United States have not. Israel has signed but has not 
ratified, and neither India nor Pakistan are its signitories.'" On October 13, 
1999, the US Senate voted 51-48 to reject the CTBT."*^  President Bill 
Clinton declared, "by this vote, the Senate majority has turned its back on 50 
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years of American leadership against the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction". ^^ 
INDIA'S POLICY ON DISARMAMENT 
India's independence coincided with the beginning of the cold war 
between the two power blocs. Not many Afro-Asian nations were members 
of the United Nations at that time. Not being a great power and lacking 
adequate military strength, India found that it was not in a position to 
influence the decisions of the powers principally concerned in matters of 
disarmament although it was much interested in this question. 
The Soviet Union and the United States were wedded to opposite 
ideologies. They held differing views on the issues involved in disarmament. 
Thus, the disarmament negotiations were conditioned by the 
atmosphere of the cold war and were, in fact, regarded by the powers 
concerned as a weapon to be used in the cold war .'*'* Instead of trying to 
reach agreement, the two power blocs made use of negotiations to indulge in 
propaganda against each other. Such an attitude was hardly conducive to the 
conclusion of an agreement on disarmament. In the pursuit of its policy of 
non-alignment, India endeavoured to eschew the approach and pressed for a 
consideration of the various matters characteristic of the cold war connected 
with disarmament on their merits. India declared that success of the 
disarmament talks depended on their being held in a "climate of peace". 
Addressing the World Federalist Conference in New Delhi on 4 
Sept. 1963 the first prime minister of India J.L. Nehru said: 
"It was not difficult to out vote the big nafions on the issue of 
disarmament in the world body through the combined efforts of smaller or 
not so powerful nations. The difficulty lay in ensuring that the big nations 
respected the majority decisions on this issue". ^ ^ Speaking on this aspect of 
the disarmament problem. He further stated: "This question can not be 
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solved by majority voting. It has to be solved ultimately by the United States 
and by the Soviet Union, as well as by other powers like the United 
Kingdom that possess these weapons and some others who may possess 
them." ^^ 
India's suggestion that there was need to find the basis for 
agreement between the big powers was very realistic because it was not 
possible to dictate terms to the countries which were directly involved. 
Moreover, only the states which were directly involved could deliver the 
goods. "This does not mean that India did not visualize any role for small 
powers in the disarmament negotiations"'*', stated Krishna Menon while 
speaking before the General Assembly. The small powers could play a vital 
role in reconciling differences between the great powers by refraining from 
taking sides in the matters under dispute. 
Prime Minister Nehru considered disarmament the most important 
question facing mankind. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, nations 
possessed the power to destroy mankind and the whole of creation. 
Disarmament therefore, occupies and continues to occupy an important 
place in India's foreign policy. 
India laid utmost stress on nuclear disarmament and the prohibition 
of the use of atomic weapons. The All India Congress Committee (AICC) 
resolution, adopted as early as September, 1945'** at the instance of Nehru, 
deplored the appearance of the atom bomb. Speaking in the Constituent 
Assembly on 2"** January 1947, Prime Minister Nehru observed that the 
conflict in the contemporary world was between the atom bomb and the 
spirit of humanity. 
It was on India's initiative that a small sub committee of the 
Disarmament Commission, consisting of the major powers was established 
in 1953. When the sub-committee became paralysed and deadlocked, India 
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suggested the expansion and reconstitution of the disarmament negotiations 
machinery in order to make it more representative of world opinion. 
Another significant aspect of India's approach to the problem of 
disarmament was its insistence that agreements should be based on the 
principle of universal applicability. There should be no discrimination. India 
came out with a practical suggestion: "Elimination of nuclear and 
conventional armaments must be so phased that at no stage will any country 
or group of countries obtain significant military advantage". ^^ 
India laid stress on the point that the problem of disarmament and 
international confidence were closely linked. The cause of friction and 
suspicion should, therefore, be removed. India attached the highest 
importance to collateral measures that prompted India to support the Soviet 
proposal, made in 1962 for a "no aggression" pact between the Soviet Union 
and the United States. 
INDIA AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The first proposal dealing directly with the spread of nuclear 
weapons were advanced by the Soviet Union and the United States in the 
subcommittee of Disarmament Commission in 1956-57. It was however, 
during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly in 1958 °^ that the 
Assembly's concern at the possible spread of nuclear weapons through 
dissemination and acquisition took a concrete shape. Ireland submitted a 
draft resolution on the subject, which paved the way for future UN 
decisions. Recognising the dangers of dissemination of nuclear weapons, the 
resolution suggested that the Ten-Nations Disarmament Committee should 
consider ways and means of averting the danger of nuclear catastrophe. 
India voted in favour of the resolution. 
The problem of proliferation was not considered at the Geneva 
Conference of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Commission as requested by the 
Assembly resolution 1380 (XIV). It again came up before the General 
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Assembly during fifteenth and sixteenth sessions on the initiative of Ireland. 
Here it is significant to note that while Soviet Union supported the draft, the 
United States abstained fi*om voting. The next development in the effort to 
halt the spread of nuclear weapons took place in 1961. The General 
Assembly, by its resolution 1664 (XIV), asked the Secretary General to 
make an inquiry into the conditions under which the countries not 
possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to give specific undertakings 
to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring them and to refuse to 
receive in the fijture nuclear weapons in their territory on behalf of any other 
country.^' The draft of this resolution was submitted by Sweden in 
November 1961. It was again the failure of efforts that both USSR and USA 
opposed the draft. India, on the other hand, supported the resolution. 
The government of India in its reply to the inquiry stressed its 
policy towards nuclear non-proliferation; India said that the elimination of 
nuclear weapons was imperative and urgent as an initial step towards 
disarmament. She pointed out that the great responsibility rests on those who 
already possessed and manufactured those weapons. 
During the seventeenth session of the General Assembly in 1962, 
there was considerable support for the idea that prevention of the spread of 
nuclear weapons should be given priority after an agreement had been 
worked out on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.^^ 
The world conununity had a breakthrough on 8 August 1963, when 
the US, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom concluded the Moscow 
Test Ban Treaty which was later subscribed to by an overwhelming majority 
of the states. Each of the parties to the treaty undertook to prohibit, to 
prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 
India immediately subscribed to the treaty with the belief that it was 
the first step towards a comprehensive tesi ban treaty. The Moscow Treaty 
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was signed by a bulk of nations with a certain amount of enthusiasm and 
optimism. It was hoped that the treaty would pave the way for further 
agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ultimately to 
the much cherished aim of disarmament.^ ^ The Indian representative in the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee described the treaty, on 29^ 
August 1963, as a significant first step towards purposeful measure for 
world peace and disarmament, and added, that, its importance does not lie so 
much in what the treaty actually says, as in what it means and the hopes it 
aroused. Nehru characterised the test ban agreement as an important 
landmark in the history of international cooperation and understanding and 
hoped that it would lead to wider agreements in other collateral tension-
reducing measures and to speedy conclusion of a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament.^ '* Probably what India did not realise was that the 
treaty was the consequence of an agreement between the concluding parties 
to ensure permanently their dominant positions and hoodwink the 
international community. That was why both China and France opposed it. 
Refusing to subscribe it, China announced the treaty as a "big fraud". 
In between the conclusion of the PTBT in August 1963 and the 
Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, the efforts of the super-powers were 
concentrated not on evolving a comprehensive test ban treaty and nuclear 
disarmament but on setting up of an international system by which they 
retain their monopoly in nuclear technology to ensure their dominant 
position which was being eroded by developments in international affairs. 
In such a global environment, India sought elimination of nuclear 
weapons. She pleaded for a wider approach to eliminate nuclear weapons 
instead of a limited approach, which had been responsible for increase in the 
number of nuclear powers since 1945. Accordingly, India took the initiative 
to inscribe for the first time on the agenda of the General Assembly an item 
under the title of "Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons" on 10 October 
1964.^ ^ 
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Earlier to it, the UN resolutions spoke of "prevention of the wider 
dissemination of nuclear weapons". India differentiated between 
dissemination and proliferation and said the former was the transfer and 
receipt of weapons and technology whereas the latter related to 
manufacturing of nuclear weapons. India wanted the international 
community to voice its concern at the proliferation in all its manifestations 
rather than only at one aspect of it. 
The enunciation of the Indian approach to non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is an improvement on the reply of the Government of India 
to the Inquiry of the Secretary General under the General Assembly's 
resolution 1664 (X.VI). In the Disarmament Commission, India raised the 
question of security and her representative stressed that it was unrealistic to 
ask countries to foreswear forever a programme of nuclear weapons 
production, when the existing nuclear powers continued to hold on to their 
awesome arsenals. 
Non-proliferation and Nuclear Policy of India 
India's approach to the non-proliferation and her nuclear policy 
were lucidly stated by the Indian representative in the first Committee of the 
General Assembly on 14 May 1968. Referring to the deep and abiding 
interest of the government of India in disarmament, the Indian representative 
recalled that India has been consistently of the view that all nuclear 
weapons, being weapons of mass destruction, must be completely eliminated 
and it was urged that the test ban treaty of August, 1963 which India had 
initiated, and to which she had subscribed, be extended to underground tests 
as well. She pleaded for a wider approach to eliminate nuclear weapons 
instead of a limited approach which, it was felt, had been responsible for 
increase in the number of nuclear powers from one in 1945 to tive in 1964.^ ^ 
The Indian representative also recalled the policy of the government 
of India regarding the utilization of nuclear energy. It was argued that 
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India's policy intended to utilize nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. This policy was based on the firm belief in disarmament, which 
made it necessary to refrain from doing anything that may escalate nuclear 
arms race. 
The classic problem of cheating under a disarmament agreement, 
which has been recognized and discussed by both the Soviet Union and the 
United States is the spectre of the hidden stockpiles of nuclear weapons.^ ^ A 
clandestine stockpile could result either from production antedating the 
disarmament agreement through a combination of under-declaration and 
imperfect inspection or from clandestine production carried on while the 
agreement was in force. Concealed nuclear weapons are not in themselves 
substantial threats without effective delivery systems, but concealment of 
some quantity of delivery vehicles also, now appears, feasible even under 
conditions of extensive inspection. 
The treacherous attack that shatters the peace of a supposedly 
disarmed world and the sudden ultimatum backed by a dramatic revelations 
of a nuclear weapons cache are the two terrors to which disarmament 
discussions return again and again. 
Nehru publicly opposed the development of nuclear weapons. His 
opposition to nuclear weapons accorded with his deep-rooted opposition to 
the use of force to resolve international disputes. Nehru's aversion to 
nuclear weapons is also drawn from his fundamental fear of the 
militarization of Indian society. Additionally, his opposition was an 
outgrowth of his firm beliefs about the role of the use of military force in 
world affairs. He believed that military spending was, at best, a necessary 
evil.^ * 
A turning point in the Indian foreign policy establishment attitude 
towards defence spending came in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border 
war of October 1962. After invading India along the Himalayan border the 
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Chinese Peoples Liberation Army routed the ill-equipped and ill prepared 
Indian army and came to occupy some 14,000 square miles of Indian 
territory.^' In December 1964 at a press conference in London, prime 
minister Lai Bahadur Shastri revealed India's efforts to obtain a nuclear 
guarantee from the nuclear weapon states.^ ^ 
India allowed Britain to insert safeguard arrangements to prevent 
the diversion of fissile by-products to weapons use in the agreement it 
signed to import enriched uranium from the United Kingdom for APSARA, 
India's firs experimental research reactor. For CIRUS, the second research 
reactor, India did not accept any controls, as Canada at that time did not 
have a strong bargaining position.^' The 'peacefiil uses only' clause became 
increasingly controversial in Indo-Canadian relations following India's 
performance in the NPT debate after 1965." 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America was signed on 14 February 1967. It is the only 
instrument concluded so far establishing a nuclear weapon free zone 
(NWFZ) in a densely populated area. 
Despite the fact that Tlatelolco Treaty establishes Latin America as 
a NWFZ and there is Organizing Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to exercise supervisory control. Yet 
it suffers from loopholes from the sides of Argentina, Brazil, Soviet Union 
& USA. India welcomed the treaty as an event of historic significance in the 
efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
INDIAS POLICY TOWARDS DISARMAMENTN AND NON-
PROLIFERATION SINCE 1985 
India's policy carved out during Jawaharlal Nehru era, followed by 
Indira Gandhi, continued during Rajiv Gandhi's era in India's functioning in 
world politics. Among other issues nuclear disarmament was indeed an 
alarming one. So Rajiv Gandhi's objective to mobilize public opinion 
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against nuclear weapons was primary in India's overall nuclear policy. India 
had consistently urged to ban the vertical proliferation and substantial 
reduction in stockpiling chemical weapons. Rajiv Gandhi carried this 
campaign to various international as well as regional fora.^ '* 
On May 22nd, 1984^ '* prime minister Indira Gandhi had appealed to 
the nuclear powers - for disarmament and an end to arms race in the interest 
of peace. The late prime minister of India Rajiv Gandhi as her successor 
followed up this appeal while pressing over a summit conference of six 
countries on disarmament as the chairperson of non-aligned nations. This 
conference was called on the basis of the appeal of 22 May 1984; it 
accepted the programme to persuade the nuclear powers to stop further 
arms-race. This summit was held on 28"* of January, 1985.^ ^ Rajiv Gandhi 
presided over the summit of Six Nations comprising Sweden, Mexico, 
Greece, Tanzania, India and Argentina. The main objective of the summit 
was to prevent further production and proliferation of chemical, biological 
and all nuclear weapons. The Delhi Declaration was signed at the end of the 
summit where it was unanimously accepted that all nuclear tests using outer 
space must be scrapped and the outer space should be used for the benefit of 
mankind. The summit demanded elimination of nuclear weapons of the two 
super-powers to ensure peace and security in the world. Above all, they 
suggested for verification under the auspices of the United Nations to further 
the process of disarmament unless there is a complete halt of production of 
nuclear weapons. Without reduction in conventional weapons there cannot 
be a nuclear free world. The participating nations in the summit stressed on 
the halt of all types of testing, production and deployment of nuclear 
weapons.^ ^ 
The comprising states of Delhi Declaration believed that only 
concrete steps would facilitate to avert the dangers of a nuclear war. Two 
specific steps required special attention at that time; the prevention of an 
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arms race in outer space and a comprehensive test ban treaty. In their view, 
outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not a s 
battle ground for the future. They further urged the nuclear weapon states to 
immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons and a treaty on 
nuclear weapon test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step towards 
ending the continuous modernisation of nuclear arsenals.^^ However, the 
Summit Declaration was not supported by other third world countries. The 
critics also argued that India, in its effort for disarmament, was left alone 
without much support of the non-aligned countries. 
The international situation was tense in the second half of the 
eighties. So the AICC (1) urged the nuclear powers "to find a common 
ground for reversing the disastrous lurch towards mutual destruction. The 
tremendous potential of scientific and technological development could be 
harnessed.^* The Soviet Union also stressed on complete disarmament and 
put the task before nuclear powers. The common approach of both India and 
the USSR on major international issues testified, "after Rajiv came to power 
new orientation had been given to India's policies. There was no doubt that 
India became the centre-piece of the Soviet Union's policy on Asia and also 
in its global strategy and there was no question of leaving India in the 
lurch".^ ^ 
India's nuclear policy was aimed at peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
At the same time the Indian government alleged Pakistan's nuclear activities 
and the US role in supporting Pakistan's policy by supplying sophisticated 
arms. On December 18, 1985^ *^, both the heads of India and Pakistan agreed 
not to attack each other's nuclear stations. The declaration was definiiely a 
welcome step. 
It is not wrong to say that India's nuclear programme was designed 
to use available nuclear energy for peaceftil purposes. The environmental 
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concern was another factor, which prompted Indian government to go for 
peaceful nuclear energy programme. 
India is committed to non-proliferation and disarmament, perhaps 
one of the highest watermarks in Indo-Soviet relations was the official visit 
of Mikhail Gorbachev to India in November 19867' In their meetings, the 
heads of the two governments issued 'Delhi Declaration' on principle for a 
nuclear weapons free zone and non violent world. 
The Indian government was anxious to implement the Delhi 
Declaration, as it would help in ushering in a nuclear weapon free and non-
violent world. Rajiv Gandhi's plan which coincided with Gorbachev's 
statement of January 15, 1986 in many respects is based on four provisions: 
One, there should be a binding commitment by all nuclear weapon and non-
nuclear weapons in stages; second, all nuclear weapon states and non-
nuclear weapon states must participate in the process of nuclear 
disarmament; third, to demonstrate good faith and build the required 
confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the 
common goal; fourth, changes are required in doctrines, policies and 
institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should 
be undertaken to establish a comprehensive global security system under the 
aegis of the United Nations.'^ The Soviet Union highly valued India's 
position and its approach on the issue of the complete halt of all types of 
nuclear tests every where. 
The security environment around the country had considerably 
degenerated. The government of India in all circumstances favoured 
disarmament without ambiguity, a nuclear firee world and pursued a peacefiil 
non-aligned policy. 
No doubt, India should increase activity in taking initiatives and 
advancing proposal intended to help normalise the situation on the globe, to 
achieve disarmament and to reduce the nuclear danger, when the Soviet 
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people supported India's struggle for a world with out nuclear arms7^ There 
had been all round cooperation between the two countries. But the United 
States, in its strategy to restore balance of power in South East Asia and to 
counter India's link towards Russia, started strengthening India's two 
Border States, China and Pakistan. Despite the Sincere desire of India and 
other like-minded concerned nations the super-powers went on increasing 
their defence buildups. 
The Geneva Conference succeeded in mobilising public opinion 
against the production and proliferation of nuclear warheads. India proposed 
an action plan in this regard, which envisioned that nuclear disarmament can 
not be attained till the nuclear weapons are committed to observe the 
doctrines of deterrence. India's 'Action Plan' was based on the premise that 
the process of disarmament cannot be confined to USA and USSR but there 
should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear 
weapons.^ "* India's approach was to eliminate the nuclear weapons by 2010 
A.D. and to establish a non-violent, nuclear weapon free world, so that 
mankind would survive. 
INDIA AND THE NPT 
In between the conclusion of Partial Test Ban Treaty in August 
1963 and Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the efforts of the super powers 
were concentrated not on evolving a comprehensive test ban treaty and 
nuclear disarmament but on the setting up of an international system by 
which they retain their monopoly in nuclear technology to ensure their 
dominant position which was being eroded by developments in international 
affairs. 
The NPT was hailed as "man's latest effort to achieve political 
control on a global scale over the distributive potential of his science and 
technology.... also a step towards the stabilization of the international 
political environment". But the NPT was more discriminatory and riddled 
238 
with many loopholes, consequently the champion of slogan of disarmament 
refused to sign the NPT. India had made its stand very clear at the draft 
stage itself. The then Indian foreign minister said on 27 March 1967 that 
"when the draft of NPT is given to us we will carefully consider it and that 
the primary consideration - is our national security".^^ India further made it 
clear that it was in a position to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
and thus India was opposed to any thing in the treaty which would impede 
its plan to use nuclear energy for peaceftil purposes.'^ The stand was 
reiterated by Indian delegate, V.C. Trivedi in the ENDC on 23 May, 1967 
when he said that.'huclear weapon's apartheid could be tolerated but not an 
no 
atomic apartheid for economic and peaceful development". 
While commenting on the draft NPT, India's deputy minister of 
foreign affairs told Lok Sabha on 14 March 1968 that the present draft 
treaty does not promote disarmament!'^  Explaining India's attitude towards 
the NPT as not being rigid, Mrs. Gandhi said that, "if the Treaty were to be 
changed and we feel that it was in our interests, we shall sign it and we have 
made it clear in no uncertain terms that the present draft treaty does not give 
us any satisfaction". °^ It is in this background that India raised objections to 
the discriminatory provisions of the NPT and refused to sign it. 
India regarded the pattern of obligations between NWS and NNWS 
in the Treaty as imbalanced. It questioned the absence of any method to 
assess whether the NWS and their NNWS allies were adhering to their 
obligations under first two articles of the Treaty.** The NPT was in 
consistent with the General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) and was replete 
with all ingredients of discrimination. It avoided equal and mutual 
obligations of NWS and NNWS. Despite the well-known fact that NWS 
were in possession of an over kill capacity, the Treaty failed to prohibit 
proliferation of nuclear weapons within NWS. The controls applied to the 
NNWS could be applied to the NWS with a view to facilitate a balance of 
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obligations and responsibilities between the former and the latter "but the 
Treaty did not concern itself with the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
or their augmentation or their further sophistication". ^^  
Because of discriminatory provisions, India has not so far acceded 
to the NPT, which has been signed by 172 countries*^ hitherto. Instead of 
adopting incremental measures like NPT, India has called for general and 
complete disarmament. 
At the same time India has also advocated the right of developing 
countries to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. India has 
been steadfast in its commitment in harnessing nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes. As far back as in mid 1950s, the then prime minister of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, had stated that it would never use nuclear energy for 
military purposes. And India has been genuinely committed to this.^ '* 
Initially, the NPT played a significant role in creating an 
international consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
especially due to the cooperation of the two super powers.*^ But gradually 
its operational aspects became increasingly difficult and complex. Even its 
ardent supporters became disenchanted and rather disillusioned with its 
success. They began to perceive the nuclear non-proliferation process as 
"fraudulent" and interpreted it as a calculated attempt of the super powers to 
legitimise their nuclear monopoly. 
India, in fact, is not against the NPT but against its discriminatory 
character. Indian foreign policy elites are in agreement with the conception 
that "the NPT would cage the puppy of horizontal proliferation while 
leaving the tiger of vertical proliferation free to maraud the world7^ India, 
therefore, urges the nuclear powers that they ought to effect vertical non-
proliferation which in turn might induce others not to engage in nuclear 
proliferation. But, paradoxically, seeds of nuclear proliferation are inherent 
in the clauses of NPT itself 
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Unfortunately, the super powers are not willing to forsake the tempo 
of increasing armaments going on in the weapon industries. The failure of 
the super-power disarmament talks in Geneva confirm India's worst fears 
that intransigence and lack of real political will on the part of both parties 
would create an international climate of mutual suspicion and distrust and 
intensify the scramble for armaments throughout the world. 
India is sensitive to the discriminatory features of the NPT and the 
US Non-Proliferation Act, 1978. Therefore, it has refused to ratify the NPT, 
which prompted the US to stop nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapur Nuclear 
Reactor. 
India's frustration became all the more manifest when the US -
Non-Proliferation Act, 1978 exempts nuclear weapon states from the full 
scope safeguard requirement as a precondition for making American nuclear 
technology available to them. The Indian government was annoyed with the 
US decision to regard China as a nuclear weapon state under the 1978 Act. 
This signifies that Beijing is entitled to procure nuclear technology directly 
from the US or through third party transfer of American nuclear 
technology.^* 
The US 1978 Act perhaps came into existence as a reaction to 
India's Pokhran explosion of May 1974. Though the US government 
described the Indian PNE as equivalent to a nuclear weapon from the point 
of view of proliferation, the Act did not confer the status of a weapon state 
on India. Thus, India is prevented to exempt itself from full scope 
safeguards. Due to the dichotomous nature of US nuclear policy, India seeks 
to keep its nuclear option open. It pursues a policy of developing nuclear 
energy for constructive purposes with a view to gradually reduce its reliance 
on external energy sources. 
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Discriminatory Safeguards in NPT 
India has been a staunch critic of the safeguards requirements under 
Article 111 of the NPT. The Indian representative to the ENDC told that 
India has satisfactory arrangement for safeguards with the countries that 
helped in its nuclear programme. India was of the view that atomic reactors 
engaged in peaceful pursuits and atomic power stations of the developing 
countries, did not in themselves; pose any threat to the security of the 
international society. 
India had consistently expressed the view that the guiding principle 
that should be followed in regard to safeguards, "is that they should be 
universally applicable and be based on objective and non-discriminatory 
criteria".^^ 
The Indian representative to the UN further observed that the NPT 
placed all safeguards and controls on the NNWS and none whatsoever on 
the NWS. India further objected to the system of safeguards as 
unsatisfactory and which brought discrimination among the NNWS. 
India, however, had no objections to the presence of IAEA in 
relation to safeguards. It did not agree that the IAEA was fully competent to 
negotiate and conclude agreements with the states parties, to the NPT. It laid 
emphasis on the fact that application of safeguards had to be in accordance 
with the provisions of the statute of the IAEA.'" 
India found the IAEA safeguards system as more comprehensive 
and non-discriminatory as compared to the NPT safeguards. It therefore 
called for the simplification and rationalisation of IAEA safeguards systems. 
Security Implications 
The NPT has referred to the security implications for the NNWS. In 
India's view, the problem of the security of the NNWS from the use or the 
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threat of use of nuclear weapons arose from the possession, the continued 
stockpiling and the further sophistication of nuclear weapons.^' 
India firmly believed that the real and credible guarantee of security 
of the NNWS from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could be 
provided only through nuclear disarmament especially when the nuclear 
weapons are completely eliminated. The discriminatory provisions of the 
NPT permits NWS to retain their nuclear monopoly where as the NNWS 
were prevented from going nuclear. 
It was made clear that India would welcome any steps by the NWS 
and NNWS to make the United Nations more effective for the purpose of 
providing effective security to the NNWS. India demanded that the whole 
question of security assurance should be dealt with "separately and 
independently" of the NPT.^ ^ 
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Denied 
The NPT denied even the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the 
NNWS and for this reason also India did not sign the NPT. M.C. Chagla, the 
Indian foreign minister, told the Lok Sabha on 31 May 1967 that the most 
important thing in the Treaty which went against the NNWS was in respect 
of nuclear technology M.C. Chagla further declared: "We seriously object to 
it. We strongly resist any attempt at preventing this country from making 
progress towards betterment and improvement of nuclear technology". ^^  
India was of the view that nuclear energy played a decisive role in 
the mobilisation of nation's resources for development purposes. All the 
nations must have the right to develop and utilize atomic energy in every 
form, as also the right to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions. These 
explosions not only made great civil-engineering projects possible but also 
offered an ever-increasing variety of applications capable of speeding up the 
progress of the people. The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was 
all the more important for the developing countries.''' India felt thai the 
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efforts of various developing countries to achieve national reconstruction 
would suffer a big setback if a non-proliferation treaty sought to impose 
limitations on their right to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It 
declared that non-proliferation treaty should, if it was to be effective and 
mutually acceptable, recognise the right of every nation to develop atomic 
energy and conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.'^ 
The nuclear powers argued that the non-nuclear countries should be 
prohibited from developing the technology of carrying out peaceful nuclear 
explosions on the ground that this technology involved was the same as the 
technology used in making nuclear weapons.^ ^ Realising the same situation 
the then representative of the United States, Foster, said; "All that the 
nuclear powers want to do is to deny them (i.e. non-nuclear powers), the 
technology needed for manufacturing nuclear devices for fear that they may 
use them for military purposes".'' The remarks made by Indian ambassador 
Trivedi, on this issue, stated; 
"The Indian delegation does not deny that the technology involved 
in the production of nuclear weapons is the same as the technology which 
produces a peaceful explosive device; although a weapon has many 
characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device. Moreover, as far 
as fission technology is concerned, it is known to a large number of 
countries. But that, in any case is not the issue. As the Indian delegation 
pointed out in the United Nations last year, technology in itself is not evil, 
aeronautics, electronics, even steel fabrication, these are technologies, which 
can be used for weapons as well as for economic development. That does 
not mean, therefore, that only the poor and developing nations should be 
denied all technology for fear that they may use it for military purposes".'^ 
India was aware of the risks involving in giving every nation 
unfettered freedom to develop the technology of peaceful nuclear 
explosions. It therefore, called for the devising of a proper system that 
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would ensure that various nuclear devices were used for peaceful purposes 
only. Ambassador Trivedi further stated: 
"India recognizes that such explosions must be adequately 
safeguarded. The safeguards must apply equally to all nations, and the 
Indian delegation is prepared to work with others in involving a system of 
regulation, which could be accepted by all states. The solution of the 
problem must not be sought in renunciation of the sovereign right of 
unrestricted development of new sources of energy by some countries only, 
and mainly by the developing countries". '^ 
India did not want any stockpiling of nuclear devices. It favoured 
international controls over all the stages of the manufacture of peaceful 
nuclear devices. It called upon all states (nuclear as well as non-nuclear) to 
accept international safeguards against possible misuse of peaceful nuclear 
explosions for military purposes. It offered to cooperate with other nations 
in evolving an international system of regulations in this regard. 
NPT - Review Conferences and India 
The fiist NPT Review Conference was held at Geneva from 5-30 May 
1975. It was attended by 58 states, seven signatory states and seven observer 
states. Prior to the commencement of the Review Conference under the 
auspices of the UN Secretariat, had prepared four papers covering the basic 
aspects of the operation of Articles I, II, IV,V and VI. The IAEA also prepared 
papers on the functioning of Articles III, IV, and V. The Organisation on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) also submitted a 
study about Article VII of the NPT with regard to the functioning of nuclear 
weapon free zones. These documents were issued as documents of the 
Conference. 
The non-nuclear weapon states represented the Review Conference 
criticised the non-implementation of Article IV regarding nuclear disarmament, 
the policy of denial of peaceful nuclear technology through more stringent 
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safeguards measures which were contrary to the spirit of Article IV; the non 
implementation of Article V regarding PNEs and about the inadequacy of the 
security guarantee as envisaged under resolution 255 (1968) of the Security 
Council. 
India, being a non-signatory to the NPT, was not represented at the 
first NPT Review Conference (1975). Since the recommendations of Review 
Conference did in no way answer India's basic objection to the provisions of 
the NPT, there was no change in India's attitude towards the NPT. The second 
NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva from 11* August to 7''' 
September 1980. A total of 75 countries of which 43 belonged to the third 
world, 24 from the west and 8 from east Europe participated. The Nigerian 
delegate drew the attention towards the fact that 10 near nuclear weapon states 
were not parties to the Treaty, how for it is realistic to believe that the treaty 
will succeed. 
Even the third NPT Review Conference held in Geneva from 21 
September to 27 October 1985 has failed lo conclude the demands of non-
aligned non-nuclear weapon states. This has created a stalemate between the 
NWS and NNWS. The NPT ^ s valid up to 1995. 
India being a non-signatory to the NPT was not represented in the 
three NPT Review Conferences. But India's standpoint has been vindicated by 
the group of 77 represented in these Review Conferences. India has abjured the 
production of war bombs preferring peace bombs instead because the country's 
interest is economic reconstruction and not political power."'*^  Unless the 
discriminatory provisions of the NPT are removed; India and some other non-
nuclear weapons states are not expected to be parties to the NPT. 
Indefinite Extension of the NPT 
If NATO consolidation and expansion was one major assault on the 
post cold war disarmament momentum, the other big blow was dealt by the 
permanent and indefinite extension of the NPT in April 1995.'°' This 
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symbolized as nothing else but the determination of the existing NWSs to 
maintain their exclusive club and to completely distort the original purpose of 
the NPT. The NPT should now no longer be regarded as the one living 
institutionalized commitment of the NWSs to carrying out their own eventual 
disarmament. The NPT through its permanent and indefinite extension has 
been finally and fiiUy transformed into little more than the central 
institutionalized mechanism for ensuring non-proliferation, i.e. the enduring 
exclusivity of the nuclear club. 
The fact that France and China finally joined the NPT regime in the 
post cold war period did not reflect a newfound commitment on their part to 
obey Art VI that called on the nuclear weapons states, which are signatories to 
the treaty to pursue negotiation's 'in good faith' for complete disarmament. 
Nor did it mean a newfound enthusiasm on their part for promotion of global 
disarmament. Both France and China had earlier repeatedly committed 
themselves to joining disarmament negotiation if the US and Russia reduced 
their arsenals by fifty percent. Once this became feasible and certain in the post 
cold war era, both quite shamelessly reverted fi-om their promises in this 
regard. France and China (along with UK) now declared that they would only 
enter such negotiations when the US and Russia had reduced their arsenals by 
95 percent. It is in keeping with this cynical mentality that China and France 
joined the NPT. That is to say, they joined the NPT when they correctly 
perceived it to have been reduced to little more than a collective mechanism for 
ensuring non-proliferation outside the ranks of the NWSs while also 
legitimising their 'own formal' entry and status into the nuclear club. 
How did this betrayal of earlier hopes in the NPT entertained by the 
NNWSs come about? It was due to a combination of factors. At the heart of the 
NPT lay a bargain, renunciation of the nuclear option by NNWS, in return for a 
commitment by NWSs, which were members of the treaty to move towards 
complete global disarmament. The NPT still contains the only legal 
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commitment made by the NWS to carry out total disarmament hence its 
enduring attraction for many NNWSs, and anti-nuclear activities and groups 
that see in this the existence of some minimal point of international diplomatic 
leverage vis-a-vis the NWSs. Even the ICJ ruling took strength from Article VI 
and the legal conunitment it embodied. 
So disillusioned however, had the NNWSs become with the perfidious 
behaviour of the NWSs in not obeying tiiis Article that by the time the treaty's 
life was ending (25 years after 1970 when it came into force) and the issue of 
its possible extension arose, the precise fate of the NPT was quite uncertain. It 
was by no means self evident that the NPT would survive. Certainly, its 
permanent and mdefinite extension was widely considered to be among the less 
likely outcomes.'^ ^ The most widespread view was that the NPT would be 
extended but not indefinitely and that most bargaining would be around the 
length of time period for which it should be extended. The NWSs would want 
as long a time period as possible while NNWSs would have to arrive at 
agreement about what would be a reasonable period. It was obvious to all that 
as long as the extension was limited, the NNWSs would possess stronger 
leverage on the NWSs since the NPT's future life could again be made more 
easily conditional on future behaviour by the NWSs. 
When NPT went into force in 1970, it contained provisions for a 
review conference every five years'"^ and after twenty-five years, 
determinations as to whether it would be extended further. Although not a 
signatory, India rejected such an extension, hoping that the treaty might be 
modified in several ways. In May 1995, however, the treaty was extended 
indefinitely with surprising ease, and Indians who followed these issues were 
alarmed by the prospect of growing international support for an arms control 
treaty that targeted particular capacities. In India's case, there was no 
opposition to a test ban per se, but the nuclear establishment strongly opposed 
any treaty that threatened the nuclear option. Its members knew that the 1974 
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test was not a success, and fresh tests were required to improve the old design 
and to experiment with new ones.'°^ 
Since India had been the first ever state to propose a comprehensive 
test ban, the shifting Indian position was not taken very seriously by the 
Clinton administration. Its highest priority was non-proliferation and people 
saw India as a traditional supporter of a test ban.*^ ^ 
In 1995 the NPT came up for its twenty-five year review. The United 
States, one of the principal proponents of the NPT regime, sought an 
'unconditional and indefinite extension' of the Treaty. India, which had chosen 
to stay outside the NPT regime, decided not to participate in the proceedings in 
New York during April-May 1995 and did not even seek observer status.'*'^  
The Indian hope was that the U.S. would fail to cobble together a condition that 
would tmconditionally and indefinitely extend the treaty. Such expectations and 
fears were believed as unassailable but relentless US diplomacy ensured the 
achievement of the US goal. After the Treaty was extended, only India, 
Pakistan, and Israel remained outside its scope. The US success came as a 
dramatic shock to the Indian security policy establishment, which now realized 
that India would come under quite pressure to sign the NPT or at least to agree 
to fiill-scale safeguards on its nuclear power plants, including those of the 
indigenous origin. 
The extension of the NPT and the passage of the Brown Amendment, 
which led to a renewal of up to $368 million in US military assistance to 
Pakistan, inevitably provoked Indian security concerns."^ 
The Brown Amendment allowed the provision of economic and some 
military assistance to Pakistan without any attached conditions. Despite 
vigorous opposition from senators committed to non-proliferation, the amended 
bill passed."" 
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The Import of the Strengthened Review Process 
All through the years of its existence, threats to the NPT have always 
been deemed to be arising from without from nations refiising to accept the 
treaty and its safeguards regime. Efforts have therefore, consistently been made 
to bring them into the NPT fold in order to ensure the universality of the treaty, 
these attempts were fiirther intensified so that by 1995, 175 nations had joined 
the NPT. This was brought about by a judicious use of the "carrot and stick" 
policy by the NWS, and especially by the United States. They succeeded in 
ensuring the physical presence of enough countries that were willing to support 
the indefinite extension of the treaty.*" 
In return for their cooperation, the NNWSs were offered a few 
concessions, those that the NWS did not then attach much importance to. The 
most significant of these related to agreeing to the sfrengthening of the treaty 
review process by holding at least three Prepcoms in the last three years (viz 
April, 7-18, 1997 at New York, April 22 - May 8, 1998 in Geneva and the last 
in Washington on May 10, 1999) "^ in the run up to every five yearly Revcom. 
The "intent" or at least, how it was perceived by the NNWS, was to transform 
the review into a more credible and meaningful process of accountability for 
the treaty's implementation by all state parties, and for future review to 
encompass the full scope of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. The 
NWS did not then accord much significance to the possible implications of 
such a move. They had not bargained for the Prepcoms turning into mini 
review conferences in which their policies would be subject to scrutiny and 
criticism by NNWS. This has nevertheless; happened, resulting in the 
Prepcoms witnessing acrimonious debates exposing sharp division within the 
NPT parties. So much so that the NWS have now begin to put forth a narrow 
interpretation of the new review process by arguing that the Prepcom is not 
authorised to report on any thing except making procedural preparations and 
formulating draft recommendations for the forthcoming Revcom. The NNWS 
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are of course opposed to this interpretation demanding a much wider role for 
the Prepcoms. 
The "strengthening review process" was structured around a general 
debate, and an examination of three "clusters" of the NPT, namely nuclear 
disarmament (including non-proliferation, nuclear weapon free zones and 
security assurances); safeguards; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The three 
Prepcoms held since 1995 have essentially adhered to this format. However, 
the objective behind the new review process is still not fully met. Rather the 
three Prepcoms have found themselves unable to arrive at any substantive 
report to be placed before the Revcom. In 2000, in the absence of the specific 
proposals before it, Revcom will have a difficult time living upto fulfilling its 
twin functions of carrying out an assessment of the operation of treaty in the 
five year period under review, as also establishing a set of goals to promote the 
implementation of the treaty over the next five years."^ 
It is not less important to mention here that the third Prepcom began 
on May 10,1999, in the shadow of two major events that were deemed to have 
adversely impacted on the international security environment. These were: 
reaffirmation by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as mentioned 
earlier of its commitment to nuclear sharing and first use; and the continued 
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, despite protests from China, Russia and a host 
of other NNWS. In fact, the meeting began with the participants observing 
token silence as a mark of respect for those killed in the "mistaken" bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.'''* 
The sinister designs of NATO arrangements and practices were now 
realised by most of the signatories of NPT. It would not be a surprise to say 
that N. Korea's withdrawal from NPT on 10 Jan., 2003"^ is an utmost setback 
to the treaty. In 1995 itself, Mexico had questioned NATO's arrangements for 
American weapons to be stationed in Europe. At the 1997 Prepcom, South 
Africa had raised concerns about the "non proliferation implications" of 
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NATO's planned expansion."^ By the 1998 Prepcom, however the NAM had 
put its act together to be able to put forth a collective statement opposing 
nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. 
The three Prepcoms held until now to ensure smooth sailing for the 
2000 Revcom ran into rough weather themselves, exposing fault lines on a 
number of issues. Egypt, a frontline NAM state, put forth a proposal in a 
strongly worded statement that recommended that the Prepcom should adopt an 
interpretation of the treaty that would outlaw current NATO practices and 
possible future European Union Nuclear Weapon Cooperation. 
The NAM members have expressed their dissatisfaction at the present 
pace of progress and sought well-delineated comprehensive steps towards an 
eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. Some other states including traditional 
allies of some of the NWS too have put forth practical proposals. 
INDIA and the CTBT 
In the history of state's efforts at amassing military power, the period 
beginning with 1945 is unique because of the advent of nuclear weapons. 
Whether one likes it or not, possession of nuclear weapons by a state has been 
the most probable sign that it is militarily powerful. It is not an accident that all 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all nuclear haves. 
Utility or desirability of nuclear weapons in war has been widely debated."^ 
But the incontrovertible fact remains that those states which have nuclear 
weapons are bent upon keeping them. Reductions in the number of bombs or 
missiles by way of SALT, START or INF treaties between the USA and the 
erstwhile USSR have nothing to do with nuclear disarmament. Basically they 
have been economy measures of course, they have as well been intended to 
convey right kind of diplomatic noises. 
Likewise, the provisions for guarantee by nuclear powers to nuclear 
havenots under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was thoroughly 
meaningless. It suffices to say that during those heydays of the cold war it was 
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impossible to implement any system of guarantee outside the US. and inside 
the UN, the Security Council itself was paralyzed by the cold war divide. In 
fact, the Security Council resolution 255 of June 19,1968, did not really contain 
any additional commitment on the part of the permanent members. 
History so far has witnessed two simultaneous and parallel 
developmenis; development of new weapons as a concomitant to the ceaseless 
struggle between states for survival and aggrandizement and efforts at arms 
control and/or disarmament for a variety of reasons (as steps to part with 
dispensable weapons, economy measures or as peace postures). Though these 
two parallel developments ostensibly seem to be mutually contradictory, in 
reality they are not. The declared formal goals of any arms control 
disarmament conference concerned states engage in one-upmanship. That is, a 
state strives, by a way of arms control measures, to improve its power position 
vis-a-vis other states. Such dichotomy between official goals of an international 
conference intended for arms control and the actual goal of participating states 
has its parallels elsewhere as well. 
It is in the light of the aforesaid that we can view the PTBT and the 
NPT, which, not accidentally, are the worthy predecessors of the CTBT. 
During the 1950s the super-powers made a large number of nuclear and 
thermo-nuclear tests in the atmosphere and found that the resulting levels of 
radio-activity not only far surpassed their calculations but also caused 
unacceptably high political fallouts."* As a result UK, Japan and India called 
for suspension of testing and Nehru also spoke for "standstill agreement". "^ 
Exactly similar motives also prompted the 1968 NPT. Hammered into 
shape by the super powers as a collaborative venture in 1968'^ °, the NPT has, 
despite its obvious inadequacies, been extended indefinitely and 
unconditionally by way of 1995 Geneva Review Conference. 
Though there are, effectively, 181 states, parties to the NPT India has 
not yet signed the NPT for its starkly discriminatoiy nature as mentioned 
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earlier in this chapter. In this sense, correlation between the PTBT and NPT 
cannot be missed. After all, the real intent behind the NPT was to retain the 
monopoly of the nuclear haves intact by disarming the unarmed. And the same 
dynamics that prompted these two treaties have their imprint on the 1996 
CTBT as well.'^ * 
India has been consistent in its commitment to the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction and to global nuclear disarmament on a universal 
and non-discriminatory basis. At the same time, India's legitimate national 
security requirements cannot be overlooked, especially in view of the 
developments in this region. In this context, as a non-aligned country, India has 
always maintained that it would not be a party to any discriminatory non-
proliferation system. " 
The United Nations seized the initiative to highlight the dangers from 
atmospheric nuclear tests, with a proposal from the Indian prime minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru on April 8, 1954, requesting the nuclear weapon states to 
negotiate: "Some sort of what may be called 'Standstill Agreement' in respect 
at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the 
discontinuance of production and stockpiling must await more substantial 
agreements among those principally concemed".'^ ^ 
The UN General Assembly adopted on December 9, 1982 a Soviet 
draft resolution with a draft treaty on comprehensive test ban and an annexe to 
it by one hundred and fifteen votes to five (Australia, China, France UK, US) 
with twenty five abstentions, as resolution 37/85, appealing to all nuclear 
weapon states to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty and stop all nuclear 
tests unfil the draft treaty referred to verification by a "combination of national 
and international measures" carried through national means as well as within 
the UN framework in accordance with UN Charter. The reports submitted in 
1982 by the adhoc group of Scientific Experts to consider international 
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cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events, gave some hope for 
efficiency and reliability in improved verification techniques.'^ '* 
In 1982, renewed efforts for a comprehensive test ban were vigorously 
pursued. In 1983, the Committee on Disarmament and later in 1984, the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) continued its work on CTBT. The United 
Nations General Assembly adopted 3 separate resolutions (39/52, 39/53, 39/60) 
in 1984. Resolution (39/52) introduced by the non-aligned and neutral 
countries appealed to the members of the CD to initiate immediately 
multilateral negotiations on CTBT. Resolution 39/53 introduced by western 
powers reaffirmed its conviction that a treaty was urgent and requested the CD 
to resume work on CTBT, to establish an international seismic monitoring 
network and also to investigate other measures to monitor and verify 
compliance with such a plan. Resolution 39/60 introduced by the socialist 
countries urged the CD to proceed promptly with the negotiations and work out 
the details of multilateral treaty. 
On August 10, 1993 the CD decided to give its mandate to its Adhoc 
Committee on Nuclear Test Ban to begin multilateral negotiations on CTBT. 
The G-21 of non-aligned states proposed in December 1993 that the CD should 
try to achieve a final test of the treaty before the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference in May 1995. The US, Russia, Australia and other states 
encouraged the idea. 
The US co-sponsored by India introduced a resolution on CTBT in the 
UN General Assembly session in 1993. The resolution for the first time 
received universal support in the UN in 1993.'^ ^ But CD failed to submit the 
text of the CTBT to the NPT Extension Conference. A rolling text of the treaty 
was under preparation. Differences on the scope, verification, institutions and 
other expected items of the treaty were being narrowed. It is significant that the 
US since August 1994 sought a CTBT "to end all nuclear explosions, without 
thresholds and exceptions". '^ ^ G-21 group of states (including India & 
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Pakistan) agreed that the treaty should define in general terms the prohibition 
of nuclear tests in all environments and forever. 
By 7 September 1994, a rolling text (heavily bracketed draft treaty) 
was ready and the Adhoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban attached text to the 
report of the CD. *^ ' The rolling text consisted of two parts: Part I comprised 
draft treaty provisions which commanded a certain degree of concensus: Part II 
contained provisions, which needed more extensive negotiations. The two 
working groups of the Adhoc Committee are working on verification and on 
legal and institutional affairs. 
While most of the states wanted a general prohibition of all nuclear 
explosions in all environments, France and UK insisted on continuing nuclear 
tests in exceptional circumstances, even after the conclusion of the CTBT. 
China wanted PNEs to be exempted from the purview of the CTBT.^ *^ 
India, as already mentioned, has been an ardent advocate of cessation 
of the arms race and of a nuclear weapons free world. Since mid 1950s, she has 
also been one of the states feeling the need for a comprehensive nuclear test 
ban regime. On the occasion of inaugurating India's first research reactor 
'Apsara' at Trombay, on Jan. 20, 1957. Nehru said, "No man can prophesy the 
fiiture. But I should like to say on behalf of my government and I think I can 
say with some assurance on behalf of any fiiture government of India that 
whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this 
atomic energy for evil purposes". There is no condition attached to this 
assurance, because once a condition is attached the value of such an assurance 
does not go very far. 
Following two years of extensive negotiations on 24"* September, 
1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as adopted by the UN 
General Assembly was thrown open for signatures, despite India's strong 
opposition and its efforts to modify the treaty text. Yet, on August 19, 1996, 
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India vetoed the draft text of the CTBT for it "did not serve the purpose of 
promoting the realization of universal disarmament goals". '^ ° 
India is of the view that the draft treaty perpetuated the hold of the 
nuclear weapon states without adequate responsibility in nuclear disarmament. 
As a result, on August 19, 1996, the 60 member CD'^* could not recommend to 
the UN General Assembly any text for adoption. According to Warren 
Christopher, the then US secretary of state, "the one country that is presenting a 
problem is India, a threshold state". '^ ^ 
For the USA, India's insistence on any time frame for nuclear 
disarmament was "impractical" and that for the US policymakers, the CTBT 
and nuclear disarmament were two separate issues. 
Any way, India stuck to her guns and refiised to endorse the CD text. 
And as a novel way to circumvent India's veto, the CD text was hijacked by 
Australia and placed before UN General Assembly as a joint proposal of 
Australia and other states.'^ '* On September 9, 1996 the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Australian proposal, essentially the same draft treaty placed before 
the CD by its Chairman Jaap Ramakar of the Netherlands on June 28, 1996.'^ ^ 
by a vote of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions. India, Bhutan and Libya voted against 
while Lebanon, Syria, Mauritius, Tanzania and Cuba abstained.'^ ^ Pakistan 
voted in favour but made it clear that she would sign the CTBT only if it is 
"universal", meaning if India also becomes a party to it. 
Debate within India over CTBT 
Unsurprisingly, the debate within India over the CTBT was framed by 
the Indian pro-bomb lobby in such a way that opposing the CTBT was taken to 
be a low for Indian autonomy and a blow against American hegemonism. The 
anti CTBT position thus encompassed right wing and conservative militants, a 
traditional left wing anti-American faction, and advocates of non-alignment. 
The latter two groups included many who did not want a bomb but who 
thought that opposing the CTBT was vital to protecting Indian security 
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interests. The defining momentum in the Indian debate came on June 20, 1996, 
when the United Front government authorised Arundhati Ghosh to pubhcly 
state in the Geneva negotiations over the CTBT that as far as India was 
concerned, "security" interests were a consideration and would be 
compromised by signing the treaty'^ *. This was a rare moment of condor, but it 
came too late to affect the treaty's end game. The major nuclear weapons states 
had worked out a number of compromises among themselves, and there was no 
interest in accommodating India. 
During the fourth phase of the Indian nuclear debate, positions against 
the west, especially the United States, hardened, and led to new alliances and 
partnerships in the Indian strategic community. Anti American groups joined 
with antinuclear groups in opposing the CTBT. The latter included those who 
wanted to abolish all nuclear weapons and those who saw an Indian weapon or 
atleast an option as useful in pressuring the west to come up with a serious 
comprehensive disarmament programme. They joined the bomb lobby, which 
increased in number and outspokenness after 1990*^ ^ and the security 
specialists, who saw the need to retain the capability of moving beyond the 
simple first generation weapon that India be assumed to have designed. The 
CTBT debate had succeeded in doing what thirty years of insecurity and 
uncertainty had not, it united Indian opinion against a treaty, that, India had 
originally proposed. Yet this was a negative consensus, there was still no 
support for an Indian nuclear weapon. Most Indians who opposed the CTBT 
were not in favour of either a declaration of nuclear weapons status or nuclear 
testing. 
India's Peace Initiative and CTBT 
Among the earliest initiatives taken by India's first prime minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, was the development of science and inculcation of the 
scientific spirit. It is this initiative that laid the foundations for achievements of 
1974 and 1998. Disarmament, nonetheless, continues to be a major plank of 
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Indian foreign policy now as it was earlier. It was, in essence, and remains still, 
the natural course for a country that achieved independence through a unique 
struggle on the basis of ahimsa and satyagraha. 
The moral tone set by Gandhi and Nehru has largely directed the India 
posture on nuclear disarmament for a good part of India's independent history. 
From the 1950s''*", when Nehru pioneered proposals for world wide nuclear 
disarmament, (Including the ideas of the nuclear test ban treaty and a freeze on 
the production of fissile materials), to the 1982 "programme of action on 
disarmament" and later, the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan including 1985 
Delhi Declaration ushering in a nuclear weapon free and non violent world 
order', and then the 1993 resolution for securing an early global ban on 
production of fissile material, India's official nuclear policy has remained 
guided by the desire to attain a state of universal nuclear disarmament.''*' 
In September 1994, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and USSR 
President Boris Yeltsin issued a joint declaration in Moscow reiterating their 
commitment to all measures aimed at the complete and universal elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
At the Cartegena non-aligned summit in November 1995 and at the 
50* session of the UN General Assembly, India along with like minded 
countries proposed the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to 
the elimination of nuclear weapons within a fixed time fi-ame, and moved a 
resolution to this effect. Following the adoption of this resolution in UNGA, 
India has been working in the 1996 session of the CD, towards the inmiediate 
setting up of an ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament for the initiation of 
these negotiations.'"*^ Landmark event took place in the field of nuclear 
disarmament in the shape of CTBT at the United Nations in New York, when 
the representatives of seventy one states signed the CTBT, adopted just two 
weeks earlier by an overwhelming majority in UNGA. All five nuclear weapon 
states were represented. President Clinton of the USA had the honour to sig
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the CTRT with the same pen when PTBT was signed by the then President of 
USA. The foreign ministers of other four nuclear weapon states and prime 
minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan were among the first to sign the 
Treaty.''*^ In Contrast to the very concise PTBT, which consists of only five 
articles and has no verification regime, the CTBT^ "*^  is voluminous consisting 
of 17 articles with 170 paragraphs, two annexes to the treaty, a protocol and 
two annexes to the protocol. 
The CTBT was a major international arms control arrangement which 
was formulated during the 1974 to May 1998 period and it was finalized in 
1996. This agreement avoided the problem of political discrimination of the 
NPT but raised the issue of technical discrimination.''*^ In her statement to the 
plennary session of CD on June 20, 1996, Ms. Arundhati Ghosh, the Indian 
representative stated: "The CTBT that we see emerging appears to be shaped 
more by the technological preferences of the nuclear weapon states rather than 
the imperatives of nuclear disarmament. This was not the CTBT that India 
envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the CTBT that India can be expected to 
accept". It was also highlighted that India's national security was adversely 
affected by the prospect the same privilege to others.''*' 
A permanent ban on testing of nuclear explosives except in laboratory 
conditions that had the effect of fireezing the NNWS on the technological curve 
on the date the CTBT came into effect. For India, the harassment potential 
came fi-om two directions, (a) if India continued its refusal to accept this treaty, 
then an international conference was expected to formulate measures against 
the 'rogue' nation(s) because India's adherence was required by the CTBT's 
'Entry into Force Clause'; (b) even if India signed on, it was inevitable, in the 
aftermath of the Iraqi experience with the UNSCOM, that International 
inspectors and spies would descend on Indian military and scientific 
establishments to verify Indian compliance with CTBT obligations. Those who 
have made a career of arms control and international inspections are expected 
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to promote their personal and institutional interests, they are not expected to 
close the file and legislate themselves and their constituents out of existence. 
This is elementary bureaucratic politics. One should think of international arms 
control organizations as employed agencies - with a long shelf life like the 
deadly plutonium.*'** 
Grounds of Indian Opposition to the CTBT 
India had three main objections to the treaty besides other minor ones. 
First, the Indians insisted that they would accede to treaty only if the nuclear 
weapon states agreed to time bound plan for universal nuclear disarmament. 
For the most part, this position was little more than a ploy; Indian policy 
makers knew only too well that none of the nuclear weapon states would agree 
to this proposition. Consequently, the inevitable fiailure to include such a time 
bound objective would give India the option to remain outside the treaty. The 
second objection stemmed from the demand of some states that the treaty could 
come into force only after 44 countries that had ongoing nuclear research and 
power facilities ratified the treaty. Again, although the argument against the 
"Entry into Force Clause" was questioned on the grounds of fairness, India's 
interest in challenging the clause was purely pragmatic. As a state with an 
ongoing but largely untested nuclear weapons programme India would come 
under enormous pressure to accede to the CTBT.*'*^  
The final Indian objection was more substantive. *^ ° It dealt with the 
treaty's allowance of computer simulation of nuclear tests and hydro-nuclear 
tests. In Indian view, the failure to close these two technological loopholes 
undermine the larger goal of taking steps towards the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. In the end, India unsuccessfully attempted to block the reporting of 
the treaty from the UNDC to the General Assembly in New York.'^' Its efforts 
to modify the treaty text or to prevent its adoption by the General Assembly 
also proved fruitless. 
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Two factors explain the Indian shift from support to rejection of the 
CTBT. At one level, as has already been discussed, the Indians were acutely 
concerned about the "Entry into Force Clause" and the likely effects of this 
upon the Indian nuclear weapons programme. The other concern not 
surprisingly, had to do with the spate of Chinese nuclear tests just prior to 
China's accession to the CTBT. The Indian strategic community correctly 
inferred that the Chinese were willing to accede to the treaty only because they 
had reached such a level of competence in their weapons developments that 
they felt no need to test further.'^ ^ 
The entry into force of the CTBT appears to be priority issue in 
involving India in the arms control process. But even at the end of nearly three 
years, only 17 countries out of stipulated 44 (whose satisfaction is a 
precondition to the Entry into Force) have ratified the CTBT so far. The key 
weapon states, the USA, Russia and China have not ratified it.'^ ^ In the USA, 
the process of ratification has not even started. The plethora of information that 
has recently emerged into public domain regarding transfer of data on US 
nuclear weapons to China, the Cox Report, reports of millions of computer 
codes' transferred to China during 1994-95'^ '* from the premier US nuclear 
weapons laboratory raise many questions. The data especially the "legacy 
codes" that have been transferred to China are believed to provide complete 
information on design of sophisticated US nuclear weapons and the data will be 
invaluable for computer simulations for new warhead designs. These reports 
raise many issues for the CTBT, the implications of which have yet to be 
adequately assessed. 
The certainty remind of the Indian concerns regarding the CTBT'S 
inability to stop transfer of validated nuclear weapon designs to other countries 
like it happened in the case of design transfer from China to Pakistan. It is 
premature, therefore, to expect India to sign the treaty at this stage.'^ ^ 
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Based on an extensive national concensus, India had refused to sign 
the CTBT in 1996. The basic reasons for that step have not altered and hence 
will necessitate give and take on both sides (the international community and 
India) even though India may now feel more self-assured in meeting its future 
security challenges. It has already declared a moratorium on testing and the 
prime minister had stated at the UN General Assembly in September 1998 that 
it would not come in the way of the treaty entering into force in September 
1999. This however, must be read in the context of the complete statement in 
this regard that: 
" having harmonized its national imperatives and security 
obligations and desirous of continuing to co-operate with the international 
community, is now engaged in discussions with key interlocutors on a range of 
issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to 
successful conclusion, so that the 'Entry into Force' of the CTBT is not delayed 
beyond September 1999. We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article 
XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions". '^ ^ 
It is interesting to note that a non-signatory state like India (having 
nuclear capability since 1974) has followed the NPT clauses of non-transfer of 
nuclear technology while China a declared nuclear weapons state - has passed 
on both nuclear and missile technology to other countries.'^' Though at the end, 
the non proliferation regime did not hold. The "regime" phrase was always 
likely to be misleading, suggesting dictation by some leading countries, 
dictating to others who were reluctant. If nuclear proliferation can be 
contained, "... this will emerge by the self-interested policies of a great many 
countries that are indeed physically capable of producing nuclear weapons".'^ * 
Indeed, force may not work as far as arms control is concerned. This became 
evident once again in the CTBT negotiations. 
India, a party to the Partial (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty, 1963, co-
sponsored the resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly favouring 
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both comprehensive nuclear test ban and fissile material cut-off treaty. It is 
doubtful that she was truly aware of the implication at the time. Subsequently, 
it became a public knowledge that simulation tests with the help of computers 
might improve weapons capability and physical tests for collection of data 
were no longer necessary. The US negotiated with the other NWS and 
orchestrated a move for comprehensive nuclear test ban. During the course of 
negotiations India suggested that the NWS should commit themselves to a 
definite time frame for a total abolition of nuclear weapons. Such an assurance 
was not forthcoming. NPT sought to perpetuate the dominance of a few over 
the rest; the CTBT was an attempt to guarantee the dominance. 
The Indian ambassador to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, 
Arundhati Ghosh had several major concerns. These became the basis of 
India's rejection of the CTBT in Geneva and the subsequent blockage of a 
consensus agreement in Geneva. Her concerns are shared by many practitioners 
and, therefore, should be spelled out, as follows.^ '^ (i) The CTBT's basic 
parameters and orientation are outlined in Article 1. It is tied to the 
maintenance of the nuclear weapon status of the P-5 powers. This Article 
reveals a permanent legal linkup between the provisions and philosophy of the 
NPT and the CTBT. Article 1 of the CTBT is the bridge between the two 
international treaties, which solidifies the nuclear weapon status of the P-5. The 
treaty has a structure of impressibility, i.e. all nuclear tests are banned but it 
also has a structure of permissibility, i.e., non-explosive tests, laser tests, and 
exchange of technical data by the P-5 nuclear powers and among themselves. 
The NPT is politically discriminatory because it created a legal distinction 
between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear ones. The CTBT avoids this 
problem. But still, it creates an opportunity for technological discrimination in 
the sense that the permissible activity in Article 1 of CTBT favours the 
technologically advanced nuclear powers of which the US is the leader. The 
CTBT would freeze the US's technological edge over all other P-5 nuclear 
powers, as well as India, Pakistan and Israel. For India, the issue does not 
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concern the technological gap between India vis-a-vis the US, France, the UK 
and Russia. The concern is about the effect of the technological gap between 
China and India once the CTBT comes into effect, given the uncertainty about 
the nature of PRC's strategic intentions and capabilities in the 2000-2010/2020 
time frame when PRC's military modernization scheduled to be completed. 
The question for India is both scientific and military. 
(ii) The CTBT's international monitoring system is meant to catch tests over 1 
kiloton capability. Zero to one kiloton clandestine testing is supposedly filtered 
by national means, e.g. by satellites. Does India possess such national means or 
would it have to depend on the US suppose the PRC or Pakistan tested in the 0-
1 kt range? What is the guarantee about the timeliness, the quality and the 
scope of US intelligence input to India in a moment of crisis? This is serious 
and practical question for India, who is not a US ally, and there are no formal 
intergovernmental intelligence sharing arrangements. This question is relevant 
because Japan, a US ally, has had doubts about the timeliness, quality and 
scope of US intelligence input to Japan when N. Korea sent its missiles over 
Japan in August 1998. Following this episode, Japan was determined to 
enhance its national intelligence acquisition capability vis-a-vis N. Korea.'^ ^ 
(iii) The CTBT has buih in potential of harassment of a non P-5 power. The 
experience of UNSCOM inspections of Iraq shows how even intrusive and 
prolonged international inspections are inconclusive, how an international 
agency can become a vehicle for spying by a major power (in this case, the 
USA) and how a UN mandated inspection activity can become a cover for both 
spying and harassment, without any prospect of closure. Imagine, Richard 
Butler making daily pronouncements that India is hiding something and he 
terms his evidence (based on US and other national means) that India is doing 
something in apparent violation of CTBT rules. The Iraqi experience is a 
chilling reminder of the harassment potential of an international treaty where 
sensitive national strategic interests and sensitivities are involved. The CTBT 
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has an intrusive on-site inspection system and it is quite likely that the P-5 
powers will harass the non P-5 ones because the P-5 states have a common 
interest to check the non P-5 states. As permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, the P-5 states enjoy the veto and they possess nuclear weapons, they 
themselves cannot be harassed against their will.'^ * 
(iv) Article 14 of the CTBT concerns the requirements for the Entry into Force 
(EIF). The EIF clause requires that 44 states including all P-5 nuclear powers, 
as well as Israel, India and Pakistan must sign the treaty before it comes into 
force. The UK, Russia, China, Egypt, and Pakistan insisted on EIF. Russia, 
would not agree to the CTBT unless the PRC did, and the PRC would not agree 
until India did, and so on. The US military did not insist on this particular 
formula for EIF, but it faced a dilemma and it agreed eventually with the 
formula as it was finally adopted. 
These four major objections indicate that the critics of the treaty see it 
as a way to co-opt India into the non-proliferation regime. It is a control 
mechanism for those who are not members of the NPT. Indian critics of the 
CTBT, including ambassador A Ghosh and Indian prime minister I.K.Gujral, 
saw it as a way to comer India because Israel and Pakistan enjoy US and PRC 
strategic protection, respectively, and only India was exposed. Hence, India's 
hardened stance against the treaty during 1995-96 and the eventual refusal to 
agree to the concensus at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in June 
1996.'" 
Prafiil Bidwai and Achin Vanaik have found five main lines of 
criticism of the CTBT, in the Indian debate. (1) The CTBT was not linked to a 
time bound schedule for global nuclear disarmament as it should if it is to be 
acceptable (ii) The CTBT is discriminatory in character (iii) The CTBT is 
decisively flawed and rendered effectively worthless at least for the US and 
perhaps France and possibly for Britain, China, and Russia. This is because, in 
its present form, it allows sub critical testing, does not prevent advances in 
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computer simulation techniques that will setup a 'vital testing regime' or 
informational test ground and allows research and development of direct fusion 
weapons to continue through such institutions as the planned National Integrity 
Facility in the US and the laser Mega Joule Facility in France (iv) The CTBT is 
another building block, after the NPT, in the perpetuation and strengthening of 
'nuclear hegemony' practiced by the nuclear haves against the nuclear havenots 
led above all by the US (v) specific criticism of some provisions of the CTBT, 
most notably Article XIV.'" 
Though the analysts refuted all the lines of criticism and argued for 
unilateral Indian nuclear disarmament. Bidwai and the American disarmament 
lobby in India was vocal but it was isolated from the mainstream lobby in 
Indian intelligentia and the press.'^ '^  The unilateralists like Bidwai and Kanti. 
Bajpai could not make their case in India because their advocacy was not 
connected in an analytical way with the history of Indian security dilemmas.'^ ^ 
Consequences of the 1998 Nuclear Test 
On May 11 and 13, 1998 India conducted two sets of nuclear tests at 
the Pokhran test site.'^ ^ The Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, 
proclaimed that, "India was a nuclear weapon state". The tests included a 
fission device, a thermonuclear device and a low-yield device. Two days later, 
New Delhi declared that it had conducted two more tests, both alleged to have 
sub-kiloton yields. At a press conference on May 17, Rajagopala Chidambaran, 
Secretary of India's Department of Atomic Energy Commission, announced the 
yields of the first tests, as 12, 43 and 0.2 kilotons respectively. A.P.J. Abdul 
Kalam then, science advisor to the prime minister, claimed that these tests were 
critical for the authentication of India nuclear capability and its prospective 
modernization. He also said that the data from the tests could be used for 
'subcritical tests'. 
The Indian tests were followed by Pakistani tests on May 28 and 30, 
1998. These took place in the Chagai Hills region. The yields of the tests on 
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May 28 were stated to be, as claimed by Dr. A.Q. Khan, in the 30-35 kiloton 
range for one test and the other four were stated to be smaller yields suitable 
for tactical weapons.'^' The test on May 30 was in the 15 to 18 kilotons range 
according to the spokesman for the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission.'^ * 
These developments had a profound impact on the strategic template 
of South Asia. Consequently the various components of the US domestic 
structure, like the congress, the administration and various civil society groups 
geared-up to review US-South Asia policy. The general view was that South 
Asia had moved one step forward towards a new destabilizing arms race. In 
particular, India and Pakistan seemed to have become enmeshed in an action-
reaction pattern. The congress, in both the houses, recorded its condemnation 
of the developments in South Asia. The U.S. administration voiced similar 
concerns regarding the arms race in South Asia.'^' More importantly the White 
House slapped economic sanctions on South Asia while urging nuclear 
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restramt. 
As is evident from Congressional hearings and reports as well as the 
writings of the US analysts, the 1998 nuclear tests were seen as a threat to the 
global norm set 30 years ago with the signing of the NPT. From the US 
perspective, unless the violators of the Treaty are shown to suffer serious 
consequences, the norm will become a "paper tiger". '^' 185 countries now 
observe this norm, including 10 that once possessed nuclear weapons or even 
had nuclear weapons porogrammes, including Argentina, Brazil and South 
Africa.'^ ^ South Asia was seen as having acquired an overt nuclear capability 
and a missile capability as well. India was regarded as having instigated the 
assault on the NPT. Pakistan's moves were, by and large seen as contingent on 
India's moves.*'^  
The US government, especially congress and the Clinton 
Administration, debated the post - 1998 South Asian crisis extensively.'^ '* A 
renewed debate occurred within congress on the CTBT. The proponents of the 
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CTBT argued that the nuclear detonations in India and Pakistan made it all the 
more important than ever the United States should lead the world to defuse the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and they urged Senate 
ratification. 
The instruments advocated were, first signing the CTBT, while 
refraining from further nuclear weapons testing. Second, to sign FMCT and 
freeze the production of fissile material. Third the report, advocated, a 
willingness to participate in a broad based moratorium on producing fissile 
material. Fourth, not to transfer nuclear or missile technology or equipment to 
any third party and to abide by missile technology control regime (MTCR) 
guidelines. Finally, it was also suggested that India and Pakistan not deploy 
missiles with nuclear warheads or aircraft with nuclear bombs. 
Indian Justification for the Test 
The explosions in 1998 by India not only had powerful regional 
reverberations but also sent off shock waves throughout, much of the non-
proliferation communities in the United States and elsewhere. The long held 
concern about the dangers of the growth of new nuclear-armed states beyond 
the original five was resurrected. Renewed fears were expressed that other 
nuclear aspirants would escalate their programs.^ ^^ These fears were heightened 
when India's long-standing adversary, Pakistan followed suit on May 30, 
1998.'^ ^ 
India has successfully demonstrated its ability to explode a nuclear 
device in May 1974. To that extent, the five tests in 1998 only emphasized the 
continuity and growth of capability over the years. The tests were predictably 
strongly criticised by the international community, especially by the Nuclear 
Weapon States and their military allies protested by nuclear weapons even if 
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not legally nuclear. 
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Jasjit Singh, considered to be an expert in the field, put the central 
factors that pushed India towards overt nuclear weapons deterrence can be 
summarised broadly under seven heads (not necessarily in that order). ''^ 
(a) Historically, India has had to formulate its nuclear policy in the 
context of those of the nuclear weapon states with China as a central factor. 
India's policy from the beginning has had to cater for a fundamental 
competition with China, which undoubtedly possesses, by far the biggest 
strategic challenge. The basic points that comply with the first factor are: 
(i) China's aggression in 1962. 
(ii) Territorial dispute, China occupies, 48,000 sq.kms of Indian Territory 
and claims another 94,000 sq.km. 
(iii) The continuing inability of China to resolve the internal tensions 
related to Tibet and Xanjiang (on India's border) creates its own 
potential problems. 
(iv) Conventional and nuclear force modernization of China has been 
progressing at a fast pace. 
(v) China's position vis-a-vis India in Security Council. This power 
(economic, political and military) has been growing almost 
dramatically in the past two decades. 
(vi) Transfer of nuclear/missile systems and technology besides 
conventional arms to other countries of South Asia particularly to 
Pakistan, which continued after China acceded to the NPT in 1992, has 
been a source of serious concern for India. 
(vii) Over 96 per cent of China's nuclear forces and ballistic missiles have 
relevance only for its immediate neighbours. 
(b) Enhanced Nuclear Proliferation includes the following: 
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(i) N. Koera pursued a clandestine nuclear programme in violation of its 
treaty obligations and was seen to be rewarded with nuclear power 
reactors. Iran is suspected by the west of pursuing a nuclear weapons 
programme in spite of its NPT commitments. Saudi Arabia was also 
reportedly pursuing nuclear ambitions at one time. 
(ii) China and France violated solemn assurances to exercise the "utmost 
restraint" in nuclear testing to validate plans for new warheads. China, 
in fact, was cynical in carrying out a nuclear test within hours of 
giving this assurance (at the NPT Extension Conference), while France 
regressed from it earlier. 
(iii) Nuclear delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles, have been 
transferred by China and N. Korea to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
(iv) Pakistan attained success in making nuclear weapons by 1987. 
(v) China is the principal supplier of weapons of mass destruction and 
missile technology to the world, and US government's efforts to turn 
Beijing against international proliferation have met with little success. 
(vi) Information has now emerged in the United States that design data 
with reared to all seven types of sophisticated US nuclear weapons has 
been transferred over the years to China through espionage. 
(C) Eroding the process of disarmament is the permanent extension of 
NPT without firm commitment to disarmament by the NPT 
signatories: 
(d) Dominant strategic doctrines: The dominant strategic doctrines of the 
major powers mostly started to re-emphasis the role and likely use of 
nuclear weapons even in non-nuclear situations. 
(e) Post cold war international order: The post cold war strategic 
environment inevitably disturbed the earlier balance. 
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(f) Threat of nuclear option: The most critical impact of aggressive non-
proliferation (and counter proliferation) without disarmament during 
the 1990s came to pose an extremely serious threat to India's policy of 
keeping its nuclear option open. 
(g) The CTBT deadline: The negotiated draft of CTBT not only violated 
the original mandate of the 1993 UN General Assembly but, failed to 
address India's concerns. India therefore, indicated its unwillingness to 
sign the CTBT, but made it clear that it would not come in the way of 
the treaty coming into force. 
Not only has nuclear disarmament seen in India as the only 
comprehensive and durable non-proliferation instrument but also nuclear 
disarmament has been a key strategic and security goal for it 
US analysts speculated on the motives of India's nuclear ambitions 
soon after South Asia crossed the nuclear Rubicon in May 1998. India in 
particular pointed out its military security needs in relation to the build up by 
China as a factor. In addition China's transfer of the M-11 missiles to Pakistan 
and Islamabad's continuing support to Kashmin msurgents were cited by 
India as the main hurdles and stumbling blocks in the path for a meaningfiil and 
lasting peace in South Asia. 
272 
References 
1. V. Mamontov, Disarmament the Command of the Times, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p.5. 
2. The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1965, Office of Public 
Information, United Nations, New York, United Nations Publications, 
67-1.8, p.l. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid, p.2. 
5. Ibid., p. 3. 
6. John Steinbruner, Arms Control: Crisis of Compromise, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 63, No.5,1985, pp. 1036-49. 
7. Robert Jervis, Arms Control, Stability and Causes of War, Political 
Science Quarterly, 108, 2, 1993,pp. 239-53. 
8. Jr. S. Joseph, Arms Control after Cold War, Foreign Affairs, 65, 5, 
1989-90, pp. 42-46. 
9. Charles, C. Ploweshee, On Lending Arms Control Agreement, 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.l, pp. 199-214. 
10. Alexei. G. Abratov, Arms Limitation and the Situation in the Asian 
Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions, Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No.l 1, 1984, 
Nov, pp. 1108-16. 
11. Lewis A. Dunn, Chemical Weapon Arms Control: Hard Choices for the 
Bush Administration, Survival, Vol. 31, No.3, May-June 1989, pp. 209-
24. 
12. Abha Dixit, Middle East Peace Plan; Why Arms control needs Top 
Billing? Strategic Analysis, Vol. 15, No.7, Oct. 1992, pp. 625-42. 
13. K. Subrahmanyam, et al.. Struggle for Disarmament, Strategic Analysis, 
Vol. 6, Nos.1-2, April-May, 1982, pp. 1-160. 
273 
14. John W. Coffey, Arms Control Dialogue, Defence Analysis Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, No.3, Sept.;1987, New York, pp. 225-31. 
15. Jayant Prasad, Non Aligned view of Disarmament, IDSA Journal, 1691, 
1984, July-Sept, pp. 77-94. 
16. T.V.Paul, Influence Through Arms Transfers: Lessons from US-
Pakistan Relationship, Asian Survey California, Monthly Journal, Vol. 
32, No. 12, December, 1992, pp. 1078-92. 
17. P.M. Pasricha, India-Pakistan Nuclear Accord, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 
9, No. 12, March,1986, pp. 1217-27. 
18. S.P.P. Seth, Indo-Pak Nuclear Duct and the United States, Asian Survey, 
Vol. 28, No. 7, July, 1988, California, pp. 19-37. 
19. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Nuclear Diplomacy in South Asia During the 
1980s, Regional Studies, Cambridge Vol. 10, No.3, 1992, pp. 53-66. 
20. ORGA (Official Records of the General Assembly) Fourteenth Session, 
Annexes, Agenda item No. 70, Documents A/4218 and A/4219. 
21. Ibid.; Plennary Meetings, 799'*' meeting. 
22. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-65. op.cit-, pp. 78-79. 
23. ORGA, op.cit, 798"* meeting and annexes. Agenda item No. 70, 
Document A/c 1/820. 
24. Ibid., Document A/c 1/821. 
25. Ibid., First Committee, 1027'*' meeting. 
26. The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-65, op. cit., p. 84. 
27. ORGA, 13'*' Session, Annexes, Agenda item 64, 70 and 72, Document 
A/c 1/L206. 
28. ORGA, Fifteenth session. Annexes, Agenda items 67, 86, 69. 
29. Ibid., Plennary Meetings, 960'*' meeting. 
30. ORGA, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda item 19, Document 
A/4980/Add. l(A/c 1/L 297 and Add. 1-2) and First Committee, 1196"' 
meeting. 
274 
31. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965, op.cit., p. 192. 
32. /^»/^.,p. 193. 
33. Ibid., p. 194. 
34. Jean E. Krasno, The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a 
Global Society, Lynne printers, Boulder, London, 2004, p. 193. 
35. Ibid., p. 196. 
36. Ibid, p. \99. 
37. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I, 1972, SALT-II, 1979, 
and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 1991. 
38. JeanE. Krasno, o/?.c/V., p. 200. 
39. A radionuclide is a type of atom that exhibits radioactivity and can be 
monitored. Hydro acoustics is the use of quasi-continuous acoustical 
and optical measurements to monitor physical and biological entities 
under water. 
40. See the Full text of CTBTO, on http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ctbttreat. 
Html, also see Provisions of CTBT in the Appendix I. 
41. Jean E. Krasno, op.c//., p. 205. 
42. Ibid 
43. Ibid 
44. Joseph. Nogee, The Diplomacy of Disarmament, International 
Conciliation, New York, No. 526, January, 1960, pp. 281-82. 
45. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speech's, Government of India Publications 
Divisions, Delhi, 1964, Vol. 5, p. 204. 
46. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, Sept. 
1946-1961, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 
1961, p. 201. 
47. UN General Assembly, 11*^  Session, 12 Nov.,1956, p. 572 
275 
48. Govind Narain Srivastava, Non-Alignment and Nuclear Disarmament, 
Indian Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, New Delhi, 1985, p.l 1, 
49. Foreign Affairs Records, March,1961, p.50. 
50. UN- United Nations and Disarmament (1945-1965), New York, 1967, 
p. 165. 
51. 76/^., p. 193. 
52. UN-United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70, New York, 1970, p. 
267. 
53. K.K. Pathak, India and Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Journal 
of African and Asian Studies, New Delhi, Vol. 1, No.2, Spring 1968, p. 
189. 
54. Foreign Affairs Records, Vol. IX, No.7, July 1963, N. Delhi, p. 154. 
55. Year Book of United Nations 1964, p. 69. 
56. GAOR (General Assembly Official Records), First Committee Meeting, 
1567, 14May,1968,p. 12. 
57. Richard, J. Bamet, Violations of Disarmament Agreements, in; Richard 
J. Bamet & Richard A. Falk ed.. Security in Disarmament, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p. 157. 
58. Sumit Ganguly, Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998, in Raju 
G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta's cd.^India's Nuclear Security, Vistaar 
Publications, New Delhi, 2000, p. 40. 
59. Ibid., p. 41 
60. Ashok Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India's Nuclear Behaviour, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 94. 
61. For a discussion of Indias attempts to obtain a nuclear guarantee, see, 
A.G. Ncorani, India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee, Asian Survey 1, 
No.7, July, 1967, pp. 490-502. 
276 
62. B.L.Singh, Regional Power vs. Global Power in Arms Control: India 
America and Nuclear Affairs, India Quarterly, Vol. 35, Nos 1-4, Jan-
March,1979,p.355. 
63. Madhusudan Mishra, Bharatiya Janata Party and India's Foreign 
Policy, UPPAL publishing House, N. Delhi, 1997, p. 52. 
64. Govind Narain Srivastava, op. cit., p. 13. 
65. Asit Kumar Sen, International Relation's since World War I, S. Chand 
& Co. New Delhi, Sixth Ed,- 2000, pp. 650-51. 
66. Madhusudan Mishra, op.cit., p. 52. 
67. Foreign Affairs Records, January 1985, N. Delhi, p. 9. 
68. Resolutions passed in AICC Meeting held on 4^ & 5*^  May, 1985, in 
Delhi, AICC Publications, pp. 19-20. 
69. Organiser, 26 May, 1985, p. 1. 
70. Madhusadan Mishra, op. cit, p. 54. 
71. Satish Kumar ed; Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy, 1985-86, Sage 
Publications, N.Delhi, 1988, p. 61. 
72. Glebivashentsov, Nikolaikolstov, For a World without Nuclear 
Weapons and Violence, in, Leonid P. Vladimirov, ed; The Soviet -
Indian Phenomenon, Allied Publishers, N. Delhi, 1989, pp. 62-63. 
73. Alekseyev, Aleksanda, USSR-India: Cooperation for the benefit of the 
people. International Affairs, Vol. 5, Moscow May 1987, pp. 48-49. 
74. Satish Kumar (ed;) Year book on India's Foreign Policy 1990-91, Tata 
McGraw Hills,New Delhi, 1991, pp. 224-25. 
75. Such like views were highlighted mostly by American authors, see, Jr. 
Curtin winsor. The Non-proliferation Treaty: A step Towards Peace, 
Orbis Pennysylvania, Vol. XII, No. 4, Winter, 1969, p. 1004. 
76. Statement of M.C.Chagla in Lok Sabha, India Lok Sabha Debates, 1,27. 
March;1967, Columns 985-90. 
277 
77. Ibid. 
78. SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1968-69, 
Stockholm, 1969, p. 165. 
79. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 14, 12 March-26 March, 1968, Col. 
738. 
80. Ibid 
81. ENDC/PV. 370,27 February, 1968, p. 6. 
82. K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India, N. Delhi, 1980, p. 118. 
83. P.N. Chopra, Looking Towards Asia in the Twenty-First Century, India 
Quarterly, Vol. LVI, No's 3-4, July-December;2000, Indian Council of 
World Affairs, N. Delhi, p. 7. 
84. Ibid 
85. David V. Edwards, Arms Control in International Politics, N. York, 
1973, cited in ,B .M.Jain, South Asian Security, Problems and Prospects, 
Radiant Publishers, N.Delhi, 1985, p. 119. 
86. B.M.Jain, South Asian Security: Problems and Prospects, Radiant 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p. 119. 
87. A.D. Sakharov, Nuclear Energy and Freedom of the West, The Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists, June 1978, p. 51. 
88. /6/t/., pp. 122-23. 
89. Foreign Affairs Records, Vol. XIV, No. 5, N.Delhi, May, 1968, p. 117. 
90. Indian Representative's Speech in the Safeguards Committee of IAEA, 
IAEA Document Gov/Com. 22/2 19 June, 1970. 
91. Foreign Affairs Records, op cit., p. 117. 
92. Ibid.,p. lis. 
93. India, Lok Sabha Debates, Series, 4, Vol. 3, 31' ' May 1967, Cols. 
2164-8. 
278 
94. Ashwani Kumar Chopra, India's Policy on Disarmament, ABC 
Publishing House, N. Delhi, 1984, p. 116. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Times of India (New Delhi), 8 February, 1967. 
97. ENDC/Pv. 297. 22 May, 1967, p. 10. 
98. ENDC/Pv. 298,23 May,1967, pp. 10-12. 
99. Ibid. 
100. N. Sebhagri, The Bomb: Fallout, Vikas Publishing House, 1975, pp. 67 
&85. 
101. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on Short Fuse: Nuclear 
Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 92. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid.,'p. A3. 
104. Stephen. P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Oxford University Press, 
N.Delhi, 2001,p. 173. 
105. Ibid. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Rakesh Sood, The NPT and Beyond, Paper presented at a seminar on 
Non-Proliferation and Technology Transfer, University of 
Pennsylvania, October 3-6, 1993, pp. 1-20, cited in Raju, G.C. Thomas 
& Amit Gupta ed., India's Nuclear security. Vistaar Publications, New 
Delhi, 2000, p. 53. 
108. Lewis A. Dunn, High Noon for the NPT, Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, 
No.6, July-August,l 995, pp. 3-9. 
109. Aziz Haniffa, Arms for Pakistan Near Passage: India Hurt, India 
A broad, November 3, 1995, p.l2. 
279 
110. Elaine Sciolono, Despite Nuclear Fears, Senate Acts to Lift Pakistan 
Curbs, New York Times, September 22, 1995, p. 4. 
111. Major Sulakshan Mohan (Retd.), India's Nuclear Leap, Indian 
Publishers Distributors, Delhi, 2000, p. 150. 
112. /6/V/., pp. 153-60. 
113. /Z>/fi?., pp. 152-53. 
114. Ibid., p. 161. 
115. SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security, Oxford University Press, Stockholm (Sweden);2003, p. 587. 
116. Major Sulakshan Mohan, op. cit., p. 162. 
117. David Fischer, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and 
the Prospects, Routledge Publishers, London, 1992, p. 245. 
118. David Fischer, Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dartmonth Publications, Aldershot 
England, 1993, p. 149. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Shekhar Gosh, Super power Cooperation and Transit passage through 
Straits, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XX, No. 18, May 4, 1985, 
p. 807. 
121. J. Dhanapala, Fulfilling the Promises of the NPT: The CTBT and 
Beyond; Arms Control Today, May/June, 1996, p. 4. 
122. O.P. Goel, India and SAARC Engagements, Vol. 2, ISHA Books, Delhi, 
2004, p. 476. 
123. UN Documents DC 44 and Corr.l, 8 April 1954, Disarmament 
Commission, Official Records Supplement for April-May and June, 
1954, p. 1. 
124. GAOR, 37 Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr. 1) Para 14. 
125. UN-Disarmament Year Book. Vol. 19, 1994, p. 46. 
280 
126. T.T. Poulose, The United Nations, India and the Test Ban, India 
Quarterly, Vol. LIII, Nos. 1 and 2, January-June, 1997, p. 147. 
127. Ibid. 
128. Ibid., p. 148. 
129. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 187-203. 
130. The Statesman, Calcutta, August 20, 1996, p. 1. 
131. The CD has been working on the Text of CTBT Since January, 1994, 
The 38 member CD was expanded by another 23 members on June 17, 
1996. 
132. Craig Cemiello, India blocks concensus on CTBT: Treaty may still go 
to UN, Arms Control Today, Aug.,1996, p. 31. The Statesman, Calcutta, 
August 3, 1996, p. 1. The Asian Age, Calcutta, August 2, 1996, pp. 1-2. 
133. A.G. Noorani, CTBT and UN-I: The Australian Connection, The 
Statesman, Calcutta, Sept. 6,1996, p. 8. 
134. The Statesman, September 7, 1996, p. 7. 
135. Robecca Johnson, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hanging in the 
Balance, Arms Control Today, July, 1996, p. 4. 
136. The Statesman, Calcutta, September 11, 1996, p.l. 
137. Ibid., August 5, 1996, p. 7. 
138. Stephen. P. Cohen, op.cit., p. 174. 
139. Ibid., p. 175. 
140. Mahavir Prasad Modi, India's Peace Initiative and CTBT, in V.T. Patil, 
Nalini Kant Jha ed., India in a Turbulent World, South Asian 
Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, p. 286. 
141. Ibid. 
142. Ibid. 
143. /6zV/., pp. 286-87. 
144. Ibid., pp. 289. 
281 
145. http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ctbt_treaties.html 
146. Ashok Kapur, op. cit., p. 187. 
147. Mahavir Prasad Modi, op. cit., p. 290. 
148. Ashok Kapur, op.cit., p. 188. 
149. Stephen W. Young, A Test Ban Treaty that doesn't ban tests, BASIC 
Reports, (British-American Security Information Council) Washington 
D.C.,September27, 1996, pp. 1-2. 
150. K.K. Subrahmanyam, The CTBT Puzzle, Economic Times, Bombay, 
June 8, 1996, p.5. 
151. Tarun Basu, Nation Ignores Veiled Threats, Blocks CTBT, India 
Abroad, August 23, 1996, p. 4. 
152. Sanjay Suri, Chinese Test Seen Behind Indian CTBT Stand, India 
Abroad, August 23, 1996, p. 8. 
153. Major Sulakshan Mohan (Retd.), op.cit., p. 215. 
154. Ibid., p. 216. 
155. Ibid. 
156. Ibid. 
157. Amit Gupta, A nuclear arms control agenda for India, in, Raju G.C. 
Thomas and Amit Gupta eds. India Nuclear Security, Vistaar 
Publications, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 288-89. 
158. George H. Quester, On the lessons of South Asian Proliferation in D.R. 
Sardesai and Raju G.C. Thomas eds.. Nuclear India in the Twenty first 
Century, Palgrave, New York, 2002, p. 307. 
159. Ashok Kapur, op cit., p. 207. 
160. A. Kapur, Japanese Worries, Frontline, Vol. 16, No.7, March 27-April 
9,1999, Chennai, India, pp. 64-65. 
161. Ashok Kapur, op. cit., p. 208. 
162 Ibid., p. 209 
282 
163. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, op.cil, p. 303. 
164. Ashok Kapur, op.cit., p. 233. 
165. Ashok Kapur, Indian Strategy: The dilemmas about Enmities, the 
Nature of power and Pattern of Relations, in Y.K. Malik and A.Kapur, 
eds.; India: Fifty Years of Democracy and Development, ATH 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 341-72. 
166. Times of India, May 14,1998. 
167. Howard Diamond, India Conducts Nuclear Tests, Pakistan fallows Suit, 
Arms Control Today, Vol. 28, No.4, May, 1998, pp. 22-23. 
168. Ibid. 
169. Strobe Talbott, Dealing with Bomb in South Asia, Foreign Affairs 
Records, Vol. 78, No. 2, March-April,1999, pp. 116-17. 
170. Nucleonics Week, 10 June, 1999. 
171. Georg Bmm, Nuclear Test Violate International Norm, Arms Control 
Today, Vol. 28. No. 4, May, 1998, Washington, pp. 26-27. 
172. Waldo Stumph, South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme: From 
Detrrence to Dismantlement, Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10, 
Washington, December 1995/January 1996, pp. 3-8. 
173. SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 8 L82. 
174. US Congress, Senate, Hearings on Nuclear Tests in South Asia; 
Subcommittee on the near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee (Washington D.C. GPO, 1998), June 3, 
1998. 
175. Reports on an Independent Task Force, A US Policy towards India and 
Pakistan, The Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York, Council of Foreign Relations, 1998. 
176. Sumit Ganguly, op.cit., p. 37. 
283 
177. Neil Joeck, Nuclear Development in India and Pakistan, Asian Review, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, July,1999, pp. 1-51. 
178. Jasjit Singh, India's Nuclear Policy, in Major Sulakshan Mohan (Retd.) 
ed., India's Nuclear Leap, Indian Publishers, Delhi, 2000, p. 93. 
179. /6/c/., pp. 198-204. 
180. Russell Watson, An Explosion of Indian Self-Esteem, News Week, May 
25, 1998, pp. 31-32. 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since the nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, nations have been trying to put curbs on their use. The aim is to 
free the world from the scourge of the third world war which would be 
definitely, a nuclear one. There should be no doubt about the seriousness of 
these efforts. India, as a nation, has taken up the role of leading the nations 
in the pursuit of peace through disarmament and arms control. The struggle 
in which we are engaged in these times is worldwide, and the outcome of 
disarmament and arms control measures over the coming years would 
depend on many things. The outcome of such efforts would rest heavily on 
developments of the mind and spirit, and perhaps as much on decisions of 
the public policy. Yet, the idea of disarmament lost may mean a world lost. 
After the experience of the world war, few can deny the special significance 
of the challenge in the field of disarmaments. 
Man creates things, manipulates them and ultimately fails to exercise 
control over them. Ashoka innovated dharma, used it and was called 
Chakravartin. Delhi Sultans introduced Iqtadars and excelled for centuries. 
Mughals evolved Manasahdari and managed to rule India for what seemed 
to be ages. But when they failed to do so, they perished. Those factors that 
brought them to power and helped them to sustain it and flourish turned into 
the reasons for their decay and decline. 
The US hegemony began with the dropping of nuclear bomb on 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. This nuclear bomb was the cause of the 
'birth' of US as a world power. If things go the way they do at the moment, 
the same creation of US would have led to its demise. Success has a big 
problem. It detaches you from the masses and places you in isolation in an 
exclusive category. It gradually drives you away from reality. Reality never 
changes. It remains the same, success promotes double standards. It compels 
one to treat others as insects. 
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US made nuclear bomb and also the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
(NPT) to stop others from making n-bombs. Some thing that Shah Jahaii did 
to the architects of Taj Mahal after making the Taj. 
The NPT is designed to preserve the US monopoly over nuclear 
bomb. The implication for India was that on the one hand the NPT 
legitimized, China as NWS on the other hand it sought to prevent India from 
becoming a NWS. This is inimical to India's security. The treaty is limited 
in scope because it bans nuclear explosions but allows non-explosive 
nuclear testing. It would drive testing to the laboratories by those who have 
the resources to do so. The treaty does not address the question of subcritical 
testing and computer simulation. 
It has been stated that the P-5 have reached a secret informal 
understanding to confine the alternative high-tech non-explosive tests to 
themselves and to ensure that they are permanently on the Executive 
Council of the CTBT organization. It does not set a time frame for total 
global disarmament. 
The NPT is absolutely meant to serve the interests of the nuclear 
haves. It is an expression of monopolistic approach of USA and other 
nuclear powers. 
US must realize that history is about to repeat itself and only US can 
stop this cycle. This would, however, would not be easy. The NPT must be 
made rational, if it has to be universally iaccepted so is the case with CTBT. 
All those who have nuclear capabilities must be recognized without 
doubt, but if armaments are a right of a few then disarmament should also be 
applied equally. Either none should have it or everybody should be allowed 
to have them. We have seen that the nuclear capabilities of two rival parties 
have ensured balance of power and ultimately peace has continued to be 
restored. If this happens, we will survive and so will the US. Otherwise all 
will perish as it happened in the past, during the two world wars. 
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The vast stockpiles and tremendous buildup of arms and armed forces 
and competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to ^ '^hich 
scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose 
incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates 
international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions, exacerbates the 
differences between opposite military alliances, jeopardizes the security of 
all states, heightens the sense of insecurity among all states including the 
non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) and increases the threat of nuclear war. 
The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to 
efforts for the achievement and further relaxation of international tensions, 
to establish international relations based on peaceful co-existence and trust 
between all states and to develop broad international cooperation and 
understanding. The arms race impedes the realisation of the purposes and is 
incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
Organisation (UNO), especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-
intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state. 
One of the reasons for arms race is the legitimate right to security that 
exists for every state. The right is universal, it is the same for all and 
sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nation's Organisation (UNO). No 
state, weak or strong, rich or poor is ready to abdicate responsibility for its 
basic security. In short run goals, no nation can be asked to reduce its 
defences to levels below the threats it faces. But without arms control 
among nations in the long run, weapons will be piled on weapons, with a 
huge loss of security for all. 
In the existence of such harsh facts, security can no more be regarded 
as merely national security or even bloc security, new weapons have made 
security a question of human survival. Therefore, the issue of security 
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involves the questions of attitudes and perceptions, strategic doctrine, the 
technological impact, its vertical and horizontal aspects, its national, 
regional and international dimensions and its non-military extensions. 
The attitudes of the nations are ambivalent, sometimes they seek 
security by entering into alliances, and sometimes it is obtained by regional 
and widened economic and cultural cooperation and disarmament 
agreements. 
Possession of nuclear arms by a few states which are militarily 
significant gives currency to the notion that states which aspire to great 
power status need to acquire nuclear weapons. 
If attitudes can be changed, war can be prevented. Efforts must be 
aimed at all who directly or indirectly influence decision makers. 
Different strategic doctrines have been adopted at different times by 
each super-power to provide what is thought to be necessary to enhance and 
protect its national security. 
Whatever be the character of nuclear arms race, each super-power 
perceives that its national security depends heavily on nuclear weapon 
systems and on a continuous upgrading of the capability of those systems. 
SALT, far from being a step towards disarmament has served to strengthen 
the super-power conviction that deterrence must be based on a balance of 
terror. 
Medium level nuclear powers - China-UK and France besides 
meeting their requirements of national security are also led by the concern 
for national prestige. In case of France, there is the added desire to secure at 
the same time capability, which might provide a measure of independence 
from the US deterrent. Like the UK, France also sought to exert a certain 
influence on the use of that deterrent. 
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The example of NWS allow a justification for other states to acquire 
nuclear weapons. At the same time the technical and economic difficulties in 
going nuclear are gradually decreasing with time. 
Because of the existence of nuclear weapons, those states which do 
not possess them have chosen various means to shield themselves against 
the possibility of a nuclear attack - no-use assurance, nuclear umbrella 
nuclear weapons and regional security. Some countries seek their security 
within the framework of a military alliance, others through agreements on 
regional cooperation. 
In an alliance, the nuclear weapons of the super powers, offer an 
'umbrella' - either explicit or implicit - to allied countries and thus provide 
a deterrent against all forms of military attacks, conventional as well as 
nuclear. 
The question of the relationship between armaments and 
disarmament, on the one hand, and other aspects of social, economic and 
political development, on the other, has received all too little attention in the 
past. 
Both aspects of the problem need to be taken into account; on the one 
hand, the volume of resources consumed on the arms race, and the socially 
constructive uses to which they could be put; and on the other hand, the 
social, political, economic and institutional processes, both domestic and 
international, whereby changes in military policies affect the future course 
of development in other fields which are themselves affected by it. 
Disarmament on one hand, and development, on the other, which 
nations are committed to pursue vigorously, each in its own right, are in fact 
intimately linked. Research and development is one area where the 
misdirection of efforts is glaring. In this, as in other respects, vast resources, 
badly needed for development, are being consumed as countries make ever-
greater sacrifices for military purposes. 
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Conversely, substantial progress in the field of development is 
increasingly understood to be essential for the preservation of world peace 
and security. Genuine security caimot be assured by the accumulation of 
armaments. It can only be assured through disarmament, cooperation and the 
growth of exchange and inter-dependence in world of diminishing 
inequalities. 
Substantial progress in the field of disarmament would release 
internal material, financial and human resources, relax climate of fear, 
hostility and confrontation, remove some of the barriers now hampering 
international exchanges in general and the free circulation of raw materials 
and advanced technology in particular, would facilitate the free choice by 
each country of its particular path towards development and last but not the 
least, would present major savings in industrialised countries and would 
make possible substantial increases in development assistance. In fact, 
disarmament should be so designed that the close connection between 
disarmament and development gets full recognition. Purposes of part of the 
resources released, provisions to ensure that measures of armament 
limitation are so designed that they do not impede the transfer of technology 
for peaceful ends and other similar provisions must be an integral part of 
disarmament measures. It is evident that no scheme of global peace and 
disarmament can last unless it is linked to the creation of an equitable world 
economic order. Disarmament could and should serve the larger purpose of 
ameliorating the economic injustice and deprivation to which two thirds of 
mankind is subject today. Military spending is an impediment to economic 
growth. Arms race is an obstacle to the establishment of new international 
economic order. 
The maintenance of security is precarious as long as nations 
individually retain the capacity to wage war; the achievement of socio-
economic development is ethically requisite as long as nations have to 
shoulder the burden of enormous military spending. 
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Recognition of this fact has promoted the prolonged, complex and yet 
inconclusive search for disarmament negotiations. Even those who 
genuinely advocate and seek disarmament are not at all agreed on the nature 
of the problems they expect disarmament to solve. 
Seven critical issues have arisen persistently throughout the long 
struggle for disarmament. 
Disarmament - Security, which comes first? 
Political conditions for disarmament-
Total or partial disarmament? 
Who must disarm? 
Methods of limitation. 
Towards balanced and phased disarmament. 
In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful 
place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Its 
leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self reliance and freedom of 
thought and action, rejected the cold war paradigm whose shadows were 
already appearing on the horizon and instead of aligning themselves with 
either bloc, chose the difficult path of remaining unaligned. It is this 
initiative that laid the foundation for the achievement of 11 and 13 May 
1998 made possible by exemplary cooperation among the scientists from the 
department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development 
Organisation. This has required the building up of national strength through 
our own resources, our skills and creativity and the dedication of people. 
Among the earliest initiatives taken was the development of science and 
inculcation of the scientific spirit. 
Disarmament was then and continues to be a major plank in India's 
foreign policy now. It was, in essence, and remains still, the natural course 
for a country that had waged a unique struggle for independence on the basis 
of 'ahimsa' and 'satyagraha'. 
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But the development of nuclear technology transformed the nature of 
global security. A nuclear weapon free world would therefore, enhance not 
only India's security but also the security of all nations. This is the principal 
plank of India's nuclear policy. In the absence of universal and non-
discriminatory disarmament initiative, India cannot accept a regime that 
creates an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and havenots. 
In the 50s, nuclear weapons testing took place on the ground and the 
characteristic mushroom cloud becomes the visible symbol of the nuclear 
age. India then took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear weapon 
testing as the first step for ending the nuclear arms race. Addressing the Lok 
Sabha on 2 April 1954, shortly after a major hydrogen bomb test had been 
conducted. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "nuclear, chemical and 
biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass 
destruction!' He called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of 
nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear 
testing. The world had by then witnessed less than 65 tests. More than three 
decades passed and after over 2000 tests had been conducted, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996 following 
two and a half years of negotiations in which India had participated actively. 
In its final shape, this treaty left a lot to be desired. It was neither 
comprehensive nor was it related to disarmament, truthfiilly. 
In 1965, along with small groups of non-aligned countries, India had 
put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under 
which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals 
provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such 
weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was absent when the nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) emerged in 1968. 
At global level, there is no evidence yet on the part of the nuclear 
weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a 
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nuclear weapon free world. Instead, the NPT has been extended indefinitely 
and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the 
hands of the five countries that are also permanent members of the UN, 
Security Council. Some of these countries have doctrines that permit the 
first use of nuclear weapons; these countries are also engaged in 
programmes for modernisation of their nuclear arsenals. 
India's policies towards her neighbours and other countries too have 
not changed; India remains fully committed to the promotion of peace with 
stability, aims to resolve all outstanding issues through bilateral dialogue 
and negotiations. 
India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. 
It is not a conferment that it seeks; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is 
an endowment to the nation by her scientists and engineers. It is India's due, 
the right of one-sixth of humankind. India, mindful of its international 
obligations, shall not use these weapons to commit aggression or to mount 
threats against any country; here are weapons of self-defence and to ensure 
that in turn, India is also not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. 
India remains committed to the basic tenets of her foreign policy - a 
conviction that global elimination of nuclear weapons will enhance its 
security as well as that of the rest of the world. It will continue to urge 
countries, particularly other nuclear weapon states, to adopt measures that 
would contribute meaningfully to such an objective. 
A number of initiatives have been taken in the past. In 1978 India 
proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was followed by another 
initiative in 1982 calling for a nuclear freeze, prohibition on production of 
fissile materials for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. In 1988, 
India put forward an 'Action Plan' for phased elimination of all nuclear 
weapons with a specific time frame. It is her regret that these proposals did 
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not receive a positive response from other nuclear weapon states. Had their 
response been positive, India need not have gone for the current tests. This 
difference is the cornerstone of her nuclear doctrine. It is marked by 
restraint and one of the many efforts striving for the total elimination of all 
weapons of mass destruction. 
India has not violated any international agreement, neither in 1974, 
nor in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated 
her capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example. 
Subsequent to the tests, government has already stated that India will 
now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting 
underground nuclear tests. It has also indicated willingness to move towards 
a de-jure formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT 
are thus met; to refrain from undertaking nuclear test explosions. This 
voluntary declaration is intended to convey to the international community 
the seriousness of her intent for meaningful engagement. 
India has maintained effective export controls on nuclear materials as 
well as related technologies even though it is neither a party to the NPT nor 
a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Nonetheless, India is committed 
to non-proliferation and the maintaining of stringent export controls to 
ensure that there is no leakage. 
From the perspective of international stability, the problem is not that 
certain states simply possess nuclear weapons. The real danger is that they 
might abuse their nuclear capabilities to underpin aggressive policies vis-a-
vis their neighbours or perceived enemies. Countries with the irresponsible 
governments, that have managed to achieve nuclear status might even 
detonate a nuclear weapon, either intentionally or accidentally as a result of 
mishandling or due to lack of enough controls. 
The ideal solution to achieve nuclear stability in South Asia would be 
to lock China, India and Pakistan into a triangular nuclear agreement. The 
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reality on the ground however is still far from this ideal. Although there is 
no 'hot' dispute between India China, the fear in Delhi of being 
overwhelmed by a superior nuclear China is greater than the fear of nuclear 
instability with Pakistan. 
The prospects of peace and stability in Southern Asia are primarily 
dependent on ushering harmony into India-Pakistan ties. Apart from India 
and Pakistan, China has become another influential actor in Southern Asia, 
India and China have been able to mitigate the intensity of their adverse ties 
by initiating CBMs through the JWG and by promoting trade and commerce. 
However the India-Pakistan ties despite several attempts at seeking harmony 
in the past have been far from peaceful. The intractable question of Kashmir 
has proved to be the central cause for the on going disharmony between the 
two countries. 
In China's foreign policy calculations South Asia is a key region for 
the extension of its dominance and influence, it puts forward its claim over 
the region more strongly than the Soviet Union. Due to the absence of a 
collective regional approach, Chinese leaders were eager to transform the 
subcontinent into its sphere of influence. However, India's proclaimed role 
of a leader of the non-aligned world proved a deterrent to fulfilling its 
autonomous role in the region. 
Sino-US rapprochement was viewed by India as a dangerous factor to 
the strategic equilibrium of the region. The United States wanted to project 
China as a potential deterrent to the Soviet Union. One must not for get that 
China is now more concerned with the superpowers and its efforts and 
strategies are intrinsically directed at them to maximize its global as well as 
its regional interests. 
Thus, unless there is an identity of views between India and China in 
their policies towards South and South East Asia, there does not appear to be 
positive signs of reconciliation between the two countries on the border 
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question. Though the process of normalization has begun, it is bound to be a 
prolonged process 
China is eager to cultivate a special relationship with Nepal and 
Pakistan in order to promote its strategic and military interests. 
Ideologically, there is nothing common between these countries. On the 
other hand, China and Pakistan have two diametrically opposed, social and 
political systems. However the factors governing their relations are Sino-
Soviet hostility, Sino-Indian adverse relations and the Sino-American axis 
which seeks to contain Soviet influence in the region 
China is one of the main sources of military aid and assistance to 
Pakistan. Chinese aid to Pakistan began in the wake of persisting hostilities 
between India and China. 
US bilateral and multilateral aid is chiefly determined in accordance 
with its political expediency, strategic needs, policy choices, criteria and 
diplomatic goals in the structure of, super power relationship. Given this 
framework, the US has peripheral interests in the Maldives, Bhutan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal in order of priority. However, its chief 
concern is with India and Pakistan, although with divergent aims and 
objectives. 
US arms policy towards the subcontinent has given rise to the 
emergence of new initiatives so far as recent developments in Iran are 
concerned. There is also the possibility of a new kind of alliance amidst US, 
China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The security system of South Asia is also 
becoming serious. 
If Pakistan is transformed into a strategic base of a US-China, 
sponsored security framework for the subcontinent, India's security and its 
political affairs are bound to undergo a critical change. This dimension of 
US arms policy towards the subcontinent must be taken into consideration 
by Indian strategic and military planners. 
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The US must abandon its excessive military aid to Pakistan in its own 
interests and those of the subcontinent. 
If the United States does not exercise a restraint over the present 
regime of Pakistan and accelerates the arms race in the subcontinent, the 
whole region might be drawn into the theatre of war in view of the changed 
security scenario and the qualitative character of arms that both countries are 
acquiring from diverse sources. 
Thus, all South Asian countries except India have been supporting the 
UN proposals for de-nuclearisation of the sub-continent. New Delhi agrees 
that acceptance of the nuclear free zone concept is tantamount to granting 
legitimacy to the nuclear monopoly of the great powers. 
India argues that, given the internal dynamics of the region, if the 
nuclear free zone concept is accepted, it would intensify the security 
dependence of countries of the subcontinent on extra-regional powers which 
may gradually erode their politico-social institutions. 
The Indian Ocean has been the principal focus of great power rivalry, 
especially after the British withdrawal from the region. In its quest for a 
global balanced power in one's favour, each superpower is seriously 
engaged in deploying and increasing naval forces in the Indian Ocean. 
Geo-political compulsions propel India to evolve a viable Indian 
Ocean policy. Not only does India jet out like a dagger into the heart of the 
Indian Ocean but in turn is enclosed by its waters and also by four 
continents, Antarctica, Africa, Asia and Australia. 
India-China-Pakistan nuclear relationship may become dangerously 
unstable in a crisis involving any two of the three countries. There are three 
aspects of crisis instability that are worth noting here; the escalation of 
conventional hostilities to the nuclear level; the difficulties engendered by 
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India's two-front nuclear problem and the role of nuclear powers outside the 
triangle. 
Given these dangerous possibilities, what can and should India China 
and Pakistan do to invest in the stability of their nuclear relationships 
Broadly speaking, there are two lines of policy open to them; political 
initiatives to reduce tensions and encourage an enduring settlement of 
bilateral disputes, and arms control initiatives that stabilize the military 
relationship. These are complementary tracks and could be pursued, more or 
less, simultaneously. 
One argues that, though the measures listed here are eminently 
sensible, they are mostly unviable in the present strategic environment. On 
the other hand, there are other factors at work, which dampen instability and 
give the three countries time to come round to pursue a systematic political 
programme of arms control and risk reduction. 
Four factors are helping to maintain a certain degree of stability 
between India, China and Pakistan; 
• a recognition of the devasting costs of nuclear weapons use. 
• technological limits affecting the nuclear weapons programmes of all 
three countries. 
• the economic costs of nuclear weapons. 
• strategic restraint arising from the accords already in place between 
India and Pakistan, and India and China. 
It is, therefore, visualized that the politics of the sub-continent will 
have a compulsory and continuous impact on all nations of the region. 
APPENDIX 
PROVISIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 
TREATY 
As has become commonplace with multilateral arms control 
agreements, the CTBT is a lengthy and complex document, consisting of 
three components. The text of the treaty itself includes a preamble and 17 
articles. Integral to the treaty, the CTBT also contains two annexes and a 
protocol. A brief description of the articles, aimexes, and protocol follow. 
Preamble to the treaty : 
The preamble to the CTBT establishes the historic context of the 
treaty, defines the spirit behind the treaty and spells out what is intended by 
its entry into force and implementation. The most important element of the 
preamble is its declaration that it is the intention of the framers to use it as a 
means for achieving nuclear disarmament. It is their view that a ban on 
nuclear testing, by constraining improvements to existing nuclear weapons 
and ending the development of new weapons, will eventually result in 
disarmament. 
Article-I 
This article describes the core purposes of the treaty. It bars 
participating states from conducting "any nuclear weapon test explosion or 
any other nuclear explosion" at any place under its control. Further, 
participating states pledge not to encourage or participate in nuclear test 
explosions carried out by other states or in other jurisdictions. 
Article -II 
This provision establishes the treaty's implementing body, called the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The organization 
will consist of three elements. The Conference of States Parties includes 
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representatives of all the participating states and is responsible for directing 
the activities of the organization at the broadest level. The Executive 
Council includes the representatives of 51 of the participating states, which 
are chosen based on geographical distribution. The Executive Council, as its 
name implies, fulfills the executive functions of the organization. The 
Technical Secretariat is responsible for managing the monitoring activities 
included in later articles of the treaty and the protocol attached to treaty. 
Article - III 
Article III imposes a responsibility on states parties to devise ways to 
implement the treaty. These include adopting national legislation to outlaw 
the activities prohibited by the treaty and to establish an office in the 
national government to serve as a liaison with the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty Organization. 
Article - IV 
This provision establishes the verification regime. This regime 
includes: (1) an international monitoring system, which includes a variety of 
sensor systems for detecting nuclear explosions, (2) a procedure for 
resolving questions related to noncompliance with the treaty, (3) an on-site 
inspection process and (4) confidence-building measures to promote the 
sharing of information among states parties and the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty Organisation to resolve concerns related to noncompliance. 
The international monitoring system is quite elaborate. It includes for 
kinds of monitoring facilities to be located throughout the world. They 
include scismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound 
monitors. 
The procedure for resolving compliance problems is designed to 
allow resolution of claims of suspicious behaviour or noncompliance 
without resorting to an on-site inspection. The procedure would have the 
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Executive Council of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization play mediator between the state charging suspicious behaviour 
and the state being charged. 
The on-site inspection regime established in Article IV would be 
triggered by a state submitting a request for such an inspection on the 
territory of another state. The Executive Council can approve the request if 
30 of its 51 members vote for it. 
The confidence-building provision is designed to prevent 
misinterpretations of verification data arising from the non-nuclear activities 
of participating states, particularly chemical explosions. The provision 
encourages state parties to cooperate with each other and the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation to avoid such misinterpretations. 
Article - V 
This article establishes the enforcement mechanism. The failure by a 
state party to redress a compliance problem could result in the restriction or 
suspension of treaty rights for that state, the recommendation of "collective 
measures" by other states parties to the treaty, and in the most serious cases 
a referral to the United Nations for consideration. The specific types of 
collective measures that may be adopted or options for the United Nations 
are not defined in the treaty 
Article - VI 
Article VI creates a mechanism for settling disputes. This mechanism 
provides for the involvement of both the Executive Council and the 
Conference of States Parties to assist in the resolution of such disputes. 
Under certain circumstances the International Court of Justice, an arm of the 
U.N., established to mediate disputes among states on a full range of 
matters, could be called on to settle specific disputes over the meaning of 
treaty provisions. 
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Article - VII 
This provision establishes the procedure for amending the treaty. Any 
state that is a party to the treaty may propose an amendment. Such proposals 
are to be considered by formal amendment conferences, which may be 
convened if a majority of states agree. Amendments are adopted if a 
majority of the states vote in favour of it and no state objects. 
Article - VIII 
Article VIII authorizes the convening of review conferences to assess 
the effectiveness of the treaty at ten year intervals following entry into force. 
In the first such review conference, the question of allowing peaceful 
nuclear explosions will be addressed. The approval of such explosions 
would require a consensus of participating states. 
Article - IX 
This article declares that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It 
also establishes the procedure for a state to withdraw from the treaty. To 
withdraw, a state must describe how extraordinary events related to the 
treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests and provide other states parties 
six months notice before withdrawal. 
Article - X 
This provision states that the two annexes and the protocol are 
integral parts of tlie treaty. It means that the annexes and protocol, along 
with the text of the treaty itself, are considered a single agreement. 
Article - XI 
Article XI states that any state may sign the treaty before it enters into 
force. 
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Article XII 
This article describes the ratification procedure for the treaty. It 
allows each state to ratify the treaty in accordance with its constitution. 
Article - XIII 
This provision describes how any state that has not signed the treaty 
prior to entry into force may join at a later date. 
Article - XIV 
Article XIV sets the procedure for bringing the treaty into force. It 
states that the treaty shall become effective 180 days after the date that the 
last of 44 specifically identified countries has deposited its instrument of 
ratification, as long as it is not earlier than two years following the date the 
treaty was opened for signature. This article also calls for the convening of a 
conference to consider steps for accelerating the ratification process if the 
treaty has not entered into force by the end of a four year period following 
the date the treaty was opened for signature. Finally this article establishes 
the entry into force procedure for the countries that accede to its terms. For 
these states, entry into force will occur on the 30''' day following accession. 
Article - XV 
This provision prohibits reservations to the treaty. A reservation 
allows a country to declare a circumstance under which it will consider itself 
to be exempt firom a provision of a treaty, or even the treaty as a whole 
Article XV also prohibits reservations to the protocol to the treaty if they are 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Article - XVI 
This article designates the Secretary General of United Nations to 
serve as the depositary of the treaty. It means that he will receive treaty 
signatures, instruments of ratification and accession; and keep a record of 
which states are bound by the treaty, following its entry into force. 
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Article - XVII 
Article XVII allows for authentic texts of the treaty to appear in six 
languages. They are Arabic, Chinese English, French, Russian, and Spanish. 
Annex 1 
The first annex to the treaty consists of a list of countries divided into 
six regional groupings. It is to be used in allocating seats on the Executive 
Council of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, which 
is established by Article II of the treaty. Seats on the Executive Council are 
allocated according to a quota for each region. The purpose is to assure 
geographical balance in the Council's membership. 
Annex - 2 
The second annex to the treaty consists of a list of the 44 specific 
states that must deposit instruments of ratification to bring the treaty into 
force. The list includes, among others, the five declared nuclear powers (the 
U.S., China, France, Great Britain, and Russia), the three states that have 
nuclear weapons but are not recognized as nuclear powers (India, Israel, and 
Pakistan) and two states thought to be serious proliferation risks (Iran and 
North Korea). Together, the 44 states are all those that have significant 
nuclear facilities on their territories. If a single one of the 44 countries 
(North Koreas, for example) fails to ratify, then the treaty may not enter into 
force. 
The Protocol 
The protocol attached to the CTBT describes the international 
monitoring system and data center to detect nuclear test explosions 
worldwide and process the data collected by the system. This network of 
sensors and facilities includes 170 seismic stations, 80 radionuclide stations 
(with supporting laboratories), II hydroacoustic stations, 60 infrasound 
stations and an international data processing center. The protocol describes 
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how these facilities will be managed, both individually and collectively, to 
fulfill the verification requirements of the treaty established by Article IV. 
Further, the protocol defines the specific terms for the conduct of the on-site 
inspections and confidence-building measures, also established by Article 
IV of the treaty. Finally, the protocol contains two annexes. Annex I 
provides the precise location of the facilities described in the protocol. 
Annex II describes the parameters that international data center technicians 
will use to read the data and determine whether "an event" recorded by the 
sensors is likely to be a nuclear test explosion. This list of parameters is not 
exhaustive and leaves room for individual judgements by international data 
center technicians. 
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